A new Arab alliance system: causes of the Iraq-Iran war and the reaction of various Arab states by O'Donnell, Robert Bernard
A NEW ARAB ALLIANCE SYSTEM: CAUSES
OF THE IRAQ- IRAN WAR AND THE
















Th asis Advisor: R. H. Magnus










2. OOVT ACCESSION NO J RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (end SubtltU)
A New Arab Alliance System: Causes of
the Iraq-Iran War and the Reaction of
Various Arab States
S. TYRE OF REPORT A RER1O0 COVERED
Master's thesis;
June 19 81
• PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR^
Robert Bernard O'Donnell
• . CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf .
t. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
io. program element, project, task
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS. NUMBER OF PAGES
185
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME * AOORESS<<( different trorn Controlling Otilc*) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thla rib-on)
Unclassified
tla. DCCLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (o< thit Kepert)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol tho ebatrmct entered In Block 20, II dlllatent from Report)
It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES





20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae tide If neceaaawy end. Identity »r block number)
This thesis examines the current conflict between Iraq and Iran
and looks at the causes, both stated and unstated offering an
opinion as to the real causes of the war.
Secondly the thesis examines the Arab Nation and the reaction of
several of the states of that nation to the war in an attempt to
lay out why certain states support Arab Iraq or Persian Iran. Also
included is a look at the impact of the war on the options available




EDITION OP t NOV SB IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 660 i | TTNCT.ASSTFTED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dmta Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED
(euwrv cl*hi»'C>tiqh a* t»h »><if»*«» f>«i« ggwggj
#20 - ABSTRACT - (CONTINUED)
The thesis concludes with a look at the interworking of the
various factors and stimuli to determine if a new Arab alliance
will result from the war, and to state who will be the real
winner of the war.
Form 1473 UNCLASSIFIED
Jan .3
0102-014-6601 * hcu«i»» cl»mi»i«»tioi o' T »*i» ^»oi^«« otu i«-.«<i

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited,
A New Arab Alliance System:
Causes of the Iraq-Iran War and
the Reaction of Various Arab States
by
Robert Bernard o'Donnell
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A. , Villanova University, 1969
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This thesis examines the current conflict between Iraq
and Iran and looks at the causes, both stated and unstated
offering an opinion as to the real causes of the war.
Secondly the thesis examines the Arab Nation and the
reaction of several of the states of that nation to the
war in an attempt to lay out why certain states support Arab
Iraq or Persian Iran. Also included is a look at the impact
of the war on the options available to the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
The thesis concludes with a look at the interworking of
the various factors and stimuli to determine if a new Arab
alliance will result from the war, and to state who will be
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is written in two parts. First it examines
the causes of the current war between Iraq and Iran, differ-
entiating between stated causes, the Shatt-al-Arab, and the
Gulf Islands, and the unstated causes, the Islamic split
between Sunnism and Shiism, the personal feud between Saddam
Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini, the goal of Iraq to lead
the Arab Nation, and the goal of Iran to lead the Islamic
World. It then offers an opinion as to which cuases are the
real causes of the war and offers an explanation as to why
one set is more important than another.
Secondly the thesis examines the reaction of certain Arab
states to the war by way of looking at the historical factors
which might bear on the question of unity or disunity, reli-
gion, ethnic factors, Ottoman domination, British treachery,
the League of Arab States, Nasser, and Arab/Muslim identity
problems. The reaction of five Arab states (Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Libya) to the war are then examined
in the light of the causes of the war and inter-Arab rivalry.
Finally the thesis seeks to tie the various reactions
of the Arab states together in an encapsulated form for show-
ing the interworkings of the various factors and stimuli, to
determine whether or not there is a new Arab Alliance because
of the war; and to state without equivocation who the real







The Shatt-al-Arab is formed by the juncture of the
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, extending from Qurna at the junc-
tion of the rivers to Fao on the Arabian Gulf (or Persian
Gulf) . The Shatt-al-Arab is navigable, however, only in its
lower reach, from Basrah to Fao. The total length of the
Shatt-al-Arab is approximately 120 miles, with an average
width of 600 yards, although at some points it widens to a
mile. The Iraqi-Iranian border extends some 85 miles along
the river. The river is Iraq's only access to the sea for
large commercial vessels (i.e., oil tankers) and handles a
considerable amount of shipping and trade.
2 History of the Border Dispute
The issue of the Iraqi-Iranian border dispute goes
back into history a century or more. What is present-day
Iraq became part of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of
Sultan Salim I (1512-20) , and from that time the boundary
question has been a recurrent issue between the Ottoman
Sultans and the Persian Shahs. Iraq inherited the border
dispute from the Ottoman Empire.
Before 1847, the Shatt-al-Arab was an inland river
running through Ottoman territory and the land on both banks
of the river was under Ottoman sovereignty. Sir Henry Layard,
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a member of the Joint Mediation Commission, so stated in
his book which was offered by the governments of the United
Kingdom and Tsarist Russia to the Ottoman and Persian Empires
in preliminary negotiations to the 1847 Treaty of Erzerum.
The Treaty of Ezerum of 31 May 1847, which consisted
of nine articles, was the basis for settlement of the border
dispute between the Persian and Ottoman Empires. In an ef-
fort to end the dispute, the weakening Ottoman Empire formally
ceded to the Persian Empire the city and port of Khoramshar
the island of Abadan, the anchorage and land on the eastern
(left) bank of the Shatt-al-Arab. Freedom of navigation for
Persian vessels on the Shatt-al-Arab was granted. Negotia-
tions for settling all boundary issues were conducted under
3
the mediation of two Great Powers, Britain and Russia. Sir
Henry Layard wrote:
the principal matters in dispute were certain
parts of the frontier between the two states.
Persia claimed the left bank of the Shatt-al-
Arab or united waters of the Tigris and
Euphrates, from about sixty miles of their
junction with the Persian Gulf. ...the re-
sult of my examination of the evidence and
maps furnished me was that the claims of
Turkey to the left bank of the Shatt-al-
Arab and to Khoramshar were well founded.
Persia had never exercised more than a




The demarcation of boundaries resulting from the
treaty which was to have taken place immediately was delayed
three times by wars in Europe. The Protocol of Tehran was
signed by Persia and the Ottoman Empire on 21 December 1911.
The Protocol concluded with the aim of avoiding any controversy

in respect to the Ottoman Persian frontier. This Protocol
provided the base for negotiations and the procedure for the
delimination of the frontier. It also provided for the
establishment of a commission to meet in Constantinople,
entrusted with the task of delimiting the border. The work
of the commission was based on the clauses of the Treaty of
Erzerum. The Protocol also provided that in the case of
divergent views on any issue the questions should be sub-
mitted to the Court of Arbitration at the Hague.
The Joint Commission met in Tehran in 1912 but made
no substantial progress
.
On 4 November 1913, the Constantinople Protocol
concluded among the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Great Britain
and Russia, with the latter two governments again acting
as mediators. This Protocol provided for the establishment
of a Delimitation Commission consisting of representatives
of the four governments. This Commission finished its work
in 1914, and delimited the border so that the sovereignty
of the Ottoman Empire extended over all the Shatt-al-Arab
with the border fixed on the eastern bank of the river.
Iran was given the port of Khonamshahr and some islands in
7the river.
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War
I, and the emergence of Iraq, Iran's attitude toward the 1914
Protocol shifted. Iraq, as a successor state to the Ottoman
Empire, inherited the international frontier fixed in accord-
ance with the Delimitation Commission of 1914. Iran, however,
10

as seen through Iraqi eyes, disregarded and violated the
internationally recognized border, justifying its attitude on
the grounds that it did not recognize the validity of agree-
ments and protocols previously concluded between Persia and
the now literally defunct Ottoman Empire. The perceived
persistent violations of Iraqi borders reached a breaking
point in 1934, when Iraq submitted a formal complaint to the
gLeague of Nations.
The League was requested by Iraq to take up the issue
of the Iraqi-Iranian border in view of Iran's allegedly numer-
our boundary violations. These violations were grouped under
three categories: illegal interference with Shatt-al-Arab
navigation; territorial expansion; and the diversion of the
Gunjan Cham waters.
According to Iraq, the violations relating to the
Shatt-al-Arab consisted of Iranian gunboat interference with
normal shipping activities; disregard of the rules and bylaws
of the port of Basrah; blocking the one-way dredged Rooka
Channel; and rash seamanship. These violations, again ac-
cording to the Iraqis, threatened to block the river and
9bring the whole of Iraq's seaborne trade to a standstill.
Iraq relied heavily on the Treaty of Erzerum and the
1913 Constantinople Protocol when presenting its case to the
League. Iran, on the other hand, argued that neither the
Erzerum Treaty, nor the 1913 Protocol, held any binding




The League was unable to solve the dispute and re-
commended that both parties enter into bilateral discussions
to negotiate an equitable solution. Direct negotiations
were held by Iraq and Iran from 1935 to 1937. The main
Iranian position was set down by the Shah when he stated,
"he wanted nothing from Iraq more than the deepest line of
the river in front of Abadan. " Iraq finally agreed to this
demand and a boundary was finally concluded on 4 July 1937.
Under this treaty and attached protocols, Iran, aside from
extending her soveriegnty over the part of the Shatt-al-
Arab in front of Abadan, consolidated several gains.
First, Iran gained treaty possession of the city
and port of Khorramshahr, Abadan, the anchorage and land on
the east bank of the river, all of which were, prior to 1847,
part of the Ottoman Empire and Iraq. Secondly, Iran, in the
Treaty of 19 37, pushed the boundary line from the low water
mark to the "Thalweg" (middle) of the river for a distance
of five miles opposite Abadan. This was the gain referred
to by Shah Reza Pahlevi in his main statement regarding Iran's
. . 12
negotiating position on the 1937 Treaty.
From 1937 until 1969 the Treaty stood in effect as
the delineating document concerning the border and the Shatt-
al-Arab. Problems surrounding the border, however, did not
disappear. Iraq claimed that the 19 37 Treaty was signed
only under severe pressure from Britain which ultimately
forced Iraq to accede to the Shah's demands. Iraq further
12

claimed that Iran repeatedly violated the border (the claimed
violations were similar to those prior to 1934). Iran, on
the other hand, claimed that it also succumbed to British
pressure in 19 37 and that the Treaty was forced upon it and
was a colonial relic. Furthermore, Iran claimed that Iraq
failed to live up to its obligations under the 1937 Treaty,
vis-a-vis navigational maintenance, collection of dues, and
dredging and that the Shatt-al-Arab was a boundary river not
13
an island river as Iraq claimed.
The Treaty of 1937 must also be looked at in the light
of Riza Shah's regional goals at the time. The Saadabad Pact
between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan was signed on
8 July 193 7, four days after the signing of the Shatt-al-
Arab Treaty of 1937. It would seem that Iran may have been
most interested in affecting the Saadabad Non-Agression Pact
and sublimated its interests in the Shatt-al-Arab (which was
a stumbling block to the Saadabad Pact) for the greater good
of a regional effort to establish friendly relations with
the new neighboring states of the area.
On July 17, 1968, the Ba'ath party of Iraq, again in
conjunction with the military, executed its second coup in
14little more than five years. Since the downfall of the
Iraqi monarchy in July, 1958 and the proclamation of a
Republic by Abd al-Karim Kassem, the relationship between
monarchical Iran and republican Iraq was significantly damaged
This was due to the fact that Kassem, under severe Arab pres-
sure, departed from the "Baghdad Pact" between Iraq, Turkey,
13

Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain. Kassem departed from the
pro-Western orientation of the "Baghdad Pact" states and
adopted an apparent pro-Soviet policy and sharply criticized
the Western policy toward the Middle East. This trend toward
Soviet orientation was increasingly perceived by the Shah
as a threat to Iran. Kassem, only a short time after he came
to power, proclaimed his territorial desires to Kuwait, which,
he claimed, was part of Iraq and he supported various nation-
alistic elements in Arabistan (Khuzistan) , the southern, oil
rich, part of Iran.
Kassem' s successors continued to support the elements
in Arabistan and in 1965, border conflicts erupted between
the two states, while quite frequently the Iraqis interrupted
the shipping of Iranian tankers through the Shatt-al-Arab
.
The Iraqis, contrary to the Treaty of 1937, claimed that the
whole river of the Shatt-al-Arab was located within Iraqi
territory, was an Iraqi inland river and that Iranian navi-
gation of it was an illegal act. The Shah's regime, whose
position it was that the Shatt-al-Arab was a boundary river,
demanded that the border be in the center of the Shatt-al-Arab
The Ba'ath Regime of Hassan al-Bakr was beset by
internal problems and preoccupied with consolidating its posi-
tion of power. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi took advantage of the
weakness of Iraq and in 19 69 abrogated the 19 37 Treaty and
presented Iraq with a fait accompli in the area. Iranian
gunboats supported by Iranian aircraft accompanied Iranian
ships which crossed through the Shatt-al-Arab without the
14

Iraqi flag flying. Iraq did not and could not (because of
Iran's overwhelming military superiority) militarily contest
Iran's actions.
3. The Kurdish Card
In addition to its predominant military position vis-
a-vis Iraq, Iran also had another "card" to play in this
border dispute. Iraq, Iran and Turkey all have a sizable
minority of Kurdish peoples within their borders. This tri-
bal group of peoples is culturally and ethnically homogenous
and has for many centuries sought to establish an autonomous
Kurdish state. The Kurds of today vary from highly nonradi-
cal tribal groups to settled town life. The Kurds are organ-
ized in a tight system of kinship, binding together large
units of several hundred households, which band together to
form tribes. Despite the close kinship alliances there is
no consistent hierarchy among kin, and power rivalries often
lead to violence. The second most important element of
homogeneity is the Kurdish language itself.
The Kurdish tribes are aggressive and warlike. For-
merly frequent raiders of caravans and villages, today's
Kurds have transferred their enmity to a sometimes fierce
struggle for freedom from their Arab, Persian, and Turkish
overlords.
In Iraq the Kurds represent by far the largest non-
Arab ethnic minority accounting for approximately 18 percent
of the population, some two million souls. Predominantly
Sunni, they inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys of
15

northern and northeastern Iraq (i.e., the oil producing
region). Since the early 1960's the urban Kurdish areas
have grown rapidly. Kurdish migration was prompted by the
escalating armed conflict with central authorities in Baghdad,
the destruction of villages by bombing, and such natural
disasters as the severe draught in the 1958-61 period.
In Iran reside approximately 3.5 million Kurds. They
are one of the largest ethnic groups in the country, numbering
about one-tenth of the population. The Kurds are related to
the Persians by their language and ethnic origins. The Kurds
differ from the Persians in their social organization and
their form of Islam. The Kurds in Iran also follow the Sunni
branch of Islam. However, a number of Kurdish tribal leaders
profess Shi'a Islam, which is more useful to them politically.
Many Kurds have migrated to towns and cities to increase
their opportunities for employment and education.
Attempts at Kurdish autonomy occurred twice in the
1900" s. In 1919 a Kurdish chief, Ismail Aga, led an unsuccess-
ful rebellion. During World War II the short-lived Kurdish
Republic of Mahabad came into existence. In late 194 6 the
movement was quelled by the Iranian army, and twenty of the
leaders were hanged in Mahabad.
Fierce and unrelenting fighters, the Kurds have and
are still being used by sovereign nations to create distur-
bances in each other's countries. It is this "Kurdish card"
that the Shah played in his border dispute with Iraq. The
Kurds, led by Mustafa Barazani, began their rebellion in
16

September 19 61 and demanded autonomous rule in the northern
part of Iraq. Iranian support for the Kurds enabled them
to go on fighting for a long period of time, causing the
Iraqis heavy casualties (est. 60,000). Additionally, Iraq
was compelled to divert much of its economic and military
resources to fighting the Kurds allowing the Shah free hand
in consolidating his claims on the Shatt-al-Arab. Due to
its internal weakness, the Ba'ath regime in Iraq could not
both fight the Kurdish secessionists and contest the Shatt-
al-Arab simultaneously. After a period of some four years
the Ba'athist regime was powerful enough to begin to quell
the Kurdish rebellion. Iran, at this stage, could not sus-
tain the Kurds merely by financial and military support and
realized that it would have to send some of its own units to
fight alongside the Kurds against Iraqi forces. This was an
escalatory step that could have easily led to a war between
Iraq and Iran. An Iraqi-Iranian war would have meant, in
addition to the heavy human and material losses of both
sides, the shelling of each other's oil wells. In a speech
at the conference of Arab popular organizations held in
solidarity with Iraq in Baghdad in February 1975, Saddam
Hussein hinted at this when he declared, "Oil is a very
17flammable material." Additionally, the war might have
caused (1) the closing of the Gulf; (2) the involvement of
other Arabs in the conflict; and (3) the possible involvement
of Israel. Furthermore the Shah realized that the establish-
ment of an autonomous Kurdish state in Iraq (a possible outcome
17

of continued Kurdish insurgency) would in the long run lead
to greater problems with Iran's handling of its own sizable
Kurdish minority.
The growing seriousness of the situation led to media-
tion efforts by King Hussein of Jordan, President Sadat of
Egypt, and Algerian President Boumedienne. These efforts
succeeded, and on 6 March 1975, Saddam Hussein and the Shah
signed an agreement which benefitted both sides (Appendix A)
.
For Iran, the agreement meant (1) Iraq's acceptance of the
demands that the boundaries between the two countries in the
Shatt-al-Arab along the Thalweg (middle) line; (2) an end to
Iraqi aid to Iranian dissidents and Arab and Baluch secession-
ists. For Iraq the agreement meant (1) the withdrawal of
Iran's backing of Kurdish forces and the cut-off of aid to
them, thus ending the drain of Iraqi resources; (2) upholding
1
8
the status quo concerning the land frontiers.
4 . The Abrogation of the 19 75 Treaty
Both Iraq and Iran had agreed to a settlement of the
border dispute in order to enhance their respective national
and regional security positions and interests. But the
lingering concern of Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab again came
to the fore with the fall of the Shah, the rise of the Islamic
movement in Iran and the attendant emasculation of Iran's
security forces.
With only some fifty miles of coastline on the Gulf,
and almost all of it unusable for shipping, Iraq must depend
on its main port Basrah which is nearly 100 miles up the

Shatt-al-Arab from the Gulf. Even in the best of times
19
Basrah suffers from a three-month cargo bottleneck. Further-
more, the Iraqi naval base of Umm Qasr is situated on the
border with Kuwait and is only accessible to the sea by
means of a narrow passage. Umm Qasr does not offer a channel
of sufficient depth for other than shallow-draft military type
vessels. The entrance to the Shatt estuary itself is commanded
by Iranian Naval posts and artillery around Abadan island.
Viewed through Iraqi eyes, the Shatt-al-Arab is eminently
vulnerable to hostile forces. Iraq is the only OPEC member
whose oil exports cannot reach the outside world without
either crossing foreign territory in the north (the pipeline
to Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey) or without coming so close to
Iranian territory in the south. In effect Iraq does not en-
joy a strong position of security for its most important ex-
port, oil. Iraq therefore suffers from a strategic necessity
to maintain good relations with its neighbors in order to
ensure the continued flow of its oil to world markets.
In February 1979 Iraq through its strongman, Saddam
Hussein, officially welcomed the Khomeini revolution and de-
clared that Iraq had no interests in Iran and fully supported
20the Iranian people's choice of new leadership. The Ayatollah
Khomeini answered Saddam Hussein and expressed Iran's wish to
establish cordial relations with all Arab states particularly
21those in the Gulf and Iraq. Public statements aside, Iraq
was apprehensive with Khomeini's rise. While not unknown to
Iraq (Khomeini had lived in exile in Iraq for some fourteen
19

years), Khomeini's revolution concerned Iraq Ba'athist non-
sectarian leaders for several reasons.
Iraq feared growing unrest within the Shi ' a community
in Iraq resulting from a spillover of Islamic fervor from
Iran (more than half of the Iraqi total population is Shi ' a)
.
Additionally, Iraq feared a resurgence of the Kurdish rebellion,
since it was not sure the position Teheran's new leaders
would take on this issue, and a strengthening of leftist powers
in Iran, which would lead to a direct danger from pro-communist
forces, who Saddam Hussein had been taking great pains to
neutralize and eliminate in his own country. Furthermore a
fragmented Iran might invite a superpower intervention and
confrontation in the region.
Iraq, possibly sensing an advantage in its bilateral
relations with Iran, began applying pressure even before the
fall of the Shah, when in December 1978 it called for an
amendment to the 197 5 Algiers agreement on the Shatt-al-Arab
and the restoration of the three Gulf islands (Abu Moussa,
Big Tumb, and Little Tumb) to Arab control. These islands are
secondary factors in the dispute between Iraq and Iran but
an important propaganda tool for Iraq in marshalling allies
on an Arab ideological plane. In light of that, some his-




B. ABU MOUSSA, GREAT AND LITTLE TUMB ISLANDS
1 . History of the Dispute
The three islands are situated in the Gulf some 30
to 50 miles south-southeast of the Iranian port of Bandar-
e Lengh. The dispute is actually related to an old and com-
plex one that pitted Iran against Great Britain, first of
all, as protector of the emirates of the Trucial coast (today
the United Arab Emirates) and against the emirates themselves
after they constituted a federation amongst themselves and
acceded to full independence in 19 71. The United Arab Emi-
rates became independent on 2 December 1971 and were admitted
to the United Nations on 9 December 1971. A few days earlier
on 30 November, the Iranian army had invaded and occupied the
two Tumb islands, which were in the possession of the emir of
Ras-el-Kheyma, and took possession of the island of Abu Moussa,
but in this case with the agreement of the emir of Sharja.
These islands occupy a surface area of less than 10 square
kilometers and are inhabited by less than 1,000 souls.
Until 1887 these islands undisputedly belonged to the
sheik of Lengh. While the sheik of Lengh belonged to the
same tribe as those of Ras-al-Kheymah (the Jowasimis) , he
was nevertheless a vassal of the Shah of Iran. It has however
been claimed that the sheik of Lengh administered these is-
lands not as a subject of the Iranian government but rather
as a member of the Jowasimis tribe. This position, defended
by the British government from 1887 on, is nevertheless con-
troverted by all the official maps of Her Majesty's government
21

and the reports by the India officer residents who had re-
sponsibilities in the region. In particular, a map prepared
in 1887 by the Intelligence Department sent to Tehran by the
British minister on 22 July 1888 on behalf of the Queen, for
the information of the Shah showed the islands in Iranian
colors. Already in 1836, the Queen's political resident had
established in the Gulf a "restrictive line" which passed
below the islands in question and which the warships of the
sheiks of the Trucial coast were forbidden to cross.
That the sheiks of Lengh were subject to the Iranian
government and not to the sheiks of the Arab coast is attested
to by the fact that when the British undertook, in 1819, a
punitive operation against the sheiks of the Arab coast of
what was then called the "Pirates' coast," the Persian govern-
ment maintained its protection of the sheiks of Lengh and in
1822 obtained from the British government payment for the
22damage done to their ships. Furthermore the sheik of Lengh
did not sign any of the treaties forming the basis of the
relations of the sheiks of the Trucial coast among themselves
or with Great Britain. The sheiks of Lengh, appointed as
governors by the Persian central government and paying tribute
to it, were on several occasions chosen as arbiters in con-
flicts between those of Ras-al-Kheymah and those of Abu-Dhabi
which would not have been possible if Lengh was subject to
Ras-al-Kheymah.
On the other hand, examination of the acts of private
management on the islands reveals a more confused situation,
22

for private titles are evoked on both one side and the other.
Nevertheless, they could not be of such a nature as to injure
24
the territorial limits of a sovereign state. Since they
could not invoke historical titles in favor of the sovereign-
ty of the sheiks of the Arab Coast, the British fell back on
25
a pretense of prescription, which was supposed to have
begun in 1887. After this date, in effect, the British, who
ensured the protection of the emirates, pushed them to carry
out acts of sovereignty over the islands, such as planting a
flag, or carried out projects themselves, such as the erection
26
of a lighthouse in 1912. For prescription to be invoked,
it also has to be peaceful, uninterrupted and undisputed.
But Iran has, ever since 1888, stopped protesting, on many
occasions, against the British or Arab occupation of the
islands in question. What is more, every time the Iranian
government wished to exercise its sovereign rights over the
islands, it was subjected by the British government to threats
27
of use of force. It follows from the preceding that the
Iranian claims were not without foundation when they stated
that the islands were part of Iranian territory until 1887
and that the taking of possession of them by the sheiks of
the Trucial coast at the instigation and with the assistance
of the British government, despite Iran's repeated protests,
was not of such a nature as to enable the sheiks to win, by




The seriousness of the Iranian claim was undoubtedly
not the only reason that led the British government, at the
time of its withdrawal from the region, to come to an under-
standing with Iran. In the view of the West, the Shah's
government was capable of taking up effectively the role of
29policeman of the region. With Iran concomitantly renouncing
its claims on Bahrain, the British gave their blessing to
the agreement between Iran and the emir of Sharja, as well
as to the occupation of the Tumb islands. For Iran, it was
a matter of putting an end to the British colonialization
and ensuring a return to the territorial integrity of the
30
empire.
Iraq has used the seizure of these islands as a
rallying point in order to muster the support of other Arab
states on this "Arab" issue. Just as Iraq claims the left
(eastern) bank of the Shatt-al-Arab and the province of
Khuzistan (Arabistan) to be "Arab" issues, so too Iraq seeks
to legitimize its whole policy toward Iran as an Arab issue.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi has recently
outlined the steps which his government took regarding the
Shatt-al-Arab dispute by claiming that Iraq had warned Iran
and demanded, in a formal memorandum, that Iran withdraw from
the Arab territories it was illegally occupying. Iran, it
is claimed, did not respond and this forced Iraq to take
back its territory by force, proclaim total sovereignty over
the Shatt-al-Arab and unilaterally annul the 1975 Algiers
Agreement. Iraq claims that it then submitted an official
24

memorandum to Iran requesting an understanding on the basis
of current realities (i.e., Iraqi control of the Shatt-al-
Arab and the east bank) , to settle all problems by peaceful
means. Iran, again, apparently did not respond to that
memorandum but according to Hammadi, closed the Shatt-al-Arab,
closed its air space and began shelling the Iraqi borders.
These last acts, according to Hammadi, were the cause of
Iraq's military forces entering Iranian territory, in order
to, in his words, "protect Iraqi territory and gain Iranian
31
recognition of Irag's right to Iraqi land and waters."
25
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An underlying, unstated cause of the current conflict
between Iraq and Iran has its roots deep in the history of
that area of the world. The Islamic faith is by no means a
homogenous one. Over the centuries, since the death of the
prophet Mohammed, sects have appeared and disappeared among
the Islamic faithful.
Today the overwhelming majority of Muslims subscribe to
Islam of the "Sunnah" or Sunni Islam with its faithful ad-
herence to the doctrine evolved during the Orthodox Caliphate.
Subscribers to this doctrine are known as orthodox or "Sunnis,"
and they constitute over eighty-five percent of all those who
call themselves Muslims today. The Sunnis form one major
sect but juridicially they may belong to one of the four
recognized rites or madhahib: Maliki, Shaf i * i , Hanafi, or
2Hanbali.
Differences in Islam are basically due to two historical
factors. Political challenges to existing authority, with
the disputing parties usually taking on the sanctity of re-
ligious protection and thus giving rise to a plethora of
sects accounts for one factor. The other came from attempts
to provide rational bases for the basic tenets of the faith,
leading to the proliferation of philosophical schools of
approach to theological beliefs. Both these factors had a
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similar impact in that they distracted from the theological,
political and consequently, the social unity of Islam.
The Shi ' at 'Ali (the partisans of Ali) cling to Ali
with adoring affection insisting that only he and his descend-
ants had the legitimate right to assume the caliphate. (The
Shiites believed that after the death of the Prophet the
caliphate and religious authority should have passed directly
to Ali by virtue of Ali ' s marriage to Mohammed's daughter
Fatima and his station in relation to the Prophet.) Originally
a group tolerant of other religions this changed about the
year 850 when the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil became particu-
larly harsh with the Shi 'a, destroying their venerated
shrines: the tombs of Ali at Najaf and his more admired son
Husayn at Karbala (both located in modern day Iraq)
.
As opposed to the Sunnis who were loyal to the duly
empowered caliph, the Shi ' as professed loyalty only to the
Imam, who was a direct descendent of Ali, on the basis that
Ali had inherited from the prophet Mohammed both his spiritual
and secular powers. Thus instead of the secular guide of
the Sunnis, the caliph, whose religious authority was limited
to setting a correct example, the Shi"' as recognized an Imam
who was regarded as an infallible teacher and the only source
of religious instruction and guidance. On the mysterious
disappearance of the twelfth Imam, the collective body of
Shiite religions, the ulema, began to exercise the preroga-
tives of his office awaiting his return. The succession from
Husayn (Ali's grandson) produced nine of the twelve Imam's
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considered by the majority of Shi' as as the correct line of
succession. The twelfth Imam disappeared a second time in
878 in the cave of the great Mosque at Samarra without leaving
an heir.
This hidden Imam, who is not dead but merely in a stage
of occultation, is destined to reappear as the Mahdi
.
The Shi ' a teach that the faithful must believe in all
the Imams, and especially in the Imam of their own time.
This belief was exalted into an additional pillar of Islam.
Among the Sunnis the caliph was the head of the community,
responsible for the administration of justice through the
Shari'a, and for the defense of the realm of Islam, and the
caliph owed his office either to the choice of the community
or to the nomination of his predecessor. Not so the Imam
of the Shi" 1 a. He is the divinely appointed ruler and teacher
of the faithful who has succeeded to the prerogatives of the
prophet himself. He possess superhuman qualities which descend
to him from the first man, through Mohammed, a divine light
which is given to chosen mortals from generation to generation.
In popular beliefs which survive in some places today, the
Imam's body casts no shadow and he cannot be physically
7harmed
.
The outstanding difference between Sunni and Shi ' a doc-
trines of infallibility is not a quality inherent in the
prophet by virtue of his being, but a special grace from God.
His superhuman knowledge is given him from time to time by
God whose message he repeats to men. His merit was to be
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chosen by God to be his mouthpiece. On the other hand, with
the Shi"' as senlessness and infallibility is in the Imam. He
possesses a secret knowledge inherited from his superhuman
forebears by which he knows all that will happen in the world
until the Resurrection Day. Therefore he cannot err. He
is the sole and ultimate authority in the interpretation of
the Quran, the source of all truth, and the only being with
the right to men's obedience. Therefore all doctrine must
have his authority.
Hence article 5 in the Constitution of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran states:
During the Occultation of the Lord of the
Age (may God hasten his renewed manifesta-
tion.1 ), the governance and leadership of
the nation devolve upon the just and pious
faqil who is acquainted with the circum-
stances of his age; courageous, resourceful,
and possessed of administrative ability;
and recognized and accepted as leader by
the majority of the people...
and goes on to add in article 107:
Whenever one of the fuqalia possessing the
qualifications specified in article 5 of
the Constitution is recognized and accepted
as marja' and leader by a decisive majority
of the people—as has been the case with
the exalted marja 1 -i taqlill and leader of
the revolution, Ayatollah al-Uzma Imam
Khomeiai—he is to exercise governance and
all responsibilities arising therefrom. If
such should not be the case, experts elected
by the people will review and consult among
themselves concerning all persons qualified
to act as majra' and leader. If they dis-
cern outstanding capacity for leadership
in a certain majra' they will present him
to the people as their leader; if not they
will appoint either three or five maya's
possessing the necessary qualifications for




Qualifications for membership on the leadership council
are set down in article 109:
the following are the qualifications and
attributes of the leader or members of the
Leadership Council:
a. Suitability with respect to learning and
piety as required for the functions of
mufti and majra'.
b. Political and social perspicacity, courage,
strength, and the necessary administra-
tive abilities for leadership.-'-
Ayatollah Khomeini himself has said that, "the Islamic
government is the government of the law and God alone is
the ruler and the legislator." And he goes on to delineate




So it is clearly evident that the Shi ' a sect of Islam
holds substantially different views as to the qualifications
of the Islamic ruler, defining those qualifications in such a
manner that only an Imam may satisfy them. On the other hand,
the Sunni ' s differentiate between the religious and secular
rulers. The caliph, ruler and leader to the Sunnis, must
protect and maintain the faith and territory of Islam, must
declare jihad when necessary, is charged with the appointment
of state officials, is to collect taxes, administer public
funds, and finally is responsible for the punishment of wrong-
doing and maintenance of justice. The Sunnite leader must
hold the faith and be careful never to oppose it but he is
not a religious leader. Whereas in Shiism, the leader is
both temporal and religious.
32

When this religious cleavage is imposed on Iraqi-Iranian
relations the rift becomes more complex and clearer at the
same time.
Iraq is an Arab state with a majority of Shi 'a Muslims,
Sunnis being a large minority. The ruling elite are pre-
dominantly Sunni. However Iraq is ruled by the Ba'ath Party.
The political thought of the Ba'ath Party as a whole has
centered on a combination of socialism and Arab nationalism.
The slogan of unity, liberty, and socialism focused on Arab
unity, liberation from Western imperialism, and Arab or Islamic
socialism. The Iraqi Ba'athists endorsed these notions before
attaining power, but the leadership of the Ba'athists has
pursued an ultra-nationalist and exclusionist policy. The
Shi 'a Muslims and the Sunni Kurds, who together account for
perhaps seventy percent of the population are blatantly
underrepresented in the small ruling elite of the Ba'ath
Party.
Ba'ath political theory involves numerous contradictions.
The contradictions are particularly sharp between certain
basic tenets of Islam and what some Ba'athists refer to as
"scientific rationalism." Islam, for example, specifically
condones private property, but Ba'athism advocates the aboli-
tion of private property. Islam is an open and individualis-
tic faith whereas Ba'athist practice is secretive and collective
15
along the lines of the Communist cell structure.
From the Iraqi perspective, Iran and its Islamic revolu-
tion are considered very dangerous: one, because of the
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Shi 'a majority in Iraq which are daily treated to pleadings
and exhortations from Teheran radio to rise up and throw off
1 fi
the chains of the ruling infidels. Even the Islamic Con-
stitution of Iran threatens Iraq (and other Arab states)
when it states in article 154:
The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal
human happiness throughout human society, and
considers the attainment of independence,
freedom, and just government to be the right
of all peoples of the world . While scrupuously
refraining from all forms of aggressive inter-
vention in the internal affairs of other
nations, it therefore protects the just struggles
of the oppressed in every corner of the globe. 17
Secondly, an eventuality such as a Shi ' a revolution in Iraq
would dispossess the ruling Ba'ath Party and its Sunni elite.
Iran, on the other hand, regards Iraq as an infidel state
and thereby a threat to the Islamic revolution. This has be-
come a personal duel between Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam
Hussein, a subject to be discussed later. Iran sees Iraq as
a godless state and a state which oppresses its Shi 'a brethren,
The Islamic Organization of Iran published a "black report
card" for Iraq which listed some 42 violations against Mos-
lems in Iraq. These ranged from accusations that Iraq had
expelled some 70,000 Iranian Shiites residing in Iraq (and
also confiscating their wealth and property) , to turning over
Iranian mujaheds to SAVAK, to issuing a death warrant for
18Ayatollah Khomeini.
In fact in April, 1980 prior to the war Iraq expelled
some 70,000 Iranians, a significant portion of which were
Shiite Ulema. Saddam Hussein was apparently particularly
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ruthless with the followers of Khomeini's ally, Ayatollah
Mohammad Baqar Sadr and his Islamic Call Party, executing
. . 19
some seventy party members by firing squad.
Historically Shi ' as have viewed themselves as a body
that has been deprived of its rights and oppressed. From
the martyrdom of Husayn at the hands of the second Umayyad
Caliph, Yazid in 680, to the destruction of their venerated
shrines by al-Mutaqakkil in 850, to the government of Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi, to the recent treatment at the hands of the
"Great Satan," the United States, Shiism to Shi 'as is an
undergod, oppressed, struggling cause.
Because of its fear of the Islamic Revolution in Iran,
particularly to the Shi ' a majority, the leadership of Iraq
has taken great pains to establish itself as a friend and
protector of Islam. Saddam Hussein has sought the backing
of the leading Ayatollah of the Shiite faith, Imam Khoui
.
This was done for two reasons: (1) in order to lend credence
to Hussein's legitimacy as ruler, and (2) in order to suppress
criticism that the ruling Sunnis were neglecting and violat-
ing the holy shrines of Ali and Husayn.
This internal rivalry between Sunni and Shi 'a gave rise
to two serious disturbances in Iraq during the 1970' s. The
first occurred in December 1974 when five Shi 'a notables
from Najaf were executed for having protested excessive Shiite
20
casualties in the fighting in Kurdish areas of the north.
Far more serious were the disturbances in Najaf and
Karbala on 5 and 6 February 1977. The occasion was the annual
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religious procession between Najaf and Karbala to celebrate
the fortieth day after the death of Imam Husayn. On this
particular occasion verbal abuse against the Ba'athist
leadership was freely sounded and for two days the riots
increased until the situation got out of hand. It was only
after the army intervened that the disturbances were sup-
pressed and calm restored. Although explanations for the
riot vary--a Syrian provocation, a mob attack on an Iraqi
police post, an Iraqi army attack on a peaceful religious
procession--it is clear that the disturbances were fanned by
widespread dissatisfaction among the Shiites. A special
tribunal was set up after the disturbances to try 110 de-
tainees: eight were sentenced to death, fifteen to life
imprisonment, and eighty-seven were acquitted. Unofficial
accounts indicated that many more were killed and arrested
during the riots.
So it is not surprising that the government of Iraq would
react in a negative manner to the exhortations of Teheran
toward the Shi' a majority in Iraq.
B. PERSONAL FEUD
Another underlying causal factor in the Iraqi-Iranian
conflict stems from the nature of the leaders of both coun-
tries. Both Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini dominate
the internal and external political scene in their respective
nations. Both are the major force in their country: Khomeini,
as the constitutionally declared leader, and Hussein, as the
22president and head of the RCC. Both have surrounded
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themselves with similarly inclined political personages and
are swift to remove those who wander from expected political
conduct, e.g., Khomeini's removal of Prime Minister Barzagan
after the takeover of the American Embassy, and Hussein's
removal and subsequent execution of Adnan Hussein, the num-
ber three man in the Ba'ath Party, after an alleged coup
attempt was uncovered. Both maintain power, to a large ex-
tent, by force of their personality and are pragmatic in the
application and maintenance of that power. Both see them-
selves as something more than just a national personality
with appeal that transcends the boundaries of Iraq and Iran:
Khomeini as a force and rallying point for all Muslims, par-
ticularly Shiites, and Hussein as a spokesman and leader for
all Arabs, particularly the nebulous "Arab Nation."
It is here where their supranational ideologies and goals
conflict, that these two leaders are engaged in a personal
feud.
1. Saddam Hussein
President Saddam Hussein al-Takriti was born in Tikrit
on 28 April 1937, into a less than well-off peasant family.
In Tikrit intermarriage among peasant families established
a special form of kin relationship. Family ties, among
persons even remotely related, created a deep sense of soli-
darity and personal loyalty among the young men of the same
area, which was often manifested in a readiness to cooperate




It has been observed that a few young men from Tikrit
who made their way to Baghdad seem to have worked very closely
together and ended up with earning the label of the Tikuti
clan.
From the time when he was still in Tikrit a number
of significant events seem to have had an indelible impact
on his future career. Khayr-Allah Talfah, a maternal uncle,
who was then an officer in the Army participated in the ill-
fated Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani uprising and took part in the
25
military operations against Britain in 1941. After the
fall of Rashid 'Ali, Talfah was expelled from the military
service. The impact of the Rashid 'Ali affair was one of
the principal reasons that prompted Saddam Hussein to par-
ticipate in nationalist activities which had, as their goal,
the elimination of foreign influence not only from his country
2 6but from all Arab lands.
The second important event in Saddam Hussein's life
was his decision to continue his studies in Baghdad. After
he finished primary education in Tikrit and while he was
in the second year of high school, he began to follow stu-
dent activities in Baghdad and aspired to be in the midst
of those events. He left Tikrit in 1955 and entered a secon-
dary school in Baghdad. While still in school he became in-
volved in the activity of the Ba'ath Party and participated
27in the abortive coup of 1956. Saddam Hussein escaped
arrest and the next year he, as did many other students,
became a full-fledged member of the Ba'ath party.
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The third important event was Saddam Hussein's par-
ticipation in an attempt on Abd al-Karim Qasim's life in
2 81959. Though he was wounded and sentenced to death in
absentia, he fled his country via his native town in disguise,
and took refuge in Syria. In 1960 he made his way to Cairo
and there completed high school. Furthermore, he was drawn
into nationalist activities during the next two years and
became the leader of the Cairo unit of the Ba'ath party.
He enrolled in the Cairo University Law College in 1962, but
before he finished his first year he returned to Baghdad when
the Ba'ath party seized power in February 1963. He was jailed
in November 19 64 after the fall of the Ba'ath party from
power. His star began to rise when he and other Ba'ath party
members supported General Admad Hasan al-Bakr, a fellow
Tikriti, in his drive to control the Regional Command Leader-
ship. He worked closely with Bakr after the Ba'ath party
29
again seized power in 1968.
While in Egypt in exile, Saddam Hussein keenly ob-
served the working of the Nasirite regime at first hand.
Like many other young Ba'athist leaders, he was a great
admirer of Nasser and learned how Nasser ruled and conducted
foreign policy. Particularly interesting were Nasser's views
on and attempts at establishing an Arab nation.
Saddam Hussein, long the strongman and force behind
the throne in Iraq, succeeded to the presidency in August
1979, when President al-Bakr stepped down to retire to




Saddam Hussein now has the reins of power firmly in
his two hands. Today in Baghdad his presence is total.
A hotel lobby, a government office or a dusty rug seller's
stall, there is no escaping the poster-size photographs of
Hussein, with his medals looking tough, in his blue suit
looking business-like, in a red kaffiya holding an arab boy
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on his lap, looking like his idol Nasser. Looking tough
is the best description of the Saddam Hussein who today
rules Iraq. He is tough, tough with his enemies in Iraq
and with those outside of Iraq's borders. Hussein is a dic-
tator who has surrounded himself with a small clique of
relatives and supporters whose main redeeming trait seems to
be their personal loyalty to the president. Hussein has
draped himself in the philosophical trappings of Ba'athism
and Pan-Arabism in an attempt to establish his legitimacy
both at home among his Iraqi constituents and throughout
the Arab world. Hussein has attempted to co-opt the Kurds
by dangling the promise of an autonomous state in front of
them. He has promised more Shi ' a participation in the govern-
ment and has sought and won the backing of the Imam of Naja,
Ayatollah Khou'i in order to placate the internal Shi '
a
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majority. He doles out $175 million every four months in
aid to the Arab front line (Jordan, Syria, PLO, and Arabs in
Israeli-held lands) in order to attempt to maintain his Pan-
Arab credentials. But the pictures in Baghdad tell the story
Hussein is attempting to effect his legitimacy with the citi-
zens of Iraq by establishing a personality cult. It is this
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attempt at personal dictatorial rule, at Pan-Arab leader-
ship, and Ba'athist socialist which brings him into direct
confrontation with the other regional strongman, Ayatollah
Khomeini.
2 . Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
"A riddle wrapped in an enigma" (to use Winston
Churchill's oft quoted phrase) seems the best description
of the Ayatollah to the western mind. Time magazine's 1979
man of the year is viewed as a religious mystic, an ascetic
spiritual leader whose teachings are unquestioned, and a
fanatic whose judgments are harsh, whose reasoning is bizarre
and whose conclusions are surreal. A man for all seasons,
he is adored by his followers with the title Imam and loathed
by his enemies. As the leader of Iran's Islamic revolution
he gave the 2 0th century world a lesson in the shattering
power of the Islamic faith, and of the ease with which terror-
ism can be adopted as governmental policy. A man who has
spent his whole life in a religious calling developing an
iron will, an inflexible devotion to the simple, all-encom-
passing Islamic life style, and a lately discovered finely
tuned instinct for articulating the passions and rages of
his people while at the same time assaulting the very founda-
tions of other cultures and governments (particularly those
os Islamic Arab states) , Khomeini is a force to be reckoned




Arrogant and pious, stubborn and vengeful, humorless
and inflexible, ascetic and powerhungry, logical and Muslim
are some of the adjectives which describe this man who has
come to be the leader of Iran. Initially his stated goal was
the overthrow of the Shah and his Satanic backer (the U.S.)
and the establishment of an Islamic Republic, Khomeini has
since been drawn into the political realm and is now the
leader of Iran in both the religious and political sense.
So much so that he now has more titles than the man he worked
so long and hard to overthrow, the Shah, ever had: Savior
of the Generations, Defeater of the Oppressors, Imam of the
Age.
Born on May 17, 1900, Khomeini has spent 6 6 of his
80 years of life in philosophical study and religious teach-
ing. A long time opponent of the Shah, Khomeini, in 1944,
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contributed to a book which denounced the monarchy.
Khomeini maintained his anti-Shah credentials and in 196 3 he
and other members of the Muslim clergy protested the Shah's
"White Revolution" by leading large demonstrations against
the monarchy. The "White Revolution" was a program of moderni-
zation which angered Khomeini and the mullahs because they,
as the second largest group of landholders in the country,
were monetarily disenfranchised of their land as the Shah
distributed their huge red estate holdings to the people.
Khomeini also attacked the government and the Majlis for pass-
ing a bill which granted diplomatic immunity and privileges
for U.S. military personnel and a further bill which sought
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a 200 million dollar loan from the U.S. for the purchase of
military equipment.
Among the six Grand Ayatollah's of the time, Khomeini
was the only one who was not co-opted by the Shah and for his
efforts was exiled in 1964, first to Turkey and then to Iraq.
From 1964 until 1978 Khomeini kept up his incessant but
generally unpublicized attacks on the Iranian monarchy. In
October 1978 when the popular uprisings against the Shah began
to gather momentum, Reza Pahlavi pressured Iraq to expel
Khomeini in the hope that moving him from near proximity
to Iran would aid in defusing the unrest then ongoing in the
Shah's Empire. Khomeini and his supporters settled in a
small town outside Paris and kept up his attack on the Iranian
government, only now Khomeini had the Western press and media
to transmit his message to an ever-enlarging mass of supporters
inside Iran.
On January 16, 1979 the Shah and his Empress left Iran
for a "vacation" and in February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini
returned to Iran in a 747 to a tumultuous welcome.
Khomeini set about designing and implementing his
Islamic state. First a national referendum overwhelmingly
gave legitimacy to his Islamic dream, followed next by the
writing of an Islamic constitution, election of a president
and a majlis (dominated by Islamic clerics) . In between were
the executions of many of the former Shah's supporters and in
November 1979, the apparently spontaneous takeover of the U.S.




Khomeini has declared many times, that his ideal
Islamic state existed during the five year reign of Ali, who
died in 661 A.D., the last Orthodox Caliph. And so to
Khomeini the only just state is one which is ruled by Islamic
theologians, who alone can be trusted to interpret God's com-
mands directly. The clergy's duty is not just to pass moral
judgment on the acts of the government, but, as can be seen
by Iran's new constitution, to rule the state directly.
While they come from completely different backgrounds,
both Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini are the leaders
of regionally powerful and important states which by virtue
of their strategic geographic positions and natural resources
(i.e., oil), are vital to the world scene. Both countries
are nominally run in a constitutional manner (see Appendices
B and C) , but in reality both are controlled in an almost
absolute fashion by the men at the top, i.e., Hussein and
Khomeini
.
It is inevitable then when two conflicting nations
each have an authoritarian ruler that the course of the con-
flict will hinge around the two personalities of the heads of
state and the relationship between them. In the case of Iraq
and Iran, Hussein and Khomeini share a bitter personal and a
bitter religious rivalry while their nations have a centuries-
old history of nationalist disputes.
For Saddam Hussein, Khomeini holds out the danger of
a Shiite renaissance which could sweep through "Eastern Islam"
taking with it Hussein, the Ba'athists and the rest of the
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Gulf. For Khomeini, Saddam Hussein represents the conserva-
tive Sunni reaction to all he has attempted to achieve for
the Shiites. Furthermore, Hussein has shown a dangerous
capability to drown the Islamic nature of the Iranian revo-
lution by a renewed call for Arabs to unite in the face of
Persia. Both men are competing with two opposed ideologies
37
for the same international constituency.
Hussein may have never forgotten the humiliation meted
out by the Shah of Iran to Iraq and himself personally, when
the Shah imposed the 1975 Algiers Agreement on a then power-
less Iraq. The revolutionary Khomeini once installed in
power in Teheran, began to call on Iraqi Shiites to rise up
3 8
and "stab Hussein in the back." The attempt by Khomeini to
stir up sectarian and religious dissent in Iraq is a particu-
larly sore point with Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists, who
have spent a great amount of time and effort to build a unified
socialist Iraq. Particularly nettlesome to Hussein were the
increased efforts in the summer of 1980 by Khomeini to send
agitators into Iraq to organize the al' Da'wa Party, and the
39
Teheran press publicized plans to overthrow the Iraqi Regime.
In April, 19 80 the Iraqi regime claimed to have uncovered an
organization called Al Da'wa al Islamiya, which has ties to
Iran and is comprised of Iraqi Shi ' as , Kurds, and Communists.
Al Da'wa was saidto be planning sabotage operations through-
out the country and to possess large quantities of ammunition
40
and explosives smuggled from Iran. Increased inflammatory
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radio broadcasts from Iran, with mocking attacks on the
41leadership of Saddam Hussein led to fuel the personal feud.
Likewise Ayatollah Khomeini has personal grievances
against Hussein. When in exile in Iraq during the reign
of the Shah, Khomeini settled in the holy cities of Karbola
and Najaf. Under pressure from the Shah, Saddam Hussein had
Khomeini placed under house arrest and then deported to France.
Shortly after his departure from Iraq, Khomeini was infuriated
by reports that Empress Farah had visited the Shiite holy
city of Najaf and had been welcomed there by Saddam Hussein
in a gesture of support for the Shah's regime in Teheran.
More recently, Khomeini has been angered by the way Saddam
Hussein thwarted his efforts to move the spiritual head-
42quarters of the Shiite movement from Najaf to Qom.
Khomeini had asked that the governing religious board
of the Najaf college should consist mainly of theologians who
would be moved from Qom, and for Qom's college leadership to
approve and initiate Najaf 's curriculum. But Khomeini's re-
quests were opposed by Imam Khou ' i who may have suspected
that these were the first moves towards transfer of the
43highest seat of Islam from Najaf to Qom.
Imam Khou'i is the highest authority in the Shiite
world. Based in Najaf, the Imam has recently been visited
frequently by Saddam Hussein suggesting that the Imam and
the President are political allies. Both are united against
Khomeini—Hussein for fears already expressed and Khou'i for
fear that Khomeini was attempting to assume the overall
leadership of the entire Shiite world.
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In fact, shortly after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran
war, Ayatollah Khomeini's aides had sought to proclaim him
as the awaited "Mahdi," i.e., the "Hidden Imam" returning to
rule the Muslim world. In order to affect such a declara-
tion they needed Imam Khou'i 's endorsement since as has been
said, he is the highest authority in the Shi * a world and the
only man who could sanction such a declaration. In effect,
this would have made Khomeini divine.
Khou ' i refused to accommodate Khomeini firstly be-
cause it would mean a lessening of his own (Khou'i) position
and power in the Shiite world, secondly Khou'i may have feared
that Khomeini's ambitions could have set off intra-Muslim
massacres, between Khomeini supporters and detractors,
throughout the entire Islamic world, and thirdly Khou'i is
an Arab and while he may feel some affinity toward Khomeini's
brand of Shiism, Khou'i is not able to overcome the blood
ties he has with the Arab world (no doubt Saddam Hussein has
gone to great lengths to help Khou'i keep close to his ethnic
background)
.
So the personal feud between these two leaders stretches
over political, religious and ethnic lines to fuel the fires
of war and in some cases this personal animosity seems almost
to be a primary cause of the war and certainly a significant
factor in its continuance.
C. IRAQ AS A REGIONAL GENDARME
The fall of the Pahlavi monarchy in January 1979 and
the attendant directed collapse of Iran's security forces
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left a great void and vacuum in the area of the Middle
East.
Iraq with its modern Soviet-supplied military was the
only regional power in any way well situated to fill that
void. An ever-increasing fortune in petro dollars and a
political affinity to support terrorist groups and organi-
zations along with a long time hostility toward the West,
particularly the United States allowed the U.S.S.R. to step
in to accommodate Saddam Hussein's desire to be a regional
military power and demands a somewhat detailed description.
The war with Iran is the first major involvement of Soviet-
equipped Iraqi forces in military hostilities. The Army has
about 210,000 men with reserves of 250,000. It is equipped
with about 2,900 Soviet tanks, including at least 50 of the
latest T-72*s, and about 2,500 armored vehicles. The main
battle tank force is composed of T-54/55/62/34/85 ' s and seme
PT-100's. The army has some French tanks with more than 100
on order. For armored vehicles the army possesses Soviet
BTR-50/60/152's, AML-90*s and BMP ' s as well as some French
Panhards and UK ferrets. Interestingly, Iraq has received
some deliveries of a large quantity of vehicles ordered from
Brazil. Brazil has continued shipping vehicles to Iraq,
despite the war, and in return has been given priority for
Iraqi crude when available, and war relief crude from other
Arab Gulf States when it is not. Brazil recently added a
military attache to the Baghdad Embassy in probably expecta-
44tion of future orders.
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Air Force personnel number about 28,000. The force is
divided into squadrons of light bombers, interceptors, fighter
ground attack planes, transports, and helicopter gunships
.
The Iraqis deploy two bomber squadrons which have Ilyushin
IL-28s and TU-22 Blinders (32 aircraft in all) . The most
significant development in the deployment of ground attack
fighter types has been the arrival of the first 12 Mirage
F-l's. Iraq is said to be willing to buy 100 Mirages. About
60 further F-l's have been requested and the French are ex-
pected to supply the highly advanced Mirage 2000 when it be-
comes available. Apart from these, the Air Force has about
110 MIG-17/23/27's and a squadron of MIG-25's were ordered
in 1976 but has not yet been delivered. For the interceptor
role there are 115 MIG-21's and for counter insurgency 16 UK
Jet Provosts. Ilyushin IL-14's and Anotor-AN-2/12/24/26 '
s
make up the bulk of transport aircraft. Iraq has eight heli-
copter squadrons of 185 craft made up of MIL ' s , Alouettes,
45Gazelles, Pumas, Super Frelons, and Augustas.
The Navy has 4,000 men. The fleet consists of sub-chasers,
patrol boats, missile launcher boats, torpedo boats and mine-
sweepers. The main naval bases are at Basrah and Urn Qasr.
Four Soviet OSA-1 class and eight OSA-2 class, armed with
Styx surface to surface and foru SSN-2 missiles. For fast
attack torpedo operations the Navy has 12 Soviet P-6s, 2
Polutchat class large patrol craft and 14 UK Thorneycraft
coastal patrol class. A 1,850 ton Yugoslav frigate is used
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for training. There are 3 Polnocniy class tank landing
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craft and two Soviet class minesweepers.
Iraq has a long standing dispute with the U.S. over a
$2 billion deal with Italy for the supply of four Lupo class
frigates and six missile corvettes. Eight of the turbine
engines for the Italian vessels were to be manufactured in
the U.S. by General Electric. The sale of the engines was
initially approved by the Carter Administration, but in a
reversal of policy, because of the Iraq-Iran war, the ad-
. . . 47
ministration suspended delivery in September 19 80.
No other nation in the Persian Gulf area can match the
predominance of Iraq's military arsenal, and because of that
fact Saddam Hussein is in an excellent position to succeed
the Shah in the role of the area's policeman.
In his effort to propel Iraq into centerstage amongst the
Arab nations, Hussein, in February 19 80, proclaimed an Arab
National Charter which outlined and communicated to other
Arab leaders his ideas on future united political action.
The most revealing section of the Charter states that Arab
nations should not resort to the use of force against one
another to settle their disputes but that peaceful alterna-
tives should always be exhausted first. This is a far cry
from the revolutionary rhetoric of radical Iraq in the mid
and early 1970 's.
This shift can be traced back to the 197 8 Baghdad Summit.
As host, Iraq had a great stake in insuring the success of
the conference, but realized early on the difficulties
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involved in reaching a universally (pan-Arab) acceptable
position. The success of the summit was attributable to the
skill of the Iraqis, particularly Saddam Hussein, in bring-
ing together the Arab leaders into a common platform. The
Iraqis were forced to tone down their heretofore rigid revo-
lutionary position, and gave the Iraqi leaders a taste for
diplomacy and an awareness that moderate and pragmatic moves
could prove far more effective than revolutionary rhetoric
in influencing their Arab peers.
The Iranian revolution increased Iraq's prestige within
the Arabian Peninsula by allowing it to fill the strategic
vacuum left by the departure of the Shah and the disintegra-
tion of Iran's military. Iraq presented itself as the pro-
tector of the smaller Arab Gulf states against the Iranian
threat.
Difficulties at home with the Kurdish minority, the Shi"'
a
majority and political opposition within the Ba'ath party had
to a certain extent hamstrung Hussein by not allowing him to
use his military force to the full extent. Prior to 1979
Saddam Hussein could find no opponent in close enough proximity
to utilize his military forces against. The Shah and his
military were too strong, attacking another Arab state would
be an antithesis of the Ba'ath party's call for Arab unity,
and Israel was too far away and too powerful an adversary
to hope for any success against.
The fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini with the
attendant destruction of the Iranian military allowed Saddam
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Hussein to have a perfect enemy. One with whom almost every
Gulf Arab state had a historical dispute, one that was
threatening to the majority of Arab states by virtue of the
exportation of Islamic revolution, and most important of
all, one which was non-Arab and therefore could be used to
establish Iraq's international legitimacy and the leadership
of Saddam Hussein in the Arab World.
1 . Pan-Arabism
Prior to the 1978 Baghdad Conference, Iraq was viewed
by its Arab brethren staes as a somewhat renegade state set
on its own course in Arab affairs. But the Camp David accords
allowed irredential Iraq, through the calm, cool helmsmanship
of Hussein to begin to take the lead in the Arab world, es-
pecially in regards to the proper Arab line toward Israel and
Egypt. A resolution of border demarcation between Iraq and
Kuwait and Iraq and Saudi Arabia went a long way toward
calming Arab fears toward Iraq and enhancing the leadership
drive of Saddam Hussein.
Hussein has played heavily on the Arab nature of
Iraq's conflict with Iran. He has sought to make the war an
Arab-Persian confrontation as opposed to Sunni-Shi'a, or
Ba'athism versus Islamic Republicanism. Iraq's propaganda
has been strongly along the lines of an Arab-Persian dispute,
and prior to the outbreak of hostilities it is clear that
Saddam Hussein went to great pains to ensure the backing of
other Arab states for his position by sending his Foreign
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Minister, Saadoun Hammadi, to each of the Gulf States prior
to September 19 80, and by making an unprecedented visit to
Saudi Arabia's King Khalid on 5 August 19 80. In the resulting
joint communique and in Iraq's follow-up consultations with
other Arab states, the emphasis was on "the present situation
48in the Islamic world," the euphemism adopted for Iran.
Toward the Iranian threat, the Hussein-Khalid communique "en-
joined that peripheral differences should be discarded and
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ranks should be closed." Additionally in May and June 19 80,
the Crown Prince of Kuwait, the King of Jordan, the Emir of
Ras al-Khamina and an emissary from the President of the
United Arab Emirates all visited Hussein in Baghdad. The 10
May 1980 joint Iraqi-Kuwaiti communique stressed that the
50
security of the Gulf is the Arab Gulf countries' preoccupation.
So it should come as no surprise to see Saddam Hussein couch
his propaganda in terms of "Arab Khuzistan" and the three
"Arab" islands occupied by Iran. Foreign Minister Hammadi
put it thusly, "...What I would like to say is that we are
all Arabs, and our sense of responsibility is not less than
that of any other nation. When an Arab fights for Arab terri-
tory, in defense of the independence of Arab states, the issue
is a nationalist one and not a political issue pitting one
state against another. These matters must be viewed from a
nationalistic angle. When an Arab fights a non-Arab in defense
of Arab land, it is the duty of every Arab to stand by his
brother, because this is a question of Arab sovereignty..."
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On 25 August 1980, Saddam Hussein said Iraq will wage
war against any foreign force attacking Arab land, no matter
what political color this Arab regime might have: "Iraq has
a role in boosting the security of the Arab nation and in
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confronting imperialist attacks."
Iraq's support of the "Arab" cause stretched over the
border into Iran well before Iraqi military forces invaded
Iran. In June, 1979, Vice Admiral Timsar Madani , then the
Chief of Staff of the Iranian Navy and the Governor General
of the province of Khuzistan complained that, "Brother Saddam
Hussein is involved in smuggling arms into Iran and a flood
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of arms is flowing to Iran from his direction." The 3.5
million Arabs of Khuzistan are a large and potentially troubling
minority for the Teheran government.
Ever mindful of the importance of portraying the Iraq-
Iran War as an Arab-Persian conflict, Saddam Hussein has gone
to great lengths to offer support and succor to those Arabs
who seek to be free of the domination of Teheran. Abu Karmab
as spokesman for the Popular Movement in Arabistan stated that
Arabs in Arabistan consider the Iraqi army as a "liberation
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army." The Popular Movement appealed to the U.N. in a
letter to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, that they consider
Khuzistan (Arabistan) to be Arab land and wish to be an autono-
mous region.
It is interesting however to note that even though
some of the Arabs of Iran's Khuzistan Province support Iraq
in its war with Teheran, there has not been a genuine, grass
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roots, popular movement amongst the majority of the province's
Arab minority to give all-out blessing and support to Iraq's
occupation of Arabistan. Even Abu Karmak and the Popular
Movement in Arabistan did not call for permanent Iraqi occu-
pation or inclusion of Arabistan into greater Iraq. Perhaps
religious affiliation is thicker than Arab blood or perhaps
Saddam Hussein is not the Great Emancipator whom Iranian
Arabs can trust in for leadership.
Iraq's Pan Arab moves also have an economic twist.
At the 197 8 Baghdad Conference, Iraq agreed to assist certain
front-line Arab states with monetary grants totaling about
$520 million. Syria, Jordan and the PLO have received some
55$350 million thus far. Iraq officially states that these
grants are an obligation of its role as a leader in the Arab
world, but it cannot be totally discounted that Iraq is
attempting to buy friends, indeed buy its way into a position
of leadership in the Arab world.
At the July 1980 meeting of Arab Foreign and Economic
Ministers, Iraq again lead the way in discussions to set up a
joint development fund of $10-15 billion for support of non-
oil Arab states. This proposal was latter ratified by the
Arab States attending the Arab Summit in Amman Jordan.
(Syria, Libya, PDRY, Lebanon, Algeria, and the PLO did not
attend in reaction to Saddam Hussein. Egypt was not invited
due to its approval of the Camp David Accords.) Iraq solidi-
fied its emerging position of leadership by receiving the
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backing of the Arab States (except Syria) for its proposal
to end the Iraq-Iran War at the Ta'if Islamic Summit in
January 197 8. Furthermore Iraq took the lead in supporting
the Kuwaiti proposed Gulf security plan whose broad outlines
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were discussed in private meetings also at the Ta'if Summit.
Iraq is clearly in a position of power and importance
vis-a-vis the other Arab states of the Gulf. It is in the
van in the philosophical, economic, and security considera-
tions of the area. Iraq's position is contrived and currently
well established both because of the war and on account of
the war. All the Arab states look to Iraq as a regional
force not only in military terms. This new position for the
former Arab pariah state is due primarily to the cool, calcu-
lated excellent leadership of Saddam Hussein, fears of the
ruling Arab elites of a Lebanonization of the Arab Gulf coun-
tries, and to the inflexible stance and the belief of Ayatollah
Khomeini for a single Islamic government for all Islamic
53
states.
Whether Iraq's new position will survive the rigors
of a protracted war remain to be seen, but as of now Saddam
Hussein sits quite comfortably on the throne of Ba'athist
Iraq and appears to be trying on the crown of leadership of
the Arab world passed on to him by his idol Gamal Abdul Nasser.
D. OPINION
From the foregoing it is obvious that the causes of the
war are many and varied, subtle and straightforward, clear
and murky. Recovery of Arab lands and Arab waterways makes
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good propaganda, as does defense of Persian land and Persian
waterways, both on the home front and the international scene.
But through all the rhetoric unstated themes seem to be more
meaningful in discussion of the cause of the Iraqi-Iranian
conflict, the dispute over land, islands, and the Shatt-al-
Arab is a highly convenient cover under which the real causes
of the current dispute can operate. However the stated
causes of the war cannot be totally dismissed as unmeaningful
for without them the legitimacy of the cause of each side in
seeking both internal and external support could not be
guaranteed.
Without the stated causes it would be difficult at best
to muster support for a Sunai-Shi'a conflict, for a Ba'athist-
Islamic Republic conflict, for a personal feud between the
two leaders, for Iraq's attempt to become a regional power,
for Iraq's attempt to become the leader of the Arab world,
or for Iran's attempt to become the model Islamic religious
state.
But it is in these unstated causes where the real goals
of the war lie. The return of Iraqi sovereignty over the
Shatt-al-Arab and of Arab sovereignty over the islands, the
maintenance of Iranian sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab
and the islands are important issues but in effect offer a
stage for which the real issues can play behind the curtain
of legitimating each countries' real aims and goals.
Iraq, particularly the elite, seeks to maintain peace and
tranquility within its borders amongst the Shi"' a majority
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and the Sunni minority. Iraq cannot let the call of Khomeini
for Islamic revolution by Shiites go unanswered and its
leader Saddam Hussein has taken great pains to appear to be
an Islamic leader. His co-optation of Ayatollah Khou ' i into
the government fold is clear evidence of these efforts. In
this he was ably, albeit unwittingly, aided by Khomeini's
attempt to move the seat of Shiism from Najaf and Karbala to
Qom.
Iran on the same subject tried to elicit support for its
cause by playing on the religious sensibilities of Iraqi
Shiites in order to expand its revolution, which it is consti-
tutionally bound to do and secondly to keep Iraq's military
machine occupied with internal disputes while Iran rebuilt
its own defenses.
Iran also sought the overthrow of the godless government
of the Iraqi Ba'athist state on purely religious grounds, for
Ba'athism is an anathema to the guiding ideals of the Islamic
Republic. In Iran's view there can be no state which is not
governed in strict accord with the Quran and the Hadith.
The personal feud between both leaders and the wish of
each for the downfall of the other is critical to the conflict
between the two countries. The autocratic similarities of
their style of personal rule when added to religious and
governmental differences begets a situation which is totally
flammable in nature.
Iraq's attempt to be a regional power of importance, to
be the Arab standard bearer in a war against non-Arabs, to
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become the leading force in the unification of the Arab nation,
and the leader of a unified Arab nation are factors which
weigh very heavily when considering the war and its causes.
Iran, on the other hand, seeks the same type of leadership
role in the larger and more diverse Islamic world. Because
of this jockeying for a leading position amongst a group of
peoples who are not mutually exclusive a conflict between the
two states, governmental styles, and leaders was inevitable.
If the conflict is ever settled, no doubt the headlines
will dwell on the Shatt-al-Arab and Arab islands, but no
settlement will be possible until the real, underlying, un-
stated causes of the war are first brought to resolution. A
geographical peace will only lead to future war.
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IV. REACTION OF ARAB STATES TO THE WAR
The reaction of Arab States to the Iraq-Iran, Arab-
Persian war has been different and varied. The purpose of
this half of the thesis is to explore these reactions by
examining those factors internal and external to certain
states that would cause them to support ot not support either
Iraq or Iran. Both the stated and unstated causes of the
war are vital to understanding the position of Arab states.
At first blush it might be a foregone conclusion that
Arab states would align themselves along Arab or ethnic issues
to support Arab Iraq. But this is not the case for Syria and
Libya have supported Persian Iran.
Iraq's support by such states as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Kuwait may be more complex than purely an Arab solidarity
issue. Just as the support of Iran by Syria and Libya may
be more complex than religious or Islamic issues.
In order to begin this discussion the nature and makeup
of the nebulous "Arab Nation" and its ethnic and religious
ramifications seems to be called for.
A. THE ARAB NATION
The Arab Nation (al-umma al- 'arabiyyah) is a concept, a
creed, a consummation to be sought, a dream of reconstructing
past glories. The meaning of the phrase depends on the one
who uses it. The umma exists only in the minds of those who
believe in it, yet this belief is the most important note
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struck in the works of the Eastern Arab intellectual and
there is hardly a single political leader in any Arab country
who would not affirm the Arab Nation is a reality.
The beginnings of the Arab Nation can be directly traced
to the rise of Islam in the seventh century A.D. Prior to
that time while the term and concept undoubtedly did exist,
the nature of Arabs was tribal and fractional.
A few years after the proclamation of Islam by Mohammed,
the new faith had already unified the Arab tribes in the
peninsula. And as the geographical boundaries of the Cali-
phate expanded under the Ummayyids , it was as Arabs, not as
a certain tribe or unification of tribes, that expansion came.
What unified and distinguished them as Arabs, in addition to
their new faith, was their language, which all Arabs under-
stood, and the literary heritage of pre-Islamic Arabia, in
2
which all Arabs took pride. The spectacular victories won
by the Arabs on the battlefield soon widened the territorial
scope of the Arab Nation. Within one century, the Muslim-
Arab domain came to extend from Spain and the borders of
France in the west, to India and the borders of China in the
east. By the eleventh century Arabic had become not only the
chief idiom of everyday use from Persia to the Pyrenees, but
also the chief instrument of culture, superceeding old culture
languages like Coptic, Aramaic, Greek, and Latin. As the
Arabic language spread, the distinction between Arab conqueror
and Arabicized conquered faded into relative insignificance,
3
and the Arab Nation was born.
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The Arabization of the area proved permanent and lasting
throughout the centuries even though Arab political struc-
tures splintered and collapsed as crusaders from Europe and
barbaric hordes from Asia nibbled at the arabized lands and
subjected them to piecemeal occupation, plunder, and partial
foreign domination. With the triumph of the Ottoman Turks
over the Mamluks in 1516 and 1517, the road was open for
the Ottomans to subjugate virtually all Arabs. By the middle
of the 16th Century, the Ottomans had occupied the entire Arab
are stretching from the Algerian-Moroccan border in the west
to the eastern boundary of Iraq, and from the northern limits
of Syria to the southern shores of the Arabian Peninsula. Of
all the Arab lands, only Morocco and the Sudan were outside
the imperial domination of the Ottomans, and only the heart-
land of the Arabian Peninsula, the Najd, was direct occupation
and rule though Ottoman rule was generally sterile in that it
imparted no new cultural values or creative impulses to the
Arab world, and though it was often harsh and destructive of
the sources of wealth in it. It did not impinge on the
Arabism of its people so that when they began to awaken, three
4
and a half centuries later, it was as Arabs that they did so.
The Arab Nation (as a total entity) lay dormant until the
defeat of the Turks in World War I. With the fall of the
Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic Empire, all Islamic nations
fell under colonial mandated rule in one way or another (with
the exception of Hajaz and Najd) . Arab pride, piqued through
their fight against the Ottoman Turks, came to the fore as
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Britain and France double-crossed their Arab allies in a
series of secret treaties, the most famous of which was the
Sykes-Picot Agreement of April, 1916.
Early in 1915 Sharif Husayn of Mecca, anxious to rid
himself of the yoke of Ottoman Turkey, corresponded with Sir
Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner of Egypt and
Sudan. For Arab assistance against the Turks, Britain agreed
to establish a new Arab state bounded on the north by a line
drawn eastward from Alexandretta to the Iranian frontier, then
southward to the Persian Gulf and was to include the entire
Arabian peninsula.
The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed only a few
months after agreements embodied in the Husayn-McMahon corres-
pondence were concluded. It allotted to Russia the Turkisk
Strait area, the vilayets of Erzerum, Trabzon, Van, Bittis,
and Kurdistan. France was granted the coastal strip of Syria
northward from Tyre, the vilayet of Adana, and a vague area
of Cilicia. Britain obtained an enclave about Haifa and Acre
on the Mediterranean, and Mesopatamia from Baghdad to the
Persian Gulf. The area of Syria from Damascus and Aleppo
eastward through Mosul to the Iranian frontier was consigned
to French protection, while the region from Kirkuk to Akaba
and from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf became a British
sphere.
The Arabs discovered this treachery only after November,




The result of the Paris Peace Conference, the San Remo
Agreement of 1919, and the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 was that
Arab lands were now the mandates of former Arab allies.
By the end of World War II, seven Arab states had won
their independence and the cause of the Arab Nation was in
full swing. This was aimed primarily at ending foreign
colonial domination in the area and by 1971, all Arab states
were independent.
In 1948, however another incident occurred, which solidi-
fied the reaction of the Arab nation. This was the establish-
ment of the state of Israel. The Arab Nation now had two
causes to play on simultaneously: freedom from colonial
domination and the defeat of Israel.
Added to these were three other factors which at the same
time stimulated the reawakening of the Arab Nation and Arab
Nationalism: (1) the advent of modern means of communication
enhanced contact among the populations of the various Arab
lands. Arabs passed over the narrow confines of their immedi-
ate localities, within which their daily life and vision had
been restricted. This had an incalculable effect on the
emergence of concrete consciousness of the kinship among the
Arab peoples, a consciousness heretofore largely confined to
the intellectual groups; (2) an Arab cultural revival which
gained momentum during this time contributed to the sharpen-
ing of the Arab national consciousness; (3) the idea of
nationalism, the urge for freedom, was felt as a patriotic
longing for protection of one's homeland from foreign usurpers,
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The urge for unity was a corollary demand for the pursuit of
the right of every national community to establish political
7
statehood in its territory.
And so as a result of all these factors the idea of an
Arab Nation reblossomed in the 20th century. In the 1940 's
and 1950 's two events occurred which gave form and substance
to this idea. One was the establishment of the League of
Arab States in 194 5, the second was the ascension to power
of Gamal Abdul Nasser to power in Egypt in 1952.
B. THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND NASSER
The League of Arab States was created toward the end of
World War II and came formally into existence on March 22,
1945, with the signing of a pact by the seven original member
states: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen,
and Transjordan. The league was born as a result of two
main influences, Arab nationalism and British support. Today
the League is composed of twenty one member states.
Perhaps the most salient feature of the League as a
regional organization is the special relationship existing
between its member states. They view themselves not merely
as neighborly states with common interests, but rather as
brotherly states belonging to one Arab Nation. Hence the
relation between the establishment of the League and the
movement toward Arab unity. When the League was created in
1945 it was the nearest proximation to the Arab quest for
o
unity upon which its founders were then able to agree. u The
69

League came into being with the hope, explicitly stated that
Arab states would be able to agree and attempt a consolidation
9
of aims and goals. In short the greatest contribution made
by the League was the bringing together of all sectors of
the Arab World into one Pan-Arab fold.
Just as the League of Arab states gave the Arab Nation a
framework within which to operate, it was Gamal Abdul Nasser
that gave the Nation a personal leader. With the overthrow
of King Farouk in Egypt and his eventual replacement as leader
by Nasser, all the Arab peoples had a leader with whom they
could emphasize and identify with. Nasser was not merely the
Egyptian leader but in reality the leader of the whole Arab
Nation. For it was Nasser who was cheered by all Arabs when
he "turned out the Redcoats," and stood up to Britain, France
and Israel during the 1956 Suez Crisis. It was also the hero
Nasser who could tell the powerful United States to "go to
hell" with its aid. 11
Nasser also worked politically for Arab unity in the forma-
tion of the U.A.R. with Syria and the U.A.S. with Syria and
Yemen. He becme the main spokesman and provocateur for the
Arab World vis-a-vis Israel and championed the cause of
12
Arab nationalists in Morrocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
C. CRACKS IN THE ARAB NATION
However the Arab Nation also had problems on two levels:
(1) the philosophical, a struggle within itself because of
its Islamic roots; and (2) the practical, in that centrifugal
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forces existed which drew the Arab Nation away from
itself
.
Certainly Islam would not exist today if it were not
for its Arab beginnings and conversely Islam provides the
Arab Nation with its cultural and religious cement. Some-
times despite existing differences and a forced blending of
the two to confront challenges from abroad, it seems that they
blend together and become one. At other times each one of
them appears as a weapon with elements that are quite dis-
tinct from each other. Although Islam is the spiritual and
cultural backbone as well as the driving force behind the pan-
Arab trend, the spiritual, intellectual, and political heri-
tage of non-Muslim Arabs also plays a part. Not all Arabs are
Muslim and not all Muslims are Arab.
The divisions and estrangement between Arabism and Islam
has grown since the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution and
most especially since the start of the Iraqi-Iranian War.
Islam is a religion, a frame of mind, a way of life. It
preaches and advocates universal morals and values wherein all
people are equal. It transcends race, geography, and language.
Arabism designates the Arab in particular. It is a national
term, a social, psychological term which manifests an emo-
13tional phenomenon in Arab Society.
Some as Qadaffi, believe there is no place in Arabism
for a non-Muslim, that in order to be an Arab one must be a
14Muslim. Others, as Khomeini, look at Islam as a state, a
state which rules all Muslims, whether they be Arabs or Persians
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The problem arises amongst Arabs because Islam as a
religion is so pervasive throughout the society and govern-
ment of the modern Arab state. The Quran and Hadith provide
instruction for every aspect of the believers life and woe
betide the government or ruler who unwisely rules in contra-
vention of the Sharia. However Arabism exists on another
plane, the plane of politics, governments and unity within
only the Arab Nation. Do Arabs first answer the call of
their ethnicity and culture or that of their religion?
For the Arab Nation, Arabism cannot exist without Islam
and of course Islam cannot exist without Arabism. The forces
of both flow too deeply within the blood of the Arab to
differentiate, but each of the forces may push and pull
simultaneously in different directions.
An Arab war with another Islamic state intensifies these
feelings and it may be for this reason that some Arab states
may have reacted to the war between Iraq and Iran in an Arab
15
manner, while others, in an Islamic manner.
Cracks in the Arab Nation, or disunity, are oftentimes
laid to blame on foreign influences. This however is not the
case since there are a number of centrifugal forces which also
may be listed as causes of disunity: the rivalries among Arab
rulers, the discordant streaks in the Arab political canvas,
the ingrained individulaism and parochialism of the Arab
character, and, indeed, the selfishness inherent in the imper-
fection of human nature and in Arab nature which Arab Nation-
16
alists fail to take into account.
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All these have led to disputes between and amongst Arab
states in contradiction to the concept of the Arab Nation
and may play a major role in the reaction of certain Arab
states to the Iraq-Iran War.
So then it is this question of unity or disunity to use
Lenczowski's phrase which will be looked at next in the reac-
tion of Arab states to the troublesome war waging between
Arab-Islamic Iraq and Persian-Islamic Iran.
The most recent event indicative of the unity of the Arab
Nation was the Arab reaction to the Camp David Accords , in
the calling of the November, 197 8 Baghdad Summit. It looked
as if some real progress could be made toward realization of
the Arab Nation as Iraq and Syria attempted unity, the Yemeni
crisis cooled, and Iraq settled long-standing border disputes
with both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But as the fate of Reza
Pahlavi became clearer and clearer and finally a truism,
cracks began, once again, to appear in the unity and resolve
of the Arab Nation.
The next section examines some of the Arab countries' in-
volved reasons for supporting Iraq or Iran.
D. SAUDI ARABIA
More than anytning else two internal events in November
1979, spurred by external stimuli caused the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia to reevalute its position toward the Islamic Republic
of Ayatollah Khomeini. Initially Saudi Arabia was cautious
in its public pronouncements on the Iranian revolution. Glad
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to see Khomeini's switch away from Israel toward the PLO, but
on the other hand mindful that the Shah was a monarchical
ruler just as is the royal family in Saudi Arabia, and the
fall of the Shah further reduced the ever dwindling number
of monarchies in the world in general and the Middle East in
particular.
Shortly after the seizure of the American Embassy in
Teheran in November, 1979, Saudi Arabia was rocked by the
occupation of the holy mosque in Mecca by a group of Islamic
fundamentalist zealots. Almost simultaneously Shiite demon-
strators in the eastern, oil rich, Saudi Arabian province of
Sayhat rioted in support of Ayatollah Khomeini. Demonstrators,
including women, brandished the now famous placards of the
Ayatollah and chanted slogans against the royal family and
the U.S. Some 20,000 Saudi troops were brought in to quell
the riots with the resultant death of between 5 to 12 demon-
18
strators. Soon thereafter the students holding the Ameri-
can Embassy in Teheran called upon all Saudis to "rise up
19
against their rulers." Shiite riots against the rulers of
Kuwait and Bahrain at about the same time caused the Saudi
government to reevaluate its position regarding the Islamic
revolution and the Islamic government in Teheran. A small
scale rebellion of some Saudi military led by the commander
20
of the Haradh garrison also worried the royal family.
The Saudis worried that they might be the next monarchy
to fall to Islamic fundamentalism. Add this to the Saudi '
s
fear of Soviet encirclement and it is easy to understand the
paranoia of the rulers of the Kingdom.
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As Iraq sent out signals of rapproachment to the con-
servative Arab States, and publicized its willingness to
take up the banner of the Arab cause against the Persians,
the interests of Saudi Arabia and Iraq moved toward accommo-
dation, culminating in quasi -public support for Iraq in the
21
war against Iran. Saudi Arabia has made no official state-
ment offering support for Iraq in the war, although Iraq has
claimed that King Khalid did offer support by telephone.
However Saudi Arabia did publicly endorse a resolution at
the November, 1980 Arab Summit which explicitly expresses
support for the lawful rights of Iraq to its land and water
according to the international agreements previously signed
by Iraq and Iran. It is evident now however that Saudi sup-
port for Iraq in the war goes father back. In fact it is
22
clear that Saddam Hussein's August 1980 visit to the Kingdom
was for the expressed purpose of obtaining Saudi backing for
his forthcoming war with Iran.
But other concerns also occupy Saudi strategy in relation
to the situation. Iraq is without question the most powerful
military force in the area (save Israel). The Saudi' s, who
once looked to the Shah as the protector of the region and
welcomed the safety of his military umbrella, now sought to
replace Iran with Iraq. However it was not very long ago when
Iraq and Saudi Arabia were at least verbal adversaries in
the Arab world. Saddam Hussein once promised to "take the
fight right into the princes' bedrooms," and accused the
Saudi regime of being reactionary and promoting U.S. influence
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23in the Arab world. Iraq also has a longstanding claim over
the sovereignty of Kuwait, and a border dispute with Saudi
Arabia.
Additionally Saudi Arabia is fearful of a spillover of
the war into Saudi territory, especially the oil region,
and is very aware that this region is vulnerable to air
25
attacks from both Iraq and Iran.
Dangers for Saudi Arabia's future lurk on both sides of
the question of the current war. If Iraq were to win then
it surely must take the lead in the Arab world, and while
Saddam Hussein is today amenable to Saudi influence because
of the war, an Iraqi victory may mean that the Kingdom would
be forced to give up its position of preeminence and follow
the Iraqi line out of need for its own security and fear of
a victorious Iraqi military machine. Saudi Arabia is aware
of the Pan-Arab aspirations of Saddam Hussein and realizes
that it must tread carefully in its dealings with Iraq.
An Iranian victory also holds dangers for Saudi Arabia
in that it would enhance Iran's ability to influence events
in the region by virtue of military and religious/governmental
activity. It would increase the risk of domestic turmoil
in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia and might eventually
cause a loss of confidence amongst all Saudis in the present
regime.
On the otherhand Saudi Arabia may benefit from the war,
especially if it is protracted. Saudi influence on Iraq
would become greater, just as Saudi influence in the whole
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Arab world would rise. The absence of Iraqi and Iranian
oil on the world market would allow Saudi Arabia to become
even more influential in OPEC and OAPEC. Additionally, the
threat of decreased Saudi production might be used as a lever
against the West, particularly the U.S.; to tilt the balance
of power in favor of the Arab cause in Palestine.
As the military power of Saddam Hussein was diminished
by a protracted war, Saudi Arabia would have less to fear
from Iraqi military pressure after the war, just as it would
affect Hussein's ability to take the lead in the Arab world
and become the Great Arab Father.
E . SYRIA
Syria, the Arab world's other Ba'athist republic, followed
the general line of all Arab states and welcomed the ouster
of the Shah and the Islamic revolution in Iran. But Syria,
unlike most other Arab states has consistently been supportive
of Khomeini even to the point of backing Iran in the war.
It cannot be overlooked that President Assad and most
27
of the Syrian elite are Alawites, a Shute sect, however
this is felt to be only a tertiary reason, if it can be said
to be a reason at all, for Syria's ongoing support of Iran.
More probably Syria's support for Iran can be seen as a
backlash resulting from the failed attempt at unity between
Syria and Iraq.
As a result of the general unity of the Arab Nation follow-
ing the Baghdad Summit of November, 1978, Syria and Iraq began
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to move toward unity between the two countries and the two
wings of the Ba ' ath Party. Announcing a mutual defense pact
in January, 1979, President Assad and Bakr met in Baghdad
in June 1979 to chart out a program for merging the two
2 8
wings of the party.
The step down of President Bakr from the presidency of
Iraw in July, 1979 was the first signal that there were
problems in unification. Bakr stepped down or was forced to
step down after a coup attempt by Adnan Hussein was uncovered
A number of theories concerning the coup were brought forth
but it soon became clear that "it was an attempt to topple
the regime, to proclaim unity between Iraq and Syria, and
to appoint President Assad at the head of the unified state
29
and party." The leader Adnan Hussein, Iraqi Industry
Minister was reportedly personally in contact with Assad.
Initially, Saddam Hussein refused to publically accuse
Syria, but the chance for unification was over and relations
between the two countries worsened. Syria moved closer to
Iran, with visits between top governmental officials and
official Syrian statements lauding the Iranian revolutionary
31program and criticizing Iraq for its claims on the three
32Gulf Islands.
Damascus accused Iraq of directly providing military sup-
port for the vowed enemies of the Syrian state (i.e., the
Muslim Brotherhood) and of being involved in the June, 1980
33
assassination attempt on President Assad. On August 16,
19 80 Iraqi police and a battery of newsmen stormed the Syrian
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Embassy in Baghdad and uncovered a large weapons and explo-
34
sives cache. Iraqi authorities claimed that the cache was
to be used in another coup attempt while the Syrian Charge
claimed that the Iraqi police had planted the cache in the
Embassy.
Syrian diplomats were expelled from Iraq shortly there-
after, and Syria answered in kind, severing diplomatic rela-
tions with the two countries.
While Syria has offered Iran a great deal of rhetorical
support in its war with Iraw there is little incidence that
the support has been anything more than talk. Syria has
its own problems with an active Muslim Brotherhood organiza-
tion in its country, and with Lebanon which drains both mili-
tary and economic resources from the home front. Syria is not
in a position at this time to offer Iran anything more sub-
stantial in the way of assistance.
However an Iraqi victory in the war holds grave danger
for Assad's Syria. Iraq would then be the leader of the
Arab world and would certainly bring pressure, maybe in the
form of military invasion, to Syria. Iraq would no longer
need to depend on the oil pipelines which provide Syria with
cash from rental fees. And it was most probably this fear
of Iraq which, along with its fear of Israel, caused Syria
to enter into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
Soviet Union in October, 1980. These same considerations
must have also been influential in Assad's decision to join
37Libya m a merger plan.
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A victory by Iran would make Syria the most powerful
Arab military state in the Middle East. This would also
allow Assad to concentrate on Lebanon and his internal prob-
lems while not having to look over his shoulder toward Brother
Saddam. It would also allow Syria to attempt rapproachment
with the more conservative, mainstream Arab states whose
support and cash is vitally needed in the ongoing conflict
in Lebanon against Israel.
A protracted war, which simultaneously bled Saddam Hus-
sein's military machine and kept him occupied in the east,
would also aid Assad in settling his internal disputes and
concentrating on Lebanon.
F . JORDAN
Even though King Husayn of Jordan and Shah Mohammed Reza
Palhavi of Iran were great friends and mutual supporters
while the Shah ruled Iran, Iran had little to do with Jordan's
decision to support Saddam Hussein's Iraw in the war with
Iran. Neither did the Sunni-Shi'a question, or rather fear
of a Shiite revolution in Jordan, affect King Husayn, for his
country is overwhelmingly Sunni. In the same vein, the con-
test for leadership in the Arab Nation appears to have had
little effect on the King's supportive stance toward Iraq.
While there is no denying that King Hussein is afflicted with
a typical Arab state leader's egotism, there is not enough
supportive evidence that Husayn means to parley his position
on the war into a play to become the next Nasser. The same
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cannot be said in relation to the King's reaction to, and
1
8
position on, the Camp David accords.
Rather it seems that Jordan has reacted to Khomeini's
revolution on ideological grounds and to a larger extent to
situational factors in the Arab world. Since the fall of
the Shah in January, 1980, Jordan has not hidden its dis-
approval of revolutionary anti -monarchist Iran. While the
fervor of the revolutionary Shiite movement in Iran seems
to hold little danger for the King on religious grounds, the
anti-monarchical nature of the philosophy which Khomeini seeks
to support is troublesome. Husayn views this brand of revo-
lutionary Islam as an ideological enemy, a potential threat
to Jordan itself and to its traditional Saudi Arabian and
39Gulf State allies. In addition to opposition on ideologi-
cal lines, Jordan's relations with Iraq, which have been con-
siderably strengthened in recent years, is a factor. In
regional terms, Iraq is a wealthy and powerful state and
Jordan has every reason to want to cultivate a favorable
relationship with its economically and politically powerful
neighbor to the east. Jordan's relations with Iraq have im-
proved significantly since the November, 1978 Baghdad Summit.
Since that time, Jordan has received large amounts of Iraqi
aid, designed primarily to provide the Hashemite Kingdom
with the necessary financial backing to enable King Husayn
40
to withstand pressures to join the Camp David process.
The collapse of the attempted Syrian-Iraqi rapproachment
and the December, 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which
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further aroused existing Iraqi apprehension with Soviet moves
in the Middle East periphery, combined to make Jordan an
attractive and increasingly necessary ally for Iraq. With
enemies to its east and west (Syria and Iran respectively)
,
it is not surprising that Iraq was interested in Jordan's
friendship. Jordan has an army of significant strength in
regional terms, a stable and basically pro-Western regime
also concerned about the menacing posture of the Soviet Union.
Additionally, because of the war in the Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq
needed access to a port other than its own to keep its supply
line to the outside world open and King Husayn was only too
happy to continue Iraq's access to his port of Aqaba.
On the other hand, Jordan's deteriorating relations with
Syria to the north and the constant danger of Israel to the
west combined to make an Iraqi-Jordanian rapproachment mutually
beneficial. The internal weakness of the Assad regime has
made Syria in comparison to Iraq, a less attractive partner
for Jordan. Moreover since Syria's recent move toward the
Soviet Union, Syrian policies have become less and less
attractive to pro-West Jordan. Jordan's position on the
Muslim Brotherhood and its attempts to overthrow the regime
of President Assad led to increasing tension between the two
countries. In October, 1980 Syria massed some of its forces
on the Jordanian border, and Jordan answered in kind by
i 41
mobilizing its army in preparation for any Syrian attack.
Syria accused Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq of funneling
weapons to the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria and of offering
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sanctuary to the Brotherhood inside the respective countries.
So it would seem that Jordan has opted to support Iraq for
reasons of its own economic well being (i.e., to keep the
assistance flowing from Iraq and Saudi Arabia) and for its
own national security interests (i.e., using the threat of
Iraqi military assistance to keep both Syria and Israel at
bay) .
An Iraqi victory would enhance Jordan's economic inter-
ests and security interests in the short run, for the King
would be able to cash in the markers of good will he has built
up with Iraq. In the long run, however, King Husayn may not
be able to keep Saddam Hussein's pan-Arab goals in check
without seeking another backer and benefactor.
An Iranian victory would place Jordan in a difficult
position since it would mean the loss of Iraqi guaranteed
insurance in the face of the King's other enemies. The King
would be in an especially dangerous position if the Lebanon
situation were settled since Syria could then concentrate all
its military forces on pressuring Jordan.
G. KUWAIT
The war between Iran and Iraq holds considerable danger
for the Kingdom of Kuwait both from internal and external
forces. Kuwait sits at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab and
is extraordinarily vulnerable to attack from either Iraq or
Iran. Additionally about 25 percent of Kuwaiti citizens
adhere to the Shi' a sect of Islam and that according to its
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19 80 census, Kuwaiti nationals make up only 41 percent of the
43
country's population.
Kuwait is ruled by a monarchical family (the al-Sabah
family)
,
just as are the other small Arab states in the Gulf,
and because of this is less than happy with the overthrow of
the Shah and the monarchical form of government in Iran. Early
on Kuwait realized the danger of Khomeini's avowed intention
to export the Islamic revolution and to topple the Gulf sheiks
and kings from power. So much so that Kuwait sought to de-
fuse the opportunity for Shi 'a unrest and in September, 1979
deported Ayatollah Khomeini's man in Kuwait, Hojatoleslam
Sayyed Abbas al-Mohri, his son and supporters to Iran, even
44though they were Kuwaiti citizens. Nevertheless in November,
1979, Shiite Kuwaitis marched on the U.S. Embassy in support
of the Iranian student takeover of Teheran's U.S. Embassy,
and the policies of Ayatollah Khomeini. Kuwait also was
concerned by the Shi ' a uprisings in the eastern province of
Saudi Arabia, and the large and bloody riots in support of
Khomeini which periodically took place on the neighboring,
and monarchically ruled, island of Bahrain.
Kuwait also confiscated the passports of several prominent
Kuwaitis, Khalid Khalof, a former member of parliament, and
Dr. Hamod Nusayr, a former deputy oil minister, for partici-
. . . 45pating in Shiite activities.
Early on in the war the Kuwaiti press came out in support
of Iraq in the war, linking an Iraqi victory to an Arab vic-
tory and opining that the war would "determine the entire
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future of the Arab nation and the future of the whole Arab
homeland.
"
Kuwait is a wealthy oil rich nation and the war has
threatened its ability to both produce its oil (by the
Iranian air attacks on the Kuwaiti border) and to market its
oil (for fear of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz) . As
wealthy as Kuwait is, it is practically unable to defend
itself against any outside power because of its geographical
vulnerability and because of the miniscule size of its popu-
lation in relation to any of its neighboring states. So
Kuwait sought to guarantee its security by casting its lot
with Iraq and to ingratiate itself to the Arab world by
taking the position that the war was a war which threatened
the entire Arab world. Vulnerable to overthrow from an Islamic
revolution from within, and certainly no match for even the
depleted Iranian military machine, Kuwait opted to place
itself under the Iraqi umbrella of protection. Kuwait, as
did all the Arab states attending the November, 1980 Arab
Summit, endorsed a resolution supporting the lawful rights
of Iraq in regard to Iran.
However, Kuwait is also very aware of the longstanding
claim by Iraq on the entire area of Kuwait. A year after
the time of Iraqi independence, King Ghazi called for the
annexation of Iraq, and the claim has been ongoing, erupting
in a low level border war in 197 3 and followed by three
47
Iraqi border incursions over the next four years. The
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dispute was settled during bilateral discussions in 1977
and 1978, but Kuwait must be wary of Iraq's intentions,
since the war with Iran is publically over a border dispute
supposedly settled by treaty in 1975.
A victory in the current war by Iran would leave Kuwait
open to danger from its own Shiite minority on the internal
scene, with almost guaranteed support for Islamic fundamen-
talists coming from Iran. Kuwait is so militarily powerless
that Iran would be able to dictate its will to Kuwait, as it
would to the other Gulf states, unless Kuwait could find
another military protector in the area. But a loss by Iraq
would remove the only military force in the area capable of
balancing Iran's power and aims, at least for a while.
An Iraqi victory would benefit Kuwait, at least in the
short run, for it would remove both the internal and external
dangers which Iran poses to Kuwait. A victorious Iraq however
would soon most probably be a threat to Kuwait at first by
dominating the area and the Arab nation and eventually
through direct military action on its longstanding claim to
Kuwait.
The best result for the national security interests of
the government of Kuwait would be a long protracted conflict
during which both Iraq and Iran would bleed themselves white,
allowing Saudi Arabia to take up the gauntlet as the Gulf




That Libya, an Arab state, in fact because of its leader
Colonel Qaddafi, the most vocal Arab state in support of the
Arab Nation, should support the Persian state of Iran in its
war against Arab Iraq at first might seem a total misnomer.
It was Libya who in 1971 broke diplomatic relations with
Great Britain and nationalized British Petroleum in retalia-
tion for Britain's alledged deal with the Shah which allowed
Iran to occupy the Gulf Islands. Furthermore Qaddafi has
been implicated in the death of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a Lebanese
Shiite and ally of Ayatollah Khomeini in late August, 1980.
However an examination of the forces and factors which influ-
ence the Libyan leader bring some rationality to a possibly
irrational stance.
Of all Arab leaders Qaddafi is probably the one with least
to worry about as far as domestic challenges are concerned.
Although he has occasionally had to put down minor revolts
within the ranks of the army, Qaddafi is well in control
and generally seems to enjoy a modicum of support from the
Libyan people. Enormous wealth from oil revenues has found
its way to the lower classes acting as an opiate, combined
with a ruthless policy of suppression by violence against any
dissidents inside or outside Libya have allowed Qaddafi to
remain securely on the throne of political supremacy since
his takeover in 1969.
Of all Arab political leaders Qaddafi is the one least
accepted by his peers. This is due to perceived irrationality
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of action by Qaddafi of other Arab leaders. The pan-Arab
actions and orations of other Arabs pale in significance
when matched against Qaddafi' s. The colonel is convinced that
he is Nasser's successor and that only he can unit the Arab
Nation. In fact in no Arab state since Nasser's Egypt has
one man become so visibly the Nation. It is no coincidence
that Qaddafi has frequently alluded to his dream of becoming
the new Nasser of the Arab world. It was reported in 1980
that he had attempted to buy the tomb of Nasser for $500
million in order to move it to Tripoli and turn it into an
Arab shrine.
It is this dream of Qaddafi that is the most prominent
feature in explaining his opposition to Iraq in the war.
It is merely a personality conflict between two Arab rulers
who each see themselves as the "Great Arab Father" and leader
of the Arab Nation, Moammar Qaddafi and Saddam Huseein.
Qaddafi had no other choice but to oppose Iraq or he would
have vacated his claim to Arab leadership and be required to
follow the dictates of Saddam Hussein on Arab issues. Nasser's
successor could not do that.
A secondary, though important factor for Libya's support
of Iraq, is Libya's relations with the conservative Arab
states. Again this issue revolves directly around the grating
personality and contradictory proclamations of Qaddafi.
In March, 197 3 Qaddafi said, "the Quran provided solutions
for all problems and concepts. The Quran transcends place
and time. It is for this reason that we say no matter how
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much the world develops, it cannot infringe upon the Quran
49
or ascribe inadequacies to it." However in June, 1978
Qaddafi proclaimed, "The Quran does not address the problems
that we deal with in governing society. The Quran is one
50text and one book. These pronouncements did not endear
him to the conservative Muslim states.
Strangely enough, but with perfectly rational irration-
ality Qaddafi also said, "the fact that the leader of Iran
has adopted the cause of the Islamic Revolution is a great
thing, but we must understand that Islam is the religion of
51the Arabs. Islam was sent to the Arab Nation." So even
in opposition to the mainstream of Arab thought, Qaddafi tries
to hold on to his Arab Islamic credentials.
Qaddafi' s "Green Book" establishes the people's authority
and sets up the "age of the masses" through revolutionary
committees which are designed to destory imported interpre-
tations and reactionary ideas and to prevent facist per-
sonality cults. Yet he in effect legitimizes these revolutionary
committees by force of his own personality cult when he says,
"these committees (revolutionary committees) represent me
52personally.
"
Qaddafi also struck another blow at Islam and incurred
the wrath of the conservative Arab states and the ulema when
he said, "If anyone wants to challenge the revolution, we will





Probably the only consistent area of Qaddafi's policy
in regards to the Arab world has been his long and unyield-
ing support of the Palestinians, and it was because of this
support that Qaddafi was tolerated by the conservative Arab
states. However Libya's support of non-Arab Iran and his
condemnation of Saudi Arabia for defiling the Holy Places
by allegedly placing them under American control (i.e., allow
USAF AWACS aircraft in the country) were the proverbial straws
which infuriated the conservative Arab states and brought
about the break with Saudi Arabia in October, 19 80. Saudi
Arabia has been generally reluctant to publically criticize
other Arab states or leaders but considered Qaddafi's attack
so outrageous that it accused him of plotting to undermine
Arab nationalism, of being an atheist and worst of all, being
54the son of a Jewish mother.
Libya's attempt at merger with Iran's other ally would
seem to have little if any meaning, since it is a standard
modus operandi of Qaddafi to attempt to affect union with
Arab states in the cause of the Arab Nation only to have the
idea quietly disappear from view after a short time.
It does not appear that a victory in the war between
Iraq and Iran on either side will have any effect on the
fortunes of Libya, for Qaddafi it seems has this time broken
all the rules of Arab statesmanship. Whether the conserva-
tive Arab states will actively seek his overthrow remains
to be seen, but there appears to be only one country able to
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bring this neo-Nasser and his country back into the Arab
fold and that country is Israel.
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V. IMPACT OF THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE WAR
ON THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R.
No examination of the Iraq-Iran War would be complete
without a discussion of the impact on the two superpowers,
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and the potential opportunities offered
to both.
In the event of a continued protracted conflict or stale-
mate, the Soviet Union will most probably continue its criti-
cism of the U.S. attempting to halt or minimize any coor-
dinated action by the West in the Gulf. The Soviets would
most probably seek to fulfill two goals: (1) to assume a
fundamental role in dominating access to the oil lines of
communication from the Gulf; (2) and to continue to work to
attempt to negate the effect of U.S. forward-basing in the
area. The Soviets could also supply arms to both sides hoping
to retain the good will of each government and an inroad for
possible future condominiums, but any supply of arms will be
covertly undertaken for fear of atagonizing the other side
and its allies.
A protracted conflict might further split the Arab states
and allow the U.S. to increase pressure on some states to
support the Camp David Accords. Additionally a weakened Iraq
would leave a state friendly to the U.S., Saudi Arabia, in a
dominant position amongst the Arab states. However a pro-
tracted war also holds the danger of spreading to neighboring
oil producing states and restricting the flow of oil to the
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West, and forcing U.S. involvement to keep the oil flowing
risking the chance of a superpower showdown.
In the case of an Iraqi victory, the Soviet Union would
attempt to move quickly to keep its ties with Iraq on good
footing, since most probably Iraq would then be the uncon-
tested leader in the Arab world. The U.S.S.R. would also seek
to economically assist Iran in the hopes that it would be
able to increase its influence in Iran in the future. If
an Iraqi victory brought upon the disintegration of Iran could
be disposed to support pro-Soviet groups within Iran or even
might seek to engineer an Afghanistan-style coup and intervention
A victorious Iraq, as new leader of the Arab world, would
most probably doom any hope of the Camp David Peace process
from spreading to other Arab states. Furthermore the clamor
from Israel for more arms would reach a new high as Iraq's
victorious military machine turned its eyes westward. How-
ever the recent apparent moderation of Saddam Hussein and his
tilt toward the West could offer the U.S. new opportunities
to wean Iraq away from the Soviet Union and bring it fully
into the discussion of the Arab-Israeli issue as a rational
actor.
Iran mindful of the lumbering Soviet bear on its northern
border might also be better disposed due to its weakened
condition to reach some sort of accommodation with the U.S.,




In the unlikely event of an Iranian victory the Soviet
Union might expect Khomeini and his Islamic fundamentalists
to continue to seek to export their style of revolution to
the surrounding Gulf States. This could ultimately bring about
the fall of the governments of some conservative Arab states,
an outcome, especially if it occurred in Saudi Arabia, that
would be a serious setback for the United States. However,
the Islamic revolution is also anti-communist and Iran could
also seek to export its revolution to the large Moslem minori-
ties in the southern U.S.S.R. and Islamic Afghanistan.
For the U.S. an Iranian victory could see Saudi Arabia
emerge as the leader of the Arab states and might presage a
more rational approach by Arab states to the problems of the
Middle East. An Iran trying to export its revolution could
also draw more Arab states closer to the U.S., including Iraq.
The ruling regime in Iran would be in a better domestic posi-
tion and stability on the homefront would increase. Iran
would undoubtedly remain very anti-U.S., but increased sta-
bility at home would lessen the danger of any Soviet military





Just as the Shatt-al-Arab and Gulf Islands disputes were
only the convenient incidents espoused for the cause of the
Iraq-Iran War, so too the Shatt-al-Arab and the Gulf Islands
played little if any role in the reaction of Arab states,
specifically the choice of which side to support.
Just as the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, the personal feud be-
tween Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Kheomeini, Iraq's quest
for leadership of the Arab Nation, and Iran's quest for
leadership of the Islamic world were the real causes of the
war, so too were these factors, combined with the interne-
cine rivalry between Arab leaders, the real causes for the
decision of Arab states to support Iraq or Iran. And it is
those same factors which will undoubtedly continue to influ-
ence the interaction of Arab states throughout the next
decade at least.
Saudi Arabia's support for Iraq is due to fears for its
own internal security, the continuation of the monarchy, and
the spread of Islamic revolution not only to its eastern,
heavily Shiite populated province but to its people in general
as well. Saudi Arabia needs strong allies because it is a
relatively militarily weak state. But just as England was
in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries in Europe, Saudi Arabia
does not wish to have the Middle East and particularly the
Persian Gulf area under the domination of any single country,
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be it Jewish, Persian, or Arab. Saudi Arabia will publically
play the Arab Nation game but it will move behind the scenes
to ensure its freedom and survival by using its only asset,
petro dollars, to buy friends and buy off enemies.
Syria, on the other hand, a public ally of Iran, has
chosen its course out of fear of Iraq and to some extent
Saudi influence. Syria is in a difficult position literally
surrounded by unfriendly states and in severe turmoil from
within, while at the same time occupying Lebanon and fighting
an undeclared war with Isarel. Foolishly Syria became in-
volved in, or let itself be put into a position where it
seemed it was involved in a plotted coup against Iraq. It
was then just a matter of time before Saudi Arabia and Jordan
would back the more powerful protector of their own security,
Iraq, and further threaten Syria. So Syria took itself out
of the Arab mainstream, joined the Arab pariah Qaddaf i and
sought to insure its own security by virtue of a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. The ideological
Ba'athist dispute with Iraq over leadership of the Resurrection
Party and the personal hatred between Assad and Saddam Hussein
also led Syria to its present state but they are now secondary
as Syria tries to survive. If Syria and Assad are to survive,
it will only be a matter of time before those two factors
come to dominate Syrian and Iraqi relations.
Jordan also chose sides in the war with its own national
security interests driving the situation. Saudi Arabia and
Iraq pay the bill for King Husayn and he could not last long
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against Israel or Syria were it not for Saudi dollars and
Iraqi dollars and military capabilities.
Kuwait is typical of the Arab Gulf states insofar as its
ability to defend itself is concerned. It has a front row
seat on the stage of the war at times even feeling the heat
of battle. In order to survive Kuwait has opted to support
the lesser of two immediate threats to its physical and economic
existence, Iraq. But Kuwait knows that in the event of the
end of the war, most especially if it spells victory for
Iraq, it will only be a matter of time before the leader of
the Arab Nation, Saddam Hussein looks south to its little
oil rich neighbor and drags out Iraq's longstanding claim to
the territory of Kuwait.
Libyan support for Iran is driven solely by the personal
ambitions of its messianic ruler, Moammar Qaddafi. Iraq, in
the personage of Saddam Hussein, is a direct affront to
Qaddafi 1 s dream of universal Arab acceptance as a latter-day
Nasser. In alienating the conservative Arab states, Qaddafi
has, however, made a grevious error from which he will almost
certainly not be able to recover, no matter what the outcome
of the war.
The war itself seems destined to go on for sometime to
come since neither side is willing to give in to the demands
of the other. Saddam Hussein is vulnerable if he cannot keep
the homefront satisfied and comfortable. He seems content at
present to sit and wait until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini




Iran, on the other hand, cannot wait, for Khomeini's
death will almost certainly cause the country to self-destruct,
The Arab states will watch Iran closely for fear of a civil
war that might bring the Tudeh (communist) Party to power and
give the Soviet Union a further opportunity on the "arc of
crisis .
"
It seems that there has been a new Arab Alliance formed
by the Iraqi-Iranian War, an alliance that has split the
solidarity of the Arab Nation which seemed so concrete after
the 1978 Baghdad Summit. It. might appear the new alliance
is formed along East-West lines, on Pan-Arab lines, or along
personal lines of hatred amongst the elite. Certainly the
war has tested the mettle of the Arab Nation, has made the
Arab reevaluate his position within the Islamic world, and
has seriously muddied the waters for future Arab cooperation.
But the factors that have caused this new alliance to come
into being are as unpredictable as the sands of the desert,
and in time the sands will shift again in the direction of the
then prevailing winds to alter the situation. Arab alliances
are not made for ideological commitments to the larger Arab
Nation, nor are they made for Islamic reasons. They are
made for fear of losing power, in order to maintain accumu-
lated power, and in order to acquire new power. Ideological,
religious, and ethnic factors are nothing more than convenient
baggage used to justify moves to assist the national security
objectives of any state. Churchill's words were meant for
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Europe especially England, but are just as correct when
applied to the Arab Nation, "There are no permanent alli-
ances, only permanent interests."
Hence there is only one real winner in this war which has
split the Arab Nation. As long as they quarrel amongst
themselves and build up barriers between Arab states, only
Israel stands to prosper. It is to Israel's benefit to
have the Arab states occupied quarreling amongst themselves
and using their resources to fight Iran. In fact it is only
Israel which can make the Arab Nation work as a unit, it is
only Israel which can engender enough emotion and hatred to
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IRAN-IRAQ: TREATY ON INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS
[Baghdad, June 13, 1975]
Following is the full text of the International Border and
Good Neighborly Relations Treaty concluded between Iraq and
Iran.
The President of the Republic of Iraq and His Imperial
Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran, in view of the sincere willing-
ness of the two parties expressed in the Algiers agreement of
March 6, 1975, to reach an ultimate and permanent settlement
of all outstanding questions between the two countries;
And in view of the fact that the two paries have conducted
a final redemarcation of their land borders on the basis of
the Constantinople proptocol of 1913 and the minutes of the
Border Demarcation Commission's Sessions of 1914 and have
demarcated their river borders in accordance with Thalweg line;
and in view of their willingness to restore security and
mutual confidence along their joint borders;
And in view of the historical, religious, cultural and
neighborly relations between the peoples of Iraq and Iran;
And proceding from their desire to consolidate the rela-
tionships of friendship and good neighbor liness, promote their
relations in the economic and cultural fields and enhance the
ties between their peoples to a better standard of the princi-
ples of territorial security, border sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of each other;
And in view of their determination to establish a new era
of friendly relations between Iraq and Iran on the basis of
full respect for national independence and equality in national
sovereignty and proceeding from their behalf in the mutual
implementation of the principles and realization of the objec-
tives and purposes provided for in the United Nations Charter;
Have resolve to conclude this treaty and authorize their
commissioned representatives.
President of the Republic of Iraq...
His Excellency Saadoun Hammadi, the Foreign Minister of
Iraq;
His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran. .
.
His Excellency Abgas Ali Khalatbari, the Foreign Minister
of Iran.
Who, after exchanging instruments of their full authoriza-
tion, which they have found authentic and consistent with




The two supreme contracting parties confirmed that the
international land borders between Iraq and Iran are those
which have been re-demarcated in accordance with the princi-
ples and pursuant to the provisions of protocol for the re-
demarcation of land borders and supplements thereto, appended
with this treaty.
ARTICLE TWO
The two supreme contracting parties confirmed that the
international borders in Shatul-Arab are those demarcated in
accordance with the principles and pursuant to the provisions
of protocol for the demarcation of river borders and supple-
ments thereto, appended with this treaty
ARTICLE THREE
The two supreme contracting parties undertake to practice
along the borders in general a firm and effective control for
the purpose of stopping all penetrations of subversive nature,
wherever they may emanate, on the principles and pursuant to
the provisions of protocol on border security appended with this
treaty.
ARTICLE FOUR
The two supreme contracting parties confirm that provisions
of the three protocols and their appendices mentioned in arti-
cles 1, 2 and 3 hereof, supplementary thereto, which constitute
an inseparable part thereof, are final and permanent provisions,
irrevocable for whatever reason and shall represent undivisible
elements for a comprehensive settlement, and consequently any
encroachment upon any element of such comprehensive settlement
is contradictory in principle to the essence of Algiers agreement
ARTICLE FIVE
Within the context of non-encroachment on borders and the
strict respect for the safety of national territories of both
states, the two supreme contracting parties confirmed that the
line of their territorial and water borders is unencroachable,
permanent and final.
ARTICLE SIX
1. In the event of any dispute arising pertaining to the
interpretation or implementation of this agreement, the three
protocols and appendices, such dispute shall be resolved within
the framework of strict respect for the Iraqi-Iranian border
line specified in the Articles 1 and 2 above, and within the
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Articles 1 and 2 above, and within the context of safeguarding
Iraqi-Iranian border security pursuant to Article 3 above.
2. Such dispute shall be resolved by the two supreme con-
tracting parties, in the first stage, through direct bilateral
negotiations within a period of two months, effective from the
date of an application by any party.
3. In the case of non-agreement, the two supreme contract-
ing parties shall, within a period of three months, seek the
good offices of a third friendly state.
4. In the case that any of the two parties declines to
utilize the good offices, or in the case that their arrangements
prove ineffective, the dispute shall be resolved by means of
arbitration within a period not exceeding one month, effective
from the date of rejection or failure.
5. In the case of non-agreement between the two supreme
contracting parties on arbitration procedures, any of the su-
preme contracting parties shall have the rights, within 15
days effective from the date of non-agreement, to resort to an
arbitration tribunal. For the purpose of forming an arbitra-
tion tribunal to resolve each dispute, each of the two supreme
contracting parties may appoint one of its subjects as an arbi-
trator, and the two arbitrators shall nominate an umpire. In
the case of failure on the parts of the two supreme contracting
parties to appoint their respective arbitrators within a period
of one month, effective from the date of delivery by any party
of a notice from the other, demanding arbitration, or in the
case that the two arbitrators fail to reach agreement on the
nomination of the umpire, prior to the elapse of the said period,
the supreme contracting party which has demanded arbitration
shall have the right to call upon the chairman of the International
Court of Justice to appoint the arbitrators or the umpire in
accordance with the procedures of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.
6. Decisions by the Permanent court of arbitration shall
be binding and implementable by both supreme contracting parties.
7. The two supreme contracting parties shall equally share
arbitration expenses.
ARTICLE SEVEN
This treaty and the three protocols appended therewith shall
be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Each of the two supreme contracting parties shall ratify
this treaty and the three protocols appended therewith in
accordance with its internal law.
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This treaty and the three protocols appended therewith
shall become effective as of the exchanging instruments of
ratification, due to take place in the city of Teheran.
Pursuant thereupon, the two authorized commissioners, de-
putized by the two supreme contracting parties, have signed
this treaty and the three protocols appended therewith.
Written at Baghdad on the 13th Day of June 1975.
Abbas Ali Khalatbari
Foreign Minister of Iran
Saadoun Hammadi
Foreign Minister of Iraq
The treaty and the three protocols appended therewith have
been endorsed in the presence of His Excellency Abdul Aziz
Bouteflika member and Foreign Minister of Algeria.
Following is the text of the Protocol on Border Security
between Iraq and Iran.
Pursuant to the resolution of Algiers Agreement of March
6th 197 5, and proceeding from the keenness to consolidate
security and mutual confidence along joint border.
Proceeding from their determination to exercise an effective
control along borders to cease all infiltrations of subversive
nature and to establish a close cooperation between them, with
a view to preventing any infiltration or illegal passage through
the common borders, with purpose of subversion, revolution or
mutiny;
With reference to Teheran protocol dated March 15, minutes
of the Foreign Ministers meeting concluded in Baghdad on April
20, 1975, and minutes of the Foreign Ministers meeting con-
cluded in Algiers on May 20, 1975.
The two contracting parties have agreed to the following
provisions.
ARTICLE ONE
The two contracting parties shall exchange information re-
lated to the movement of subversive elements which penetrate
into any of the countries with a view to limit acts of subver-
sion, revolution or mutiny in that country.
The two contracting parties shall take appropriate measures




Each shall notify the other immediately of the identity
of such persons; it is agreed that they shall utilize all
measures to prevent them from committing acts of subversion.
The same measures shall be adopted against the persons who
gather in the territory of any contracting party with a view
to committing acts of sabotage or subversion in the territory
of the other party.
ARTICLE TWO
established between competent
of both contracting parties shall be applicable in respect of
border closure with the purpose of preventing the penetration
of subversive elements, at the level of border authorities of
both countries, through to the highest levels of Ministers of




Potential penetration inlets which may be conducted by the
subversive elements have been specified in the following manner.
1. Northern borders area; from the juncture point of
Iraqi/Turkish Iranian borders through Khanaqin-Qasr Sherin
(inclusive— 21 points) )
.
2. Southern borders area; From Khanaqin-Qasr Sherin (inclu-
sive) through the Iraqi-Iranian borders—17 points.
3. The penetration points specified here above are detailed
in the appendix [Note: Appendix is not reproduced.]
4. Inclusive with the points specified here above shall
be any other penetration point to be discovered in the future,
which should be closed and controlled.
5. All border passage points, except those currently as-
signed to customs authorities checkpoints, shall be subject to
total passage embargo.
6. In view of the significance of developing versatile norms
of relation between the two neighborly countries, the two con-
tracting parties have agreed that in the future, in accordance
with mutual agreement, other passage points be specified to
be under customs authority control.
ARTICLE FOUR
1. The two contracting parties, undertake to assign necessary
human and material facilities for effective border closure and
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control against any penetration of subversive elements through
the passage points specified in Article three above.
2. In the case that expe s, due to experience acquired
on the subject, consider that more effective measures should
be adopted, means the shall be specified through monthly
meetings of border authorities of both countries or through
contacts made, when necessary, between such authorities.
Results of such meetings, together with their minutes shall
be notified to supreme authorities in each party; in the case
of dispute between border authorities, competent heads of
departments, in Baghdad and Teheran, shall meet to reach entente




1. Arrested saboteurs shall be handed over to the authori-
ties concerned of the party in the territory of which they are
arrested, and shall be subject to the legislations in effect
therein.
2. The two contracting parties shall notify each other of
the measures adopted in respect of the persons referred to in
para 1 hereof.
3. In the case of border crossing by wanted saboteurs the
authorities of the other party shall be notified, which shall




When necessary, by agreement between the two contracting
parties, embargo areas maybe specified with a view to preventing
saboteurs from attaining their ends.
ARTICLE SEVEN
For the purpose of establishing and developing useful
cooperation between the two parties, a permanent joint committee
consisting of heads of border administrations and representa-
tives of the Foreign Ministries of both parties shall be set
up. The committee shall hold two annual meetings at the beginning
and middle of each calendar year.
However, at the request of any party, extraordinary meetings
may be held to consider the most appropriate utilization of
moral and material facilities for the border closure and conttrol
and for the effective and good implementation of basic provisions




Provisions of this protocol pertaining to the closure and
control of borders shall not affect special agreements between
Iraq and Iran related to grazing rights and border commission.
ARTICLE NINE
For the purpose of safeguarding the security of joint water
borders in Shatt-ul-Arab and precluding the penetration of sub-
versive elements from both parties the two contracting parties
shall adopt effective measures, notably by establishing check-
points equipped with patrol boats.
Written at Baghdad on the 13th of June 1975.
Saadoun Hammadi
Foreign Minister of Iraq
Abbas Ali Khalatbari
Foreign Minister of Iran
This protocol was endorsed in the presence of His Excellency
Abdul Aziz Bouteflika, RCC Member and Foreign Minister of Algeria
The following is the text of the re-demarcation of land
border protocols between Iraq and Iran;
In accordance to what was agreed upon in the Algiers com-
munique dated March 6, 1975 the two contracting parties agreed
upon the following provisions:
ARTICLE ONE
The two contracting parties confirm and realize that the
redemarcation of international borders between Iraq and Iran
has been conducted on land by the joint Iraqi-Iranian Algerian
Committee on the basis of the following:
1. The Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of
the Turkish Persian Border Demarcation Commission of 1914;
2. Teheran Protocol dated March 17, 1975;
3. Minutes of Foreign Minister's meeting concluded in
Baghdad on April 20, 19 75, which approved, inter alia, the
minutes of the Committee entrusted with the redemarcation of
land borders concluded in Teheran on March 30, 1975;
4. Minutes of the Foreign Minister's meeting concluded in
Algiers on May 20, 19 75;
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5. Descriptive minutes of the demarcation of land borders
between Iraq and Iran written by the Committee entrusted with
the demarcation of land borders dated June 13, 1975. These
minutes constitute Appendix No. 1 to this protocol. [Note:
A-pendices are not reproduced.]
6. Maps scale 1/50000, on which territorial border line
is demarcated together with the locations of old and new cross-
lines. These maps make up Appendix No. 2 which is an inseparable
part of this protocol. [Note: Appendices are not reproduced.]
7. Description cards of old and new crosspoints.
8. Document related to projection lines of border pegs.
9. Aerial photographs of Iraqi-Iranian border surroundings
with the locations of old and new peg points.
B. The two parties undertake to finalize demarcation of
border points between peg points fourteen and fifteen within
a period of two months.
C. The two contracting parties shall cooperate to produce
aerial photographs related to Iraqi-Iranian territorial borders,
to be used for the demarcation of border lines on maps; scale
1/25000, together with demarcation of peg positions, within
a period not exceeding one year, effective May 20, 1975. This
should cause no prejudice to the implementation of the treaty
on which this protocol constitutes an inseparable part.
As a result of this, the descriptive minutes of territorial
borders, mentioned in Para. 5 above, shall be amended.
Maps clarified in accordance with provisions of Para. C
shall replace all presently available maps.
ARTICLE TWO
The international Iraqi-Iranian border shall follow the
line specified in the descriptive minutes drawn on the maps
mentioned in Para. 5 and 6, ARticle 1 above, with due considera-
tion of provisions of Para. C of the said Article.
ARTICLE THREE
The border line defined in ARticles 1 and 2 of this protocol
shall also demarcate, in a vertical direction, the air space
and underground of both countries.
ARTICLE FOUR
The two contracting parties shall set up a joint Iraqi-
Iranian committee to settle the position of real estate property,
buildings, technical installations, etc., whose title deeds will
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change accordingly as a result of the re-demarcation of Iraqi-
Iranian borders, in a spirit of good neighbor liness and coopera-
tion, by means of repurchase, compensation or any other satis-
factory form, with a view to avoiding any source of dispute;
the committee shall carry out such settlement of public property
within a period of two months. As for claims related to private
property, the committee shall submit, within a maximum period
of two months, a report denoting that the position of such
private property will be settled within the subsequent three-
month period.
ARTICLE FIVE
1. A joint committee from the authorities of the two countries
has been set up to survey border peg points and authenticate
their positions
.
Such survey shall be conducted annually in the month
of September by the above mentioned committee in accordance
with a time table to be drawn up thereby reasonably prior
thereto
.
2. Any of the two contracting parties may apply in writing
to the other party for the conduct by the committee of an extra
survey of the peg points; in such case the survey shall be com-
menced within a maximum period of 30 days from the application
date.
3. The joint committee undertaking survey, shall write down
minutes related thereof and submit them, duly endorsed thereby,
to the competent authorities of both countries. The committee
may decide to establish new peg points, when necessary, with
the same specifications of present pegs provided that such
action shall not be conducive to changing the course of the
border line. In such case, the competent authorities of the
two countries shall check the peg points and projection lines
on relative maps and documents mentioned in Article 1 of this
protocol.
These authorities shall place the above mentioned peg in
their proper positions under supervision of the joint committee
which shall write down minutes on the work concluded, to be
submitted to the competent authorities in both countries for
filing together with the documents specified in Article one
of this protocol.
4. The two contracting parties shall jointly afford the
cost of peg maintenance.
5. The joint committee shall replace pegs moved out of
their places, rebuild destroyed or lost pegs in accordance
with maps and documents mentioned in Article one of this proto-
col and adhere strictly not to change the position of pegs under
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any circumstances. The joint committee shall, in such cases,
write down minutes on the work concluded, to be submitted
to competent authorities in both countries
.
6. Competent authorities in both countries shall exchange
information related to the condition of border pegs, with a
view to securing the most appropriate means and techniques
for their protection and maintenance.
7
.
The two contracting parties undertake to adopt all the
necessary measures to protect the pegs and punish individuals
who may commit the crime of moving them from their positions,
destroy them or damage them.
ARTICLE SIX
The two contracting parties have agreed that provisions of
this protocol, which have been concluded without any reserva-
tion, will organize them now on any border question between
Iraq and Iran, and officially undertake to react accordingly
to their mutual and final borders.
Written at Baghdad on the 13th of June, 197 5.
Abbas Ali Khalatbari
Foreign Minister of Iran
Dr. Saadoun Hammade
Foreign Minister of Iraq
This treaty and the three protocols appended therewith have
been endorsed in the presence of H.E. Abdul Aziz Douteflika,
RCC Member and Foreign Minister of Algeria.
Following the full text of the Protocol on the demarcation
of Iraq-Iran Water Borders:
Pursuant to the agreement incorporated in Algiers Declara-
tion dated March 6, 1975, the two contracting parties have
agreed to the following provisions.
ARTICLE ONE
The two contracting parties confirm and realize that the
demarcation of international water borders between Iraq and
Iran has been conducted in accordance with Thalweg line by the
Iraqi-Iranian-Algerian Committee on the basis of the following:
1. Teheran Protocol dated March 17, 1975.
2. Minutes of the Foreign Ministers meeting concluded in
Baghdad on April 20, 1975, which approved, inter alia, the
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minutes of the committee entrusted with the demarcation of
water borders, concluded on board the Iraqi vessle Thawrah
at Shatt-ul-Arab on April 16, 1975.
3. The joint water maps which, after checking on land,
verification and transfer of geographical projection lines
and border lines of 1975 thereof have been signed by specialized
technicians on water affairs, affiliated with the joint techni-
cal committee and also by the heads of Iraqi, Iranian and
Algerian delegates to the committee. The maps mentioned above
enumerated hereunder have been appended to this Protocol and
thus constitute an inseparable part thereof. [Note: Maps
are not reproduced.]
Map No. 1: Shatt-ul-Arab inlet No. 3842, published
by the British Admiralty.
Map No. 2: Internal Embankment through Point Keda
No. 3843 published by the British Admiralty.
Map No. 3: Keda Point, through Abadan, No. 3 844
published by the British Admiralty.
Map No. 4: Abadan through Urn Taweela Island, No. 3 845,
published by the Biritsh Admirality.
ARTICLE TWO
1. The border line at Shatt-ul-Arab shall follow Thalweg
Line, i.e. themedial line of the main channel, navigable when
the water level is at its lowest navigation level, beginning
from the point where territorial border line is projected at
Shatt-ul-Arab, through to the sea.
2. The border line defined in the manner specified in
Article one above shall vary in accordance with variables
emanating from natural reasons in the navigable main channel
of the river; the border line shall not vary according to
other variables, unless the two contracting parties reach a
special agreement in that connection.
3. The variables mentioned in Para (2) above shall be
authenticated jointly by the competent technical bodies of
both contracting parties.
4. In the case of any shift in the river's main channel
or/and Shatt-ul-Arab basin, due to natural phenomena, with the
resulting effect being represented in a change in the national
title to the territory of each of the two countries, the im-
movable property, buildings, technical installations or other,
such border line shall continue to represent the Thalweg Line
according to the provisions of Para (1) above.
5. Unless the two parties resolve by joint agreement that
the border line should follow from now on the new stream, the
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water stream shall, at the mutual expense of both parties, be
restored to the line of 1975, depending thus on the demarca-
tions on the four maps specified in Para (3) Article (1)
hereof, if any party requests within the two years subsequent
to the incidence of notice thereof by any party; meanwhile, the
two parties maintain the right to navigation and utilization
of water in the new main channel
.
ARTICLE THREE
1. The water borders at Shatt-ul-Arab between Iraq and
Iran, as defined in Article Two above have been demarcated in
the line specified in the joint maps mentioned in Para (2)
Article (1) above.
2. The two contracting parties have agreed to considering
the end point of water borders as located on a straight line
connecting between the ends of both shores on the Shatt-ul-
Arab Basin at the lowest ebb level (water level gauged by astro-
nomical measures) . This straight line is drawn on the joint
water maps mentioned in Para (3) Article (1) above.
ARTICLE FOUR
The border line defined in Articles One, Two and Three of
this Protocol also defines, in a vertical direction, the air
space and underground of both countries.
ARTICLE FIVE
The two contracting parties shall set up a joint Iraqi-
Iranian committee to organize, within a period of two months,
the position of real estate property, buildings, technical
installations, and other, whose title deeds have changed as
a result of Iraqi-Iranian water border demarcation, either by
purchase, compensation, or any other appropriate manner to
avoid any source of dispute.
ARTICLE SIX
In view of the finalization of survey works at Shatt-ul-
Arab and the drawing up of the joint water map mentioned in
para (3) Article (1) above, the two contracting parties have
agreed to conduct a joint survey of Shatt-ul-Arab once every
ten years, from the date of concluding this Protocol. Each
party shall have the right to conduct, jointly, new surveys
prior to the elapse of the ten-year period.
Both contracting parties shall equally share survey expenses
ARTICLE SEVEN
1. Commercial, government and military vessels belonging
to both contracting parties shall enjoy navigation freedom in
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Shatt-ul-Arab, regardless of the line demarcating the terri-
torial waters of each country in all parts of navigable channels
situated within the territorial waters and leading to Shatt-
ul-Arab main channel.
2. Vessels belonging to a third country and used for com-
mercial purposes shall enjoy navigation freedom in Shatt-ul-
Arab on equal footing and without discrimination, regardless
of the line demarcating the territorial waters of both coun-
tries in all parts of the navigable channels situated in the
territorial waters leading to Shatt-ul-Arab main channel.
3. Each of the contracting parties may permit entrance
into Shatt-ul-Arab to foreign military vessels to visit its
ports, provided that such vessels shall not belong to a country
in a state of hostility or armed dispute or war with any of
the contracting parties, and that the other party shall be
notified beforehand, at least 72 hours prior, to such a visit.
4. The two contracting parties shall, under all circum-
stances, deny permission for entry into Shatt-ul-Arab to
commercial vessels belonging to a state hostile, or in armed
dispute or at war with any of the two parties.
ARTICLE EIGHT
1. Rules for navigation in Shatt-ul-Arab shall be defined
by a joint Iraqi-Iranian committee in accordance with the
principles of equitable navigation rights of both countries.
2. The two contracting parties shall set up a committee
to draw up rules for the combat of, and control over, pollution.
3. The two contracting parties undertake to conclude sub-
sequent agreements on a matters mentioned in Paras (1) and
(2) hereof.
ARTICLE NINE
The two contracting parties realize that Shatt-ul-Arab is
mainly an international navigation route; therefore, they under-
take to refrain from any exploitation that might impede navi-
gation in Shatt-ul-Arab and the territorial waters of each
country in all parts of the navigable channels situated in the
territorial waters and leading to Shatt-ul-Arab * s main channel.
Written at Baghdad on the 13th of June, 1975.
Abbas Ali Khalatbari
Foreign Minister of Iran
Dr. Saadoun Hammadi
Foreign Minister of Iraq
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This Treaty and the three Protocols and Appendices have
been endorsed in the presence of H.E. Abdul Aziz Bouteflika,
ROC Member and Foreign Minister of Algeria.
H.E. the Iranian Foreign Minister, in a statement on the
occasion, pointed out:
"I have the honor to assure Your Excellency, that, in
accordance with our agreement on the conclusion of the treaty
pertaining to the international borders and good neighborly
relations between Iraq and Iran, together with the three
Protocols and Appendices, namely:
1. Agreement on navigation in Shatt-ul-Arab.
2. Agreement on grazing rights.
3. Agreement on border rivers.
4
.
Agreement on the rights and terms of reference of
border commissions;
The two supreme contracting parties are bound to draw up
and conclude the same simultaneously within a period of three
months as from today.
Kindly accept my respects."
Abbas Ali Khatlabari
Foreign Minister, Saadoun Hammadi's message reads:
"It honors me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
dated June 13, 1975, and confirm that, according to our agree-
ment on the conclusion of the Treaty on International Borders
and good neighborly relations between Iraq and Iran together
with the three Protocols and Appendices, namely:
1. Agreement on Navigation in Shatt-ul-Arab.
2. Agreement on grazing rights.
3. Agreement on border rivers.
4. Agreement on the rights and terms of reference of
border commissions:
The two Supreme Contracting Parties are bound to draw
up and conclude the same simultaneously within a period of
three months as from today.
Kindly acceet my respects."
Saadoun Hammadi
Foreign Minister of Iraq
H.E. the Minister,
It honors me to confirm to Your Excellency that, in an
ordnance with the agreement we have reached today, the two
supreme contracting parties undertake to conduct, within a
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period not exceeding one year, all formalities related to
the ratification of the treaty on international borders and
good neighborly relations between Iran and Iraq, together with
the three Protocols and Appendices, in accordance with the
international law as an arbiter to each party.
Kindly accept my sincere respects
Abbas Ali Khalatbari
Foreign Minister of Iran
H.E. the Minister
It honors me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
dated June 13, 1975, and confirm that according to the agreement
concluded today, each contracting party undertakes to conduct
within a period not exceeding one year, all formalities related
to ratification procedures of the Treaty on International Bor-
ders and Good Neighbor Relations Between Iraq and Iran, together
with the three Protocols and Appendices in accordance with the
international law of each party.
Saadoun Hammadi








The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Repub-
lic, which received an affirmative vote from the Iranian people
on the basis of their longstanding belif in the Qur'anic
government of truth and justice, after their victorious Islamic
Revolution led by the eminent marja'-i taqlid, Ayatullah al-
Uzma Imam Khomeini, in the referendum of Farvardin 9 and 10
in the year 1358 of the solar Islamic calendar, corresponding
to Jummadi al-Ula 1 and 2 in the year 1300 of the lunar Islamic
calendar [March 29 and 30, 1979].
ARTICLE 2
The Islamic Republic is a system of government based on
belief if:
a. the One God (as stated in the Islamic creed "There is no
god but God") , His exclusive possession of sovereignty and the
right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His
commands
;
b. divine revelation and its fundamental role in the expounding
of laws;
c. the return to God in the hereafter, and the constructive
role of this belief in man's ascending progress toward God;
d. the justice of God in creation and legislation;
e. continuous leadership and guidance, and its fundamental
role in assuring the continuity of the revolution of Islam;
f. the exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom,
joined to responsibilities, before God;
which secures equity, justice, political, economic, social,
and cultural independence, and national solidarity, by re-
course to:
a. continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha possessing the necessary
qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Book of God and
the Sunna of the Ma'sumin, upon all of whom be peace;
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b. recourse to arts and sciences and the most advanced re-
sults of human experience, together with the effort to carry
them still farther forward;
c. rejection of all forms of oppression, both the infliction
and the endurance of it, and of dominance, both its imposition
and its acceptance.
ARTICLE 3
In order to attain the objectives specified in Article 2,
the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty
of directing all its resources to the following goals:
a. the creation of a favorable environment for the growth
of spiritual virtues based upon faith and piety and the struggle
against all forms of vice and corruption;
b. raising the level of public awareness in all areas, through
the correct use of the press, the mass media, and other means;
c. free education and physical training for everyone at all
levels, and the facilitation and expansion of higher education;
d. strengthening the spirit of inquiry, investigation, and
initiative in all areas of science, technology, and culture,
as well as Islamic studies, by establishing research centers
and encouraging researchers;
e. the complete expulsion of imperialism and the prevention
of foreign influence;
f. the elimination of all forms of tyranny and autocracy and
all attempts to monopolize power;
g. the securing of political and social freedoms within the
limits of the law;
h. ensuring the participation of the entire people in the
determination of their political, economic, social, and
cultural destiny;
i. the abolition of all forms of impermissible discrimination
and the provision of just opportunities for all, in both
material and non-material matters;
j. the creation of a proper administrative system and the
elimination of unnecessary government organizations;
k. strengthening the defense of the nation to the utmost
degree by means of universal military training for the sake
of preserving the independence, territorial integrity, and
Islamic order of the country;
1. the planning of a correct and just economic system, in
accordance with Islamic criteria, in order to create prosperity,
remove poverty, and abolish all forms of deprivation with
respect to food, housing, work, and health care, and the pro-
vision of universal insurance;
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m. the attainment of self-sufficiency in industrial, agricul-
tural, and military science, and technology, and all related
matters;
n. securing the comprehensive rights of all citizens, both
women and men, and the establishment of judicial security for
all, as well as the equality of all before the law;
o. the expansion and strengthening of Islamic brotherhood and
public cooperation among all the people;
p. the formulation of the foreign policy of the country on
the basis of Islamic criteria, brotherly commitment to all
Muslims, and the unstinting support of all oppressed and
deprived people throughout the world.
ARTICLE 4
All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative/
cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations
must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies
absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution
as well as to all laws and regulations, and the fuqaha on the
Council of Guardians have the duty of supervising its implementa-
tion.
ARTICLE 5
During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age (may God
hasten his renewed manifestation!), the governance and leader-
ship of the nation devolve upon the just and pious faqih who
is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous,
resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and
recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people.
In the event that no faqih should be so recognized by the
majority, the leader, or the Leadership Council, composed of
fuqaha possessing the aforementioned qualifications, will as-
sume these responsibilities in accordance with Article 107.
ARTICLE 6
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country
must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed
by means of elections, including the election of the President
of the Republic, the representatives of the National Consul-
tative Assembly/ and the members of councils, or by means of
referenda in matters specified in other articles of this
Constitution.
ARTICLE 7
In accordance with the command of the Qur ' an contained in
the verses "Their affairs are by consultation among them"
(42:38) and "Consult them on affairs" (3:159), councils and
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consultative bodies— such as the National Consultative Assem-
bly, the Provincial Councils, the Municipal Councils, and the
City, Neighborhood, Division, and Village Councils—belong
to the decisionmaking and administrative organs of the country.
The nature of these councils, together with the manner of
their formation and the limits of their powers and functions,
is determined by the Constitution and laws arising from it.
ARTICLE 8
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, summoning men to good
by enjoining good and forbidding evil is a universal and
mutual duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect
to each other, by the government with respect to the people,
and by the people with respect to the government. The condi-
tions, limits, and nature of this duty will be specified by
law. This is in accordance with the Qur'anic verse "The
believers, men and women, are the protectors of each other;
they enjoin the good and forbid the evil" (9:71).
ARTICLE 9
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence,
unity, and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable
from each other, and their preservation is the duty of the
government and of all individual citizens. No individual,
group, or authority has the right to infringe in the slightest
way upon the political, cultural, economic, and military inde-
pendence or the territorial integrity of Iran under the pre-
text of exercising freedom. Similarly, no authority has the
right to withdraw legitimate freedoms, even by establishing
laws and regulations for that purpose, under the pretext of




In accordance with the verse "Thisyour nation is a single
nation, and I am your Lord, so worship Me," all Muslims form
a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with
a view to the merging and union of all Muslim peoples, and
it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic,
and cultural unity of the Islamic world.
ARTICLE 11
Since the family is the fundamental unit of Islamic society,
all pertinent laws, regulations, and programs must tend to
facilitate the foundation of a family and to protect the sanc-
tity and stability of family relations on the basis of the




The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver
Ja'fari school of thought, and this principle shall remain
eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools of thought, in-
cluding the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi schools,
are to be accorded full respect, and their followers are free
to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in perform-
ing their religious devotions. These schools enjoy official
status for the purposes of religious education and matters
of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and be-
quests) , being accepted in the courts for cases relating to
such matters. In areas of the country where Muslims following
one of these schools of thought constitute the majority,
local regulations, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of
local councils, are to be in accordance with the respective
school of thought, without infringing upon the rights of the
followers of other schools.
ARTICLE 13
Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only
recognized religious minorities, with the right freely to
perform their religious ceremonies within the limits of the
law and to act according to their own customs in matters of
personal status and religious education.
ARTICLE 14
In accordance with the verse "God does not forbid you to
deal kindly and justly with those who have not fought against
you because of your religion and who have not expelled you
from your homes" (60:8), the government of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-
Muslims in an ethical fashion and in accordance with Islamic
justice and equity and to respect their human rights. This
principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in con-





THE LANGUAGE, SCRIPT, CALENDAR, AND FLAG OF THE COUNTRY
ARTICLE 15
The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca
of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence,
and texts as well as schoolbooks must be in this language
and script. The use of regional and national (qaumi) languages
in the press and mass media, however, as well as for teaching
in schools the literatures written in them, is permitted in
addition to Persian.
ARTICLE 16
Since the language of the Qur'an and of Islamic learning
and culture is Arabic, and since Persian literature has been
thoroughly permeated by this language, it must be taught in
all classes from elementary school through middle school,
and in all areas of study.
ARTICLE 17
The official calendar of the country takes as its point
of departure the migration of the Prophet of Islam—God's
peace and blessings upon him and his family! Both the
solar and the lunar Islamic calendars are recognized, but
government offices will base their operations on the solar
calendar. The official weekly holiday is Friday.
ARTICLE 18
The official flag of Iran is green, white, and red and
bears the special emblem of the Islamic Republic together





THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE
ARTICLE 19
Whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong,
all people of Iran enjoy equal rights, and factors such as
color, race, and language do not bestow any privilege.
ARTICLE 2
All citizens of the nation, both women and men, equally
enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, politi-
cal, economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity
with Islamic criteria.
ARTICLE 21
The government must assure the rights of women in all
respects, in conformity with Islamic criteria, and accomplish
the following goals:
a. create a favorable environment for the growth of woman's
personality and the restoration of her rights, tangible and
intangible;
b. the protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy
and childbearing, and the protection of children without
guardians
;
c. the creation of a competent court to protect and preserve
the family;
d. the provision of special insurance for widows and aged
and destitute women;
e. the granting of guardianship of children to their mothers
whenever suitable in order to protect the interests of the
children, in the absence of a legal guardian.
ARTICLE 2 2
The dignity, life, property, rights, dwelling, and occupa-
tion of the individual are inviolate, except in cases sanctioned
by the law.
ARTICLE 23
The interrogation of persons concerning their opinions is
forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to task simply




Publications and the press are free to present all matters
except those that are detrimental to the fundamental principles
of Islam or the rights of the public. The details of this
exception will be specified by the law.
ARTICLE 2 5
The inspection of letters and the failure to deliver them,
the recording and disclosure of telephone converstions, the
disclosure of telegraphic and telex communications or the
willful failure to transmit them, wiretapping, and all forms
of covert investigation are forbidden, except as provided by
law.
ARTICLE 2 6
The formation of political and professional parties, asso-
ciations, and societies, as well as religious societies, as
well as religious societies, whether they be Islamic or per-
tain to one of the recognized religious minorities, is freely
permitted on condition that they do not violate the principles
of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of
Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic. No one may be
prevented from participating in the aforementioned groups,
or be compelled to participate in them.
ARTICLE 2 7
Public gatherings and marches may freely be held, on
condition that arms are not carried and that they are not
detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam.
ARTICLE 2 8
Everyone has the right to choose any employment he wishes,
if it is not opposed to Islam, the public interest, or the
rights of others. The government has the duty, while bearing
in mind the needs of society for different kinds of work, to
provide every citizen with the opportunity to work, and to
create equal conditions for obtaining it.
ARTICLE 29
The right to benefit from social security with respect to
retirement, unemployment, old age, disability, and destitu-
tion benefits, as well as benefits relating to being stranded
and emergencies, health services, medicine, and medical care,
provided through insurance or other means, is a universal right.
The government must assure the foregoing rights and finan-
cial protection by drawing on the national income, in accordance
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with the law, and on income derived from the participation
of the people.
ARTICLE 3
The government must provide all citizens with free educa-
tion to the end of middle school, and must expand higher edu-
cation to the level required by the country for self-sufficiency
ARTICLE 31
To own a dwelling commensurate with one's needs is the
right of every individual and family in Iran. The government
must make land available for the implementation of this princi-
ple, according priority to those whose need is greatest, in
particular the rural population and the workers.
ARTICLE 3 2
No one can be arrested except in accordance with judgment
and the procedure established by law. In the case of arrest,
charges and supporting evidence msut be communicated immediately
in writing to the prisoner and be elucidated to him, and a
provisional dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial
authorities within a maximum of twnety-four hours so that the
preliminaries to the trial can be completed as swiftly as
possible. Punishments for the infringement of these principles
will be determined by law.
ARTICLE 3 3
No one can be banished from his place of residence, pre-
vented from residing in his preferred location, or compelled
to reside in a given locality, except as provided in law.
ARTICLE 34
It is the indisputable right of every citizen to seek jus-
tice, and everyone may have access to the competent courts in
order to present his case. All members of the nation have the
right of access to such courts, and no one can be barred from
courts to which they have a legal right of recourse.
ARTICLE 35
Both parties to a dispute have the right in all courts of
law to select a lawyer, and if they are unable to do so,
arrangements must be made to provide them with legal counsel.
ARTICLE 3 6
The passing and execution of sentence must be performed




Innocence is to be presumed, and no one is to be regarded
as guilty unless his guilt has been established by the com-
petent court.
ARTICLE 3 8
Any form of torture for the purpose of extracting con-
fessions or gaining information is forbidden. It is not per-
missible to compel individuals to give testimony, make confes-
sions, or swear oaths, and any testimony, confession, or oath
obtained in this fashion is worthless and invalid. Punishments
for the infringement of these principles will be determined
by law.
ARTICLE 3 9
All affronts to the dignity and honor of persons arrested,
detained, imprisoned, or banished in accordance with the law,
whatever form they may take, are forbidden and punishable.
ARTICLE 40
No one can make the exercise of his rights a pretext for
harming others or encroaching on the public interest.
ARTICLE 41
Iranian nationality is the indisputable right of every
Iranian, and the government cannot withdraw nationality from
any Iranian unless he himself requests it or acquires the
nationality of another country.
ARTICLE 4 2
Foreign nationals may acquire Iranian nationality within
the framework of the relevant laws. Nationality may be with-
drawn from such persons if another state accepts them as its




ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
ARTICLE 4 3
In order that the economic independence of society may be
secured, poverty and deprivation uprooted, and the needs of
man in his process of growth and advancement satisfied, while
at the same time preserving his liberty, the economy of the
Islamic Republic of Iran is to be based on the following criteria
a. the provision of basic necessities to all citizens: accommo-
dation, food, clothing, health care, medicine, education, and
the necessary facilities for the establishment of a family;
b. assuring conditions and possibilities of employment for
everyone, with a view to attaining full employment; placing
the means of labor at the disposal of everyone who is able to
work but lacks the means, in the form of cooperatives; and
granting interest-free loans or recourse to any other legiti-
mate means thatneither results in the concentration of wealth
in the hands of a few individuals or its circulation among
them nor turns the government into a major or dominant employer.
These steps must be taken with due regard for the necessities
determining public planning of the national economy at each
stage of its growth;
c. the drawing up of the economic plan for the country in
such a manner that the form, content, and hours of work of
every individual will leave him, in addition to his labor,
sufficient opportunity and strength to engage in intellectual,
political, and social self-development, active participation
in the leadership of the country, and the improvement of his
skills and sense of initiative;
d. respect for the right to choose freely one's job; refrain-
ing from compelling anyone to engage in a particular job; and
preventing the exploitation of another's labor;
e. forbidding the infliction of harm upon others, monopoly,
hoarding, usury, and other evil and forbidden practices;
f. the prohibition of extravagance and wastefulness in all
matters related to the economy, including consumption, invest-
ment, production, distribution, and services;
g. the utilization of science and technology, and the train-
ing of skilled individuals in accordance with need for the
sake of the development and progress of the country's economy;
h. prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's
economy;
i. emphasis on the increase of agricultural, livestock, and
industrial production in order to satisfy public needs and




The economic system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is
to consist of three sectors: state, cooperative and private,
and is to be based on orderly and correct planning.
The state sector is to include all large-scale and major
industries, foreign trade, major mineral resources, banking,
insurance, energy, dams and large-scale irrigation networks,
radio and television, post, telegraphic and telephone services,
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these
will be publicly owned and administered by the state.
The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies
and institutions concerned with production and distribution,
established in both the cities and the countryside, in accord-
ance with Islamic criteria.
The private sector consists of those activities concerned
with agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and ser-
vices that supplement the economic activities of the state
and cooperative sectors.
Ownership in each of these three sectors is protected by
the laws of the Islamic Republic, to the extent permitted by
the other articles of this chapter, and on condition that such
ownership does not go beyond the bounds of Islamic law, that
it contributes to the economic growth and progress of the coun-
try, and that it does not harm society.
The [precise] scope of each of the three sectors, as well
as the regulations and conditions governing their operation,
will be specified by law.
ARTICLE 4 5
Public wealth and property, such as uncultivated or aban-
doned land, minerals, seas, lakes, rivers and other public
bodies of water, mountains, valleys, forests, marshland, natural
forests, unenclosed pastureland, legacies without heirs, proper-
ty of undetermined ownership, and public property recovered
from usurpers, shall be at the disposal of the Islamic govern-
ment for it to use in accordance with the public interest. Law
will specify detailed arrangements for the utilization of each
of the foregoing items.
ARTICLE 4 6
Eveyone is the owner of the fruits of his legitimate business
and labor, and no one may deprive another of the opportunity
of work under the pretext of this ownership.
ARTICLE 4 7
Private ownership, legitimately achieved, is to be respected.




All forms of discrimination among the various provinces
must be avoided in the exploitation of natural resources, in
the utilization of public income, and in the distribution of
economic activities among the various provinces and regions of
the country, thereby ensuring that every region has access
to the necessary capital and facilities in accordance with its
needs and capacity for growth.
ARTICLE 4 9
The government has the responsibility of confiscating all
wealth resulting from usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement,
theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government
contracts and transactions, the sale of uncultivated lands
and other categories of land inherently subject to public
ownership, the operation of houses of ill-repute, and other
illicit sources. When appropriate, such wealth must be re-
stored to its legitimate owner, and if no usch owner can be
identified, it must be placed in the public treasury. The
application of this principle must be accompanied by due
investigation and verification in accordance with the law of
Islam and carried out by the government.
ARTICLE 50
The preservation of the environment in which present and
future generations are charged with the construction of a
progressive society is regarded as a public duty in the Islamic
Republic. Economic and other activities that tend consistently
to pollute the environment or inflict irreparable damage on it
are therefore forbidden.
ARTICLE 51
No form of taxation may be imposed except in accordance
with the law. Provisions for tax exemption and reduction will
be determined by law.
ARTICLE 5 2
The annual budget of the country will be drawn up by the
government, in the manner specified by law, and submitted to
the National Consultative Assembly for discussion and approval.
Any change in the figures contained in the budget will be in
accordance with the procedures established in law.
ARTICLE 5 3
All sums received by the government will be concentrated
in accounts at the central treasury, and all disbursements





The National Accounting Agency is to be directly under
the supervision of the National Consultative Assembly. Its
organization and mode of operation, in Tehran and in pro-
vincial centers, are to be determined by law.
ARTICLE 5 5
The Accounting Agency will investigate and/or audit, in
the manner prescribed by law, all the accounts of ministries,
state institutions, and companies that benefit in any way from
the general budget of the country. It wil ensure that no
expenditure exceeds the allocations approved and that all sums
are spent for the proper purpose. It will collect all rele-
vant accounts, bills, records, and documents, in accordance
with law, and submit to the National Consultative Assembly a
report for the settlement of each year's budget gogether with






THE RIGHT OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
POWERS DERIVING THEREFROM
ARTICLE 5 6
Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to
God, and it is He Who has placed man in charge of his social
destiny. No one can deprive man of this God-given right, nor
subordinate it to the interests of a given individual or
group. The people exercise this God-given right by the paths
specified in the articles below.
ARTICLE 5 7
The powers of government in the Islamic Republic consist
of the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive powers,
functioning under the supervision of those invested with
governance and leadership and in accordance with articles of
this Contitution. These powers are independnet of each other,
and communication among them will be ensured by the President
of the Republic.
ARTICLE 5 8
The exercise of the legislative power is by means of the
National Consultative Assembly, consisting of the elected
representatives of the people. Legislation approved by this
body, after completion of the stages specified in the articles
below, is communicated to the executive and the judiciary for
implementation.
ARTICLE 59
In economic, political, social, and cultural matters of
great importance, it is possible for the legislative power to
be exercised by means of a referendum and direct consultation
with the people to determine their views. Any request for
such direct consultation must be approved by two-thirds of the
members of the National Consultative Assembly.
ARTICLE 6
The exercise of the executive power is by means of the
President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the minis-
ters, except for matters directly assigned to the leadership
by this Constitution.
ARTICLE 61
The exercise of the judiciary power is by means of courts
of justice, which are to be formed in accordance with the
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criteria of Islam and are to examine and settle cases, pro-
tect the rights of the public, dispense and enact justice,






The National Consultative Assembly
ARTICLE 62
The National Consultative Assembly consists of the repre-
sentatives of the people elected directly and by secret ballot.
The qualifications of electors and candidates, as well as
the method of election, will be specified by law.
ARTICLE 63
The term of membership in the National Consultative Assem-
bly is four years. Elections for each term must take place
before the end of the preceding term, so that the country is
never without an Assembly.
ARTICLE 64
There are to be two hundred seventy members of the National
Consultative Assembly. After every ten years, if the population
of the country has increased, representatives will be added to
each electoral district at the rate of one per every 150,000
additional persons. The Zoroastrians and Jews will each elect
one representative; Assyrian and Chaldean Christians will
jointly elect one representative; and Armenian Christians in
the north and those in the south of the country will each
elect one representative. If the population of these minorities
increases, they will be given additional representatives at
the rate of one per 150,000. Regulations concerning elections
will be established by law.
ARTICLE 65
After the holding of elections, sessions of the National
Consultative Assembly are considered legal when two-thirds of
the total members are present. Drafts and bills presented to
the Assembly will be approved in accordance with the internal
protocol approved by it, except in cases where the Constitution
has specified a certain quorum. The agreement of two-thirds
of all members present is necessary for the approval of the
internal protocol of the Assembly.
ARTICLE 6 6
The manner of election of the president and governing body
of the Assembly, the number of commissions and their term of
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office, and matters relating to the discussions and disci-
plinary regulations of the Assembly will be determined by the
internal protocols of the Assembly.
ARTICLE 6 7
Members of the Assembly must swear the following oath at
the first session of the Assembly and affix their signatures
to its text:
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
In the presence of the Glorious Qur'an, I swear by
God, the Powerful and Almighty, and undertake, re-
lying upon my honor as a human being, to protect
the sanctity of Islam and guard the accomplishments
of the Islamic Revolution of the Iranian people
and the foundations of the Islamic Republic; to
protect, as just trustee, the trust bestowed upon
me by the people; to observe piety in fulfilling
my duties as a member of the assembly; to be con-
stantly devoted to the independence and advancement
of the country, the protection of the rights of the
nation, and the service of the people; to defend
the Constitution; and to bear in mind, both in
speech and writing and in the expression of opinion,
the independence of the country, the freedom of the
people, and the securing of their interests.
Members belonging to the religious minorities will mention
their own sacred books when swearing this oath.
Members not participating in the first session will per-
form the ceremony of swearing the oath at the first session
they attend.
ARTICLE 68
In time of war and the military occupation of the country,
elections due to be held in occupied areas or nationwide may
be delayed for a specified period if rpoposed by the President
of the Republic, and approved by three-fourths of the total
members of the National Consultative Assembly, with the en-
dorsement of the Council of Guardians. If a new Assembly
cannot be formed, the previous one will continue to function.
ARTICLE 69
The deliberations of the National Consultative Assembly
must be held in public, and a full report of them made avail-
able to the public by the radio and the official gazette. A
closed session may be held in emergencies, if it is required
for national security, upon the demand of the Prime Minister,
one of the ministers, or ten members of the Assembly. Legis-
lation passed at a closed session is valid only when approved
by three-fourths of the members in the presence of the Council
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of Guardians. After emergency conditions have ceased to
apply, the minutes of such closed sessions, together with any
legislation approved in them, must be made available to the
public.
ARTICLE 7
The President, the Prime Minister, and the ministers have
the right to participate in the open sessions of the Assembly
either collectively or individually. If the members of the
Assembly deem it necessary, the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister, and the ministers are obliged to attend.
Conversely, whenever they request it, their statements are
to be heard.
Any invitation to the President of the Republic to attend
the Assembly must be approved by a majority of the members.
Section Two
Powers and Authority of the
National Consultative Assembly
ARTICLE 71
The National Consultative Assembly can establish laws on
all matters, within the limits of its competence as laid down
in the Constitution.
ARTICLE 7 2
The National Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws con-
trary to the principles and ordinances of the official reli-
gion of the country or to the Constitution. It is the duty of
the Council of Guardians to determine whether a violation has
occurred, in accordance with Article 96.
ARTICLE 7 3
The interpretation of ordinary laws falls within the com-
petence of the National Consultative Assembly. The intent of
this Article does not prevent the interpretations that judges
may make in the course of cassation.
ARTICLE 74
Bills are presented to the National Consultative Assembly
after receiving the approval of the Council of Ministers.
Draft bills may be introduced in the National Consultative




Drafts, proposals, and amendments to bills already pro-
posed by members that entail the reduction of thepublic in-
come or the increase of public expenditure may be introduced
in the Assembly only if means for compensating for the de-
crease in income or for securing the new expenditure are also
specified.
ARTICLE 7 6
The National Consultative Assembly has the right to inves-
tigate and examine all the affairs of the country.
ARTICLE 7 7
Treaties, international undertakings, and other agreements
of a similar nature must be approved by the National Consul-
tative Assembly.
ARTICLE 7 8
All changes in the boundaries of the country are forbidden,
with the exception of minor rectifications in keeping with the
interests of the country, on condition that they are net uni-
lateral, do not encroach on the independence and territorial
integrity of the country, and receive the approval of four-
fifths of the total members of the National Consultative
Assembly.
ARTICLE 7 9
The establishment of martial law is fobidden. In case of
war or emergency condition akin to war, the government has the
right to impose temporarily certain essential restrictions, with
the agreement of the National Consultative Assembly. In no
case can such restrictions last for more than thirty days; if
the need forthem persists beyond thirty days, the government
must obtain new authorization for them from the Assembly.
ARTICLE 80
The taking and giving of loans or grants-in-aid, domestic
and foreign, must be approved by the National Consultative
Assembly.
ARTICLE 81
The granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation
of companies or institutions for commercial, industrial, and





The employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in
cases of necessity and with the approval of the National Con-
sultative Assembly.
ARTICLE 83
Government buildings and properties forming part of the
national patrimony cannot be transferred except with the
approval of the National Consultative Assembly; unique and
irreplaceable treasures are not covered by this exception.
ARTICLE 84
Every member is responsible to the entire nation, and has
the right to express his opinion on all matters of domestic
and foreign policy.
ARTICLE 8 5
Membership in the National Consultative Assembly applies
to the individual and cannot be delegated. The Assembly can-
not assign the power of legislation to a single individual
or to a group. In cases of overriding need, however, it can
delegate the establishment of certain categories of law to
its internal commissions, in accordance with Article 72. In
such a case, the laws will be executed on an experimental basis
for a period specified by the Assembly, and their final ap-
proval will depend on the Assembly [as a whole]
.
ARTICLE 8 6
Members of the Assembly are completely free to express their
views in the course of performing their duties as members, and
they cannot be prosecuted or arrested for opinions expressed
in the Assembly or views uttered [elsewhere] in the course of
performing their duty.
ARTICLE 87
The Council of Ministers, after being formed and presented
to the Assembly and before all other business, must obtain a
vote of confidence from the Assembly. During its incumbency,
it can also request a vote of confidence from the Assembly
on important questions or matters being disputed.
ARTICLE 8 8
Whenever a member of the Assembly poses a question to a
minister on a subject relating to his duties, the minister is
obliged to attend the Assembly and answer the question. His
answer must not be delayed more than ten days, except with an




Members of the Assembly can interpellate the Council of
Ministers or an individual minister in instances they deem
necessary. Interpellations can be tabled if they bear the
signatures of ten members. The Council of Ministers or
interpellated minister must be present in the Assembly within
ten days after the tabling of the interpellation in order to
answer it and seek a vote of confidence. If the Council of
Ministers or the minister concerned fails to attend the Assem-
bly, the members who tabled the interpellation will explain
their reasons, and the Assembly will declare a vote of no
confidence if it deems it necessary.
If the Assembly does not give a vote of confidence, the
Council of Ministers or minister subject to interpellation is
dismissed. In both cases, the Prime Minister and the minis-
ters subject to interpellation cannot participate in the
next Council of Ministers to be formed.
ARTICLE 90
Whoever has a compalint concerning thework of the Assem-
bly, the executive power, or the judicial power can present
his complaint in writing to the Assembly. The Assembly must
investigate his complaint and give an adequate response. In
cases where the complaint relates to the executive or the
judiciary, the Assembly must demand investigation and the fur-
nishing of an adequate response from them, and announce the
results within a reasonable time. In cases where the subject




In order to protect the ordinances of Islam and the Con-
stitution by assuring that legislation passed by the National
Consultative Assembly does not conflict with them, a council
to be known as the Council of Guardians is to be established
with the following composition:
a. six just fuqaha, conscious of current needs and the issues
of the day, to be selected by the leader or the Leadership
Council; and
b. six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be
elected by the National Consultative Assembly from among the
Muslim jurists presented to it by the Supreme Judician Council.
ARTICLE 9 2
Members of the Council of Guardians are selected to serve
for a period of six years, but during the first term, after
three years have passed, two members of each group will be
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changed by lottery and new members will be selected in their
place.
ARTICLE 9 3
The National Consultative Assembly does not have legal
validity if there is no Council of Guardians in existence
other than to approve the credentials of its members and




All legislation passed by the National Consultative
Assembly must be sent to the Council of Guardians. The Coun-
cil of Guardians must review it within a maximum of ten days
from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility
with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds
the legislation not so compatible, it will return it to the
Assembly for review. If the Council fails to do the foregoing,
legislation passed by the Assembly acquires the force of law.
ARTICLE 95
In cases where the Council of Guardians deems ten days
inadequate for completing the process of review and deliver-
ing a definitive opinion, it can request an extension of not
more than ten days from the National Consultative Assembly,
stating its reason for the request.
ARTICLE 9 6
The determination of whether legislation passed by the
National Consultative Assembly is compatible with the ordin-
ances of Islam depends on a majority vote by the fuqaha on
the Council of Guardians; and the determination that it is
compatible with the Constitution requires a majority vote by
all members of the Council of Guardians.
ARTICLE 9 7
In order to accelerate their work, the members of the Coun-
cil of Guardians may attend the Assembly and listen to its
debates when a bill or draft is under discussion. When an
urgent draft or bill has been inscribed on the agenda of the
Assembly, the members of the Council of Guardians must attend
the Assembly and make their views known.
ARTICLE 9 8
The interpretation of the Constitution is the responsi-
bility of the Council of Guardians, and depends on the approval




The Council of Guardians has the responsibility of
supervising the election of the President of the Republic,
the elections for the National Consultative Assembly, and






In order to carry forward swiftly social, economic, develop-
ment, public health, cultural, and educational programs, as
well as other projects promoting the well-being of society,
in collaboration with the people and with regard for local
administrative needs in each village, division, city, munici-
pality, and province, the administration of each village,
division, city, municipality, and province will be supervised
by a council to be known as the Village, Division, City,
Municipality, or Provincial Council. The members of each of
these councils will be elected by the people of the locality
in question.
Qualifications for the electors and candidates for these
councils, as well as their functions and powers, the method of
election to them, the way in which they exercise their super-
vision, and the chain of authority that is to exist among them,
will be determined by law, in such a way as to preserve
national unity, territorial integrity, the system of the
Islamic Republic, and the primacy of the central government.
ARTICLE 101
In order to prevent discrimination and attract the coopera-
tion [of the people] in the preparation of programs for the
development and prosperity of the provinces and in the har-
monious implementation of such programs, a Supreme Council
of the Provinces will be formed, composed of representatives
of the Provincial Councils. Law will specify the manner in
which this council is to be formed and the functions that it
is to fulfill.
ARTICLE 102
The Supreme Council of the Provinces has the right, within
the limits of its power, to prepare draft plans and to submit
them to the National Consultative Assembly, either directly or
by way of the government. These drafts must be examined by
the Assembly.
ARTICLE 10 3
Provincial governors, city governors, divisional governors,
and other officials appointed by the government must respect






In order to ensure Islamic equity and collaboration in
the preparation of programs and to bring about the harmonious
progress of all units of production, both industrial and
agricultural, councils consisting of the representatives of
the workers, peasants, other employees, and managers, will
be formed. In educational, administrative, service, and other
units, similar councils will be formed, composed of repre-
sentatives of the members of those units.
The manner in which these councils are to be formed,
together with their functions and powers, is to be specified
by law.
ARTICLE 10 5
Decisions taken by the councils must not contradict the
criteria of Islam and the laws of the country.
ARTICLE 106
The councils may not be dissolved unless they deviate from
their legal duties. The body responsible for determining
whether such deviation has occurred, as well as the manner





THE LEADER OR LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
ARTICLE 107
Whenever one of the fuqaha possessing the qualifications
specified in Article 5 of the Constitution is recognized and
accepted as marja' and leader by a decisive majority of the
people— as has been the case with the exalted marja' i taqlid
and leader of the revolution, Ayatullah al-Uzma Imam Khomeini-'
he is to exercise governance and all the responsibilities
arising therefrom. If such should not be the case, experts
elected by the people will review and consult among themselves
concerning all persons qualified to act as marja' and leader.
If they discern outstanding capacity for leadership in a cer-
tain marja 1 , they will present him to the people as their
leader; if not, they will appoint either three or five marja 's
possessing the necessary qualifications for leadership and
present them as members of the Leadership Council.
ARTICLE 10 8
The law setting out the number and qualifications of the
experts [mentioned in the preceding article] , the manner of
their election, and the internal protocol regulating the ses-
sions of their first term must be drawn up by the fuqaha on
the first Council of Guardians, and be approved by a majority
among them and then by the Leader of the Revolution. Any
subsequent change or review of the law [in question] may be
undertaken by the Assembly of Experts.
ARTICLE 10 9
The following are the qualifications and attributes of the
leader or members of the Leadership Council:
a. suitability with respect to learning and piety, as re-
quired for the functions of mufti and marja';
b. political and social perspicacity, courage, strength, and
the necessary administrative abilities for leadership.
ARTICLE 110
The leadership is to be assigned the following duties
and powers:
a. appointment of the fuqaha on the Council of Guardians;
b. appointment of the supreme judicial authority of the
country;




(i) appointment and dismissal of the chief of the
general staff;
(ii) appointment and dismissal of the commander-in-
chief of the Corps of Guards of the Islamic
Revolution;
(iii) the formation of a Supreme National Defense Council,
composed of the following seven members:
- the President
- the Prime Minister
- the minister of defense
- the chief of the general staff
- the commander-in-chief of the Corps of Guards
of the Islamic Revolution
- two advisers appointed by the leader
(iv) appointment of the supreme commanders of the three
branches of the armed forces, based upon the
recommendation of the Supreme National Defense
Council;
(v) the declaration of war and peace, and the mobiliza-
tion of the armed forces, based on the recommenda-
tion of the Supreme National Defense Council;
d. signing the decree [formalizing the election] of the Presi-
dent of the Republic after his election by the people. The
suitability of candidates for the presidency of the Republic,
with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution,
must be confirmed before elections take place by the Council
of Guardians, and, in the case of the first term, by the
leadership
.
e. dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard
for the interests of the country, after the issue of a judgment
by the Supreme Court convicting him of failure to fulfill his
legal duties, or a vote of the National Consultative Assembly
testifying to his political incompetence;
f. pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the
bounds of Islamic criteria, after receiving a recommendation
[to that effect] from the Supreme Court.
ARTICLE 111
Whenever the leader or one member of the Leadership Council
becomes incapable of fulfilling the legal duties of leadership,
or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Article 109,
he will be dismissed. Determination [of the necessity of such
dismissal] will be made by the experts mentioned in Article 108.
Regulations for the convening of the experts in order to
implement this provision will be established at the first




The leader or the members of the Leadershio Council are








After the leadership, the President of the Republic is
the highest official position in the country. His is the
responsibility for implementing the Constitution, ordering
relations among the three powers, and heading the executive
power except in matters pertaining directly to the leadership.
ARTICLE 114
The President of the Republic is elected for a four-year
term by the direct consultation of the popular vote. He
may be re-elected only once to serve a successive term.
ARTICLE 115
The President of the Republic must be elected from among
religious and political personalities possessing the following
qualifications:
Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administrative
and managerial capacities; a good past record; trust-
worthiness; piety; convinced belief in the fundamental
principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
official school of thought of the country.
ARTICLE 116
Candidates for the post of President of the Republic must
announce their candidacy officially. Law establishes the
manner in which the President of the Republic is to be elected.
ARTICLE 117
The President of the Republic is elected by an absolute
majority of votes of all participants [in the election] . But
if none of the candidates is able to win such a majority in
the first round of voting, boting will take place a second time
on Friday of the following week. In the second round, only
the two candidates who received the most votes in the first
found will participate. If, however, some of the candidates
who gained the most votes in the first round withdraw from the
elections, the final choice will be bwtween the two candidates




Responsibility for the supervision of the election of the
President of the Republic lies with the Council of Guardians,
as stipulated in Article 99. Before the establishment of the
first Council of Guardians, however, it lies with a super-
visory body to be established by law.
ARTICLE 119
The election of a new President of the Republic must take
place no later than one month before the end of the term of
the preceding President. In the interval between the election
of the new President and the end of the term of the preceding
President, the outgoing President performs the duties of
President of the Republic.
ARTICLE 12
If any of the candidates whose suitability is established
in terms of the qualifications listed above should die ten
days before balloting day, the elections will be postponed for
two weeks. If one of the candidates holding the most votes
dies in the interval between the first and second rounds of
voting, the period for holding [the second round of] the elec-
tion will be extended for two weeks.
ARTICLE 121
The President of the Republic must swear and affix his
signature to the following oath at a session of the National
Consultative Assembly in the presence of the head of the
Supreme Court and the members of the Council of Guardians of
the Constitution:
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
As President of the Republic, I swear, in the presence
of the Noble Qur'an and the people of Iran, by God,
Powerful and Almighty, that I will guard the official
school of thought of the country, the order of the
Islamic Republic and the Constitution of the country;
that I will devote all my capacities and abilities to
the fulfillment of the responsibilities that I have
assumed; that I will devote myself to the service of the
people, the advancement of the country, the propagation
of religion and morality, and the support of truth and
justice; that I will protect the freedom and dignity of
all citizens and the rights that the Constitution has
accorded the people; that in guarding the frontiers and
the political, economic, and cultural independence of
the country I will not shirk any necessary measure; that,
seeking help from God and following the Prophet of
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Islam and the Immaculate Imams (peace be upon them)
,
I will guard the power vested in me by the people as
a sacred trust, as a pious and selfless trustee, and




The President of the Republic is responsible to the people
within the limits of his functions and powers. The manner
in which possible violation of this responsibility is to be
investigated will be determined by law.
ARTICLE 12 3
The President of the Republic has the responsibility of
signing legislation approved by the Assembly or the result
of a referendum after the legal procedures have been completed
and its has been communicated to him. After signature, he
must forward it to the responsible authorities for implementation.
ARITCLE 124
The President of the Republic will nominate a candidate
for the post of Prime Minister, and after obtaining a vote
of endorsement from the National Consultative Assembly, he
will issue a decree appointing his Prime Minister.
ARTICLE 12 5
The President or his legal representative signs pacts,
conventions, treaties, and other agreements concluded by the
Iranian government with other ogvernments, as well as agree-
ments pertaining to international organizations, after ob-
taining the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.
ARTICLE 126
Statutes and governmental protocols will be communicated
to the President of the Republic after being approved by the
Council of Ministers. If he deems them contrary to law, he
returns them to the Council of Ministers for review, stating
his reasons for so doing.
ARTICLE 127
Whenever the President of the Republic considers it necessary,




The President of the Republic signs the credentials of am-
bassadors being sent to foreign countries and receives the cre-




The award of state decorations is a prerogative of the
President of the Republic.
ARTICLE 13
In case of the absence or illness of the President of the
REpublic, his duties will be performed by a council called
the Temporary Presidential Council, consisting of the Prime
Minister, the president of the National Consultative Assembly,
and the president of the Supreme Court, on condition that
the circumstances excusing the President last not longer than
two months. Similarly, in case of the dismissal of the Presi-
dent, or if the term of one President has come to an end and
various obstacles have prevented the election of a new Presi-
dent, the duties of the President of the Republic will also
be exercised by this council.
ARTICLE 131
In the case of death, resignation, illness lasting longer
than two months, dismissal of the President of the Republic,
or similar circumstances, the Temporary Presidential Council
must arrange for a new President of the Republic to be elected
within a maximum of fifty days. During this period, it will
carry out all the functions and powers of the President except
the initiation of referenda.
ARTICLE 132
During the period when the functions of President of the
Republic are assigned to the Temporary Presidential Council,
it is not possible to interpellate the government, to pass a
vote of no confidence in it, or to undertake any steps for a
review of the Constitution.
SECTION TWO
THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTERS
ARTICLE 13 3
Ministers will be appointed upon the proposal of the Prime
Minister together with the approval of the President of the
Republic, and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote
of confidence.
The number of ministers and the limits of the power of




The Prime Minister is the head of the Council of Minis-
ters. He supervises the work of the ministers and takes all
necessary measures to coordinate the decisions of the govern-
ment. With the cooperation of the ministers, he determines
the program and policies of the government and executes the
law. The Prime Minister is responsible to the Assembly for
the actions of his ministers.
ARTICLE 135
The Prime Minister retains his position as long as he
enjoys the confidence of the Assembly. The resignation of
the government is to be presented to the President of the
REpublic, and the Prime Minister is to continue his functions
until a new government is appointed.
ARTICLE 13 6
Whenever the Prime Minister wishes to dismiss a minister
and appoint another in his place, both the dismissal and the
appointment must be approved by the President of the Republic,
and a vote of confidence must be obtained from the Assembly
for the new minister. If half the members of the Council of
Ministers change after the government has received its vote
of confidence from the Assembly, the government must seek a
new vote of confidence from the Assembly.
ARTICLE 13 7
Each of the ministers is responsible for his duties to the
Assembly, but in matters that have been approved by the Council
of Ministers as a whole, he is also responsible for the
actions of the others.
ARTICLE 138
In addition to instances in which the Council of Minis-
ters or a single minister is given the responsibility for draw-
ing up regulations for the implementation of laws, the Council
of Ministers has the right to establish decrees, regulations,
and protocols in order to fulfill its administrative duties,
secure the implementation of laws, and organize administrative
bodies. Each minister also has the right to establish regula-
tions and issue circulars within the limits of his functions
and with the approval of the Council of Ministers. The content
of all such regulations must not oppose the letter or the
spirit of the law.
ARTICLE 139
The settling of litigation relating to public and state
property and the referral thereof to arbitration is in every
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case dependent on the approval of the Council of Ministers,
and the Assembly must be informed of these matters. In cases
where one party to the dispute is a foreigner, as well as in
important cases that are purely domestic, the approval of the
Assembly must also be obtained. Law will specify the important
cases intended here.
ARTICLE 140
Accusations of common crime against the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, and the ministers will be inves-
tigated in common courts of justice after the approval of the
National Consultative Assembly has been obtained.
ARTICLE 141
The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, minis-
ters, and government employees cannot hold more than one
government position, and it is forbidden for them to hold any
additional post in institutions of which all or a part of the
capital belongs to the government or to public institutions,
to be a member of the National Consultative Assembly, to
practice the profession of attorney or legal adviser, or to
be the president, managing director, or a member of the board
of directors of any private company, with the exception of
cooperative companies affiliated with government offices and
institutions
.
Educational positions in universities and research estab-
lishments are excepted from this rule.
In time of necessity, the Prime Minister may temporarily
assume responsibility for certain ministries.
ARTICLE 142
The financial holdings of the leader or members of the
Leadership Council, the Prime Minister, the President of the
Republic, and ministers, as well as their spouses and off-
spring, are to be examined before and after their term of
office by the Supreme Court, in order to ensure they have not
increased in a fashion contrary to law.
SECTION THREE
THE ARMY AND THE CORPS OF GUARDS OF THE REVOLUTIONS
ARTICLE 14 3
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of
guarding the independence and territorial integrity of the




The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic
army, i.e., Islamic in its ideological inspiration and popular
[in its orientation] , and accept into its service individuals
who believe in the aims of the Islamic Revolution and are ready
to devote themselves to the achievement of those aims.
ARTICLE 14 5
No foreigner will be accepted into the Army or security
forces of the country.
ARTICLE 14 6
The establishment of any kind of foreign military base
in Iran, even for peaceful purposes, is forbidden.
ARTICLE 14 7
In time of peace, the government must utilize the personnel
and technical equipment of the Army in relief operations, edu-
cational and productive enterprises, and the Reconstruction
Jihad, while fully observing Islamic criteria and ensuring




All forms of personal use of military vehicles and equipment,
as well as personal use of Army personnel as servants and
chauffeurs or in similar capacities, are forbidden.
ARTICLE 149
Promotion and the withdrawal of military rank take place
in accordance with law.
ARTICLE 150
The Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution, established
in the early days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be
maintained in order that it may continue in its role of guard-
ing the Revolution and its achievements. The duties of this
Corps, together with its areas of responsibility, in relation
to the duties and areas of responsibility of the other armed
forces, are to be determined by law, with emphasis on brotherly
cooperation and harmony among them.
ARTICLE 151
In accordance with the noble Qur ' anic verse "Prepare against
them whatever force you are able to muster, and horses ready
for battle, striking fear into God's enemy and your enemy, and
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others beyond them unknown to you but known to God" (8:60),
the government has the responsibility of providing a program
of military training, together with all requisite facilities,
for all of its citizens, in accordance with Islamic criteria,
in such a way that all citizens will always be able to engage
in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
possession of arms, however, requires the granting of permis-







The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is
based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, the pre-
servation of the complete independence and territorial integ-
rity of the country, the defense of the rights of all Muslims,
non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers, and
the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-
belligerent states.
ARTICLE 153
Any form of agreement resulting in foreign domination
over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the
country, as well as other aspects of the national life, is
forbidden.
ARTICLE 154
The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human happi-
ness throughout human society, and considers the attainment of
independence, freedom, and just government to be the right of
all peoples in the world. While scrupulously refraining from
all forms of aggressive intervention in the internal affairs
of other nations, it therefore protects the just struggles
of the oppressed and deprived in every corner of the globe.
ARTICLE 155
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran may grant
political asylum to those who seek it unless they are regarded






The judiciary is an independent power, the protector of
the rights of the individual and society, responsible for the
implementation of justice, and entrusted with the following
duties:
a. investigating and passing judgment on grievances, viola-
tions of rights, and complaints; the resolving of litigation;
the settling of enmities; and the taking of all necessary
decisions and measures in probate matters as the law may
determine;
b. restoring public rights and promoting justice and legiti-
mate freedoms;
c. supervising the correct enforcement of laws;
d. uncovering crimes; prosecuting, punishing, and chastising
criminals; and enacting the penalties and provisions of the
Islamic penal code;
e. taking suitable measures to prevent the occurrence of
crime and to reform criminals.
ARTICLE 157
In order to fulfill the responsibilities of the judiciary,
council to be known as the Supreme Judicial Council will be
established, which will be the highest judicial body and en-
trusted with the following responsibilities:
a. establishing the necessary procedures in the Ministry of
Justice to fulfill the responsibilities specified in Article
156;
b. preparing bills on judicial matters appropriate to [the
form of government of] the Islamic Republic;
c. employing just and worthy judges, dismissing and appoint-
ing them, changing their place of service, assigning them
particular functions, promoting them, and carrying out similar
administrative duties, in accordance with the law.
ARTICLE 158
The Supreme Judicial Council is to consist of five members:
a. the head of the Supreme Court;
b. the Prosecutor-General;
c. three judtes of proven justice and possessing the quality
of mujtahid, to be chosen by all the judges of the country.
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The members of this council shall be chosen in the manner
to be prescribed by law, for a period of five years, and
there is no objection to their being reelected. The qualifi-
cations for candidates and electors will be specified by law.
ARTICLE 159
The Ministry of Justice is the official body to which all
grievances and complaints are to be referred. The formation
of courts and the definition of their competences is to be
determined by law.
ARTICLE 160
The Minister of Justice has the responsibility for all
matters concerning the relationship between the judiciary,
on the one hand, and the executive and legislative, on the
other hand. He will be chosen from among the individuals
proposed to the Prime Minister by the Supreme Judicial Council.
ARTICLE 161
The Supreme Court is to be formed for the purpose of
supervising the correct implementation of the laws, ensuring
uniformity of judicial procedure, and fulfilling any other
responsibilities assigned to it by law, on the basis of regula-
tions to be established by the Supreme Judicial Council.
ARTICLE 162
The head of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General
must both be just mujtahids well versed in judicial matters.
They will be nominated by the leadership for a period of five
years, in consultation with the Supreme Judicial Council.
ARTICLE 16 3
The attributes and qualifications of judge will be deter-
mined by law, in accordance with the criteria of figh.
ARTICLE 16 4
A judge cannot be removed from the post he occupies except
by trial and the establishment of guilt, or inconsequence of
a violation entailing his separation, whether temporarily or
permanently. A judge's place of service or post cannot be
changed without his consent, unless the interest of society
determines otherwise, in accordance with a unanimous vote of
the members of the Supreme Judicial Council. The periodic
transfer and rotation of judges will be in accordance with




Trials are to be held openly and members of the public may
freely attend, unless the court determines that an open trial
would be contrary to public morality or order, or, in the
case of private disputes, both parties request that the hear-
ings should not be open.
ARTICLE 166
The verdicts of courts must be accompanied by proofs and
include mention of the articles, law, and principles in
accordance with which they are delivered.
ARTICLE 167
The judge must attempt to find a basis for judgment for
every case in the codified laws of the land. If he is unable
to do so, he will issue a verdict based on reference to reputa-
ble Islamic sources or fatvas. He cannot refrain from examin-
ing cases and delivering a verdict on the pretext of silence,
deficiency, brevity, or contradiction in the law.
ARTICLE 168
Political and press offenses will be tried openly and in
the presence of a jury, in courts attached to the Ministry of
Justice. The manner of selection, qualifications, and powers
of the jury, as well as the definition of political offenses,
will be established by law in accordance with Islamic criteria,
ARTICLE 169
No act or omission may be regarded as a crime on the basis
of a law established subsequent to it.
ARTICLE 17
Judges of courts are obliged to refrain from executing
statutes and protocols of the government that are in conflict
with the laws or the provisions of Islam, or lie outside the
competence of the executive power. Anyone has the right to
demand the voiding of any such regulation from the Court of
Administrative Justice.
ARTICLE 171
If an individual suffers moral or material harm as the
result of a failure or error of the judge with respect to the
subject matter of a case, the verdict delivered, or the imple-
mentation of the verdict, the judge must stand surety for the
reparation of that harm in accordance with Islamic criteria,
if it be a case of failure. Otherwise, losses will be compen-
sated for by the state. In all cases, the repute and good




Military courts will be established by law to investigate
crimes committed in connection with their military or security
duties by members of the Army, the gendarmerie, the police,
and the Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution. They will
be tried in common courts, however, for common crimes or crimes
committed while implementing the directives of the Ministry
of Justice. The office of military prosecutor and the military
courts form part of the judiciary and are subject to the same
principles that regulate the [entire] judiciary.
ARTICLE 173
In order to investigate the complaints, grievances, and
objections of the people with respect to government officials,
organs, and statutes, a court will be established to be known
as the Court of Administrative Justice. The jurisdiction,




Based on the right of the judiciary to supervise the proper
functioning of affairs and the correct implementation of laws
by the administrative organs of the government, an organiza-
tion will be established under the supervision of the Supreme
Judicial Council to be known as the National General Inspec-







The free diffusion of information and views, in accordance
with Islamic criteria, must be assured in the mass media (radio
and television) . The media are to be administered under the
joint supervision of the three powers—the judiciary (Supreme
Judicial Council), the legislative, and the executive—in a
manner to be determined by law.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, drawn
up in twelve chapters containing one hundred seventy-five
articles and approved by a two-thirds majority of all members
of the Assembly convened to subject the Constitution to
definitive review, was definitively approved on the twenty-
fourth day of Aban in the year 1358 of the solar Islamic
calendar, corresponding to the twenty-fourth day of Dhilhijja






THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 1
PART ONE
THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
ARTICLE 1
Iraq is a Soveriegn People's Democratic Republic: its
principal aim is to achieve the United Arab State and establish
the Socialist System.
ARTICLE 2
The People is the source of authority and its legitimacy.
ARTICLE 3
(a) Sovereignty of Iraq is an indivisible unit.
(b) The land of Iraq is an indivisible unit and no part of it
shall be relinquished.
ARTICLE 4
Islam is the religion of the State.
ARTICLE 5
(a) Iraq is part of the Arba Nation.
(b) The People of Iraq is formed of two principal nationali-
ties, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This
Constitution shall recognize the national rights of the Kurdish
People and the legitimate rights of all minorities within the
unity of Iraq.
ARTICLE 6
The Iraqi nationality and its rulings shall be determined
by the law.
"'"Including the amendments of 1973 and 1974 (Official trans-
lation) . Minor alterations in style and usage, in this and




(a) Arabic is the official language.
(b) The Kurdish language, in addition to the Arabic language,
shall be the official language in the Kurdish Region.
ARTICLE 8
(a) Baghdad is the Capital of the Republic of Iraq, and it
may be shifted by a law.
(b) The Republic of Iraq shall be divided into administra-
tive units which shall be organized on the basis of decen-
tralization.
(c) The area whose majority of population is from Kurds shall
enjoy autonomy in accordance with what is defined by the law.
ARTICLE 9
The Flag and the Emblem of the Republic of Iraq and the
rules pertaining to them shall be specified by a law.
PART TWO
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASES OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
ARTICLE 10
Social solidarity is the foremost foundation for society.
Its implication is that every citizen shall perform fully his
duty towards society and that society shall ensure to the
citizen his full rights and freedoms.
ARTICLE 11
The family is the nucleus of society. The State shall
guarantee its protection and support, and shall foster maternity
and childhood.
ARTICLE 12
The State shall undertake planning, directing and guiding
the national economy in accordance with the following aims:
(a) Establishing the socialist system on scientific and
revolutionary principles.
(b) Achieving Arab economic unity.
ARTICLE 13
National resources and fundamental instruments of produc-
tion are the property of the People, and the central authority
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of the Republic of Iraq shall employ them directly in accord-
ance with the requirements of the general planning of the
national economy.
ARTICLE 14
The State shall ensure, promote and support all kinds of
cooperation in production, distribution and consumption.
ARTICLE 15
Public properties and the properties of the public sector
shall have special inviolability, which the State and all
citizens have to maintain and guarantee their security and
protection. Any subversion or attack on the structure of
society and a violence to it.
ARTICLE 16
(a) Ownership is a social function which shall be exercised
within the limits of society's aims and the State's programmes
in accordance with the provisions of the law.
(b) Private ownership and individual economic freedom shall
be guaranteed within the limits of the law provided that indi-
vidual ownership will not contradict or be detrimental to
general economic planning.
(c) Private property shall not be expropriated except for
the public interest and in accordance with just compensation
in accordance with the provisions of the law.
(d) The maximum agricultural ownership shall be defined by
the law and the excess shall be regarded as the property of
the People.
ARTICLE 17
Inheritance is a recognized right regulated by a law.
ARTICLE IS
Real estate ownership is forbidden to non-Iraqis except
in cases specified by a law.
PART THREE
BASIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES
ARTICLE 19
(a) All citizens are equal before the law, without distinc-
tion on the basis of race, origin, language, class or religion
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(b) Equal opportunities for all citizens shall be guaranteed
within the limits of the law.
ARTICLE 2
(a) The accused is innocent until he is declared guilty by
judicial procedure.
(b) The right to defense is sacred in all processes of inves-
tigation and trial in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
(c) All trials shall be open to the public unless declared
in camera.
ARTICLE 21
(a) Penalty is personal.
(b) There shall be no offense or penalty except as defined by
a law. No penalty shall be imposed except on an act deemed
by the law as an offense at the time of its commission. No
more severe penalty than the penalty enforced at the time of
committing the offense shall be applied.
ARTICLE 2 2
(a) The dignity of Man is guaranteed. Any kind of physical
or psychological torture shall be prohibited.
(b) No one may be arrested, detained, imprisoned or searched
except in accordance with the provisions of the law.
(c) Homes are inviolable. They may not be entered or searched
except as specified by the law.
ARTICLE 2 3
Privacy of mail, telegraphic and telephone correspondence
shall be guaranteed, and it shall not be violated except for
reasons of public security in accordance with the limits and
the rules provided by the law.
ARTICLE 2 4
No citizen shall be prevented from travel outside the
country or from returning thereto and no restriction shall be
imposed on his moving and residence inside the country except
in the cases defined by the law.
ARTICLE 2 5
Freedom of religion, beliefs and exercise of religious
ceremonies shall be guaranteed, provided that this freedom
shall neither contradict the provisions of the Constitution




The Constitution shall guarantee freedom of opinion, publi-
cation, meeting, demonstration, forming of political parties,
unions and societies in accordance with the aims of the Con-
stitution and within the limits of the law. The State shall
endeavor to provide the means required for exercising these
freedoms, which run in line with the nationalist and pro-
gressive line of the Revolution.
ARTICLE 2 7
(a) The State shall undertake to eliminate illiteracy and
ensure the right of free-of -charge education in various ele-
mentary, secondary and university levels to all citizens.
(b) The State shall endeavor to make elementary education com-
pulsory, expand vocational and technical education in all
towns and villages and particularly promote evening education
which enables the popular masses to correlte knowledge between
science and labor.
(c) The State shall guarantee freedom of scientific research,
promote and reward distinction and creativity in all intellec-
tual, scientific and technical activities and all kinds of
popular genius.
ARTICLE 2 8
Education shall aim at raising and developing the general
cultural level, developing the scientific thinking, encourag-
ing the spirit of research, fulfilling the requirements of
economic and social development programmes, creating a free
nationalist and progressive generation solid in structure and
character, which takes pride in its peopoe, its homeland and
its legacy, sympathizes with the rights of all its nationali-
ties and opposes the doctrines of capitalism, exploitation,
reaction, Zionism and colonialism in order to achieve Arab
unity, freedom and socialism.
ARTICLE 2 9
The State shall endeavor to provide the means of enjoying
the achievements of modern civilization for the masses of the
people and generalize the progressive outputs of modern civi-
lization to all citizens.
ARTICLE 3
(a) Public office is a sacred trust and a social service,
whose principal attribute is a loyal obligation to protect
the interests of the masses, their rights and freedoms in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the law,
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(b) Equality of employment in public office shall be guar-
anteed by the law.
ARTICLE 31
(a) Defense of the homeland is a sacred duty and an honor be-
stowed to the citizen. Service to the Flag is compulsory and
the law shall organize the manner of its performance.
(b) The Armed Forces are the property of the people, and they
are the People's tool for preserving its security, defending
its independence, protecting the people's and the homeland's
safety and unity and achieving its national and patriotic aims
and aspirations.
(c) The State alone shall undertake to establish Armed Forces,
and no body or group shall be entitled to establish military
or para-military formations.
ARTICLE 3 2
(a) Work is a right which the State shall undertake to pro-
vide to every citizen capable of it.
(b) Work is an honor and a sacred duty imposed on every
capable citizen. It is required by the necessity of partici-
pation in building society and its protection, development
and prosperity.
(c) The State shall undertake to improve conditions of work
and promote standards of living, expertise and culture for
all working citizens.
(d) The State shall undertake to provide wider social ensur-
ances for all citizens in case of sickness, disability, unem-
ployment and old age.
(e) The State shall endeavor to organize the programme and
ensure the necessary means which enable working citizens to
spend their leaves in an atmosphere that helps them to improve




The State shall undertake to protect public health through
continuous expansion of free-of-charge medical services, whether
by prevention, treatment or medicine, in all cities, towns
and villages.
ARTICLE 3 4
(a) The Republic of Iraq shall grant political asylum to all
persons persecuted in their countries because of their struggle
in the defense of human liberation principles, which the Iraqi
People has accepted under this Constitution.




Payment of taxes is a duty imposed on all citizens. Taxes
may not be imposed, amended or levied except by a law.
ARTICLE 3 6
Any activity which contradicts the aims of the people de-
fined in this Constitution and any act of conduct aiming at
undermining the national unity of the masses of the people,
provoking racial or sectarian or regional bigotry among their
ranks, or violating their progressive gains and achievements,
shall be prohibited.
PART FOUR
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
CHAPTER ONE
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL
ARTICLE 3 7
The Revolutionary Command Council is the supreme body in
the State, which has undertaken since the 17th of July, 1968,
the responsibility of achieving the people's public will by
stripping power from the reactionary, dictatorial, corrupt
system and restoring it to the people.
ARTICLE 3 3
The Revolutionary Command Council shall exercise, by a
majority of two thirds of its members, the following powers:
(a) Elect the Chairman from among its members who shall be
designated as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council
and President of the Republic.
(b) Elect the Vice Chairman from among its members who shall
be designated as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command
Council and take the place of the Chairman in case of his
official absence or his exercise of his constitutional powers
becomes difficult or impossible for any legal reason.
(c) Select new members to the Council from among the Regional
Command of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, provided that its
members shall not exceed twelve.
(d) Accept the resignation of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman
or any of the Council's members.
(e) Release any of its members from membership of the Council.
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(f) Charge and send to trial any members of the Revolutionary
Command Council, or any deputy of the President of the Repub-'
lie or any Ministers.
ARTICLE 3 9
The Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the Members of the
Revolutionary Command Council shall take the following oath
before the Council:
I swear by Almighty God, by my honour and
belief to preserve the Republican Regime and
abide by its Constitution and laws, protect
the people's interests, safeguard the home-
land's independence and safety and integrity
of its lands and endeavor with full sacrifice
and loyalty to fulfill the Arab Nation's aims
of unity, freedom and socialism.
ARTICLE 40
The Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the Members of the
Revolutionary Command Council shall enjoy full immunity and
no measure may be taken against anyone of them except by
prior permission from the Council.
ARTICLE 41
(a) The Revolutionary Command Council shall convene at the
invitation of its Chairman or Vice Chairman or one third of
its members. Its sessions shall be convened under the presi-
dency of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman and the presence
of the majority of its members.
(b) Meetings and discussions of the Revolutionary Command
Council are in camera; their disclosure shall be subject to
constitutional inquiry before the Council. Announcement, pub-
lication and notification of the decisions of the Council
shall be performed by the manners provided in this Constitution
(c) Laws and resolutions shall be approved in the Council by
the majority of its members, except in the cases otherwise
provided in this Constitution.
ARTICLE 4 2
The Revolutionary Command Council shall exercise the
following powers:
(a) Promulgate laws and decrees which have the power of the
law.
(b) Issue decrees required by the necessities of applying the




The Revolutionary Command Council shall exercise, by the
majority of its members, the following powers:
(a) Approve recommendations of the Ministry of Defense and
public security, initiate laws and adopt resolutions concern-
ing them in respect to organization and jurisdictions.
(b) Declare general mobilization partially or fully, declare
war, accept armistice and conclude peace.
(c) Approve the draft of the general budget of the State and
the independent and investment budgets annexed thereto and
the credit of the final accounts.
(d) Ratify international treaties and agreements.
(e) Provide the internal regulations of the Council, define
its cadre, approve its budget, appoint its officials and specify
remunerations and allowances of the Chairman, the Vice Chair-
man, the members and the officials.
(f) Lay down the rules for the trial of its members and
setting up the court and the procedures which must be followed.
(g) Authorize its Chairman or the Vice Chairman to exercise
some of its powers provided in this Constitution except legis-
lative powers.
ARTICLE 44
The Chairman of the Revolutionary CommandCouncil shall
undertake the following:
(a) Preside over the meetings of the Council, represent it,
conduct its sessions and order expenditure therein.
(b) Sign all laws and resolutions promulgated by the Council
and their publication in the Official Gazette.
(c) Supervise the works of the Ministers and Institutions of
the State, call the Ministers for conferring on the affairs
of their Ministries, interrogate them when necessary and in-
form the Revolutionary Command Council thereof.
ARTICLE 4 5
Each of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and Members of the
Revolutionary Command Council shall be responsible before the
Council for violating the Constitution, for violating the
obligations of the Constitutional oath or for any act or con-
duct which the Council deems as detrimental to the honor of
responsibility which he exercises.
AFTICLE 4 6
A Higher Financial Comptrolling Authority shall be estab-
lised and attached to the Revolutionary Command Council. Its






The National Assembly sha-1 consist of the representatives
of the people in all its political, economic and social sec-
tors. Its formation, manner of membership, process of work
in it and its powers shall be defined by a special law, namely,
the National Assembly Law.
ARTICLE 4 8
The National Assembly must meet in two ordinary sessions
each year. The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council
is entitled to call the Assembly for an extra-ordinary meeting
whenever required, and the meeting shall be confined to the
subjects for which it is called. Sessions of the National
Assembly shall be convened and concluded by a resolution issued
by the Revolutionary Command Council.
ARTICLE 4 9
Sessions of the Assembly shall be conducted publicly unless
it is decided to convene some of them in camera in accordance
with the provisions of its law.
ARTICLE 50
(a) Members of the National Assembly may not be questioned
over the opinions and suggestions they introduce during their
exercise of the tasks of their posts.
(b) None of the members of the Assembly may be pursued or
arrested for an offense committed during the meetings without
obtaining the Assembly's permission, except in case of being
held in the act of crime.
ARTICLE 51
The National Assembly shall undertake to:
(a) Lay down its internal regulations, specify its cadre,
approve its budget and appoint its personnel. Remunerations
and allowances of its President and Members shall be defined
by a law.
(b) Provide the rules for charging and trying its members in





The National Assembly shall consider the draft laws pro-
posed by the Revolutionary Command Council within a period of
fifteen days from the date of their arrival to the bureau of
the National Assembly's Presidency. If the Assembly approves
the draft, it shall be submitted to the President of the Repub-
lic, to promulgate it. But if the National Assembly rejected
or amended it, it shall be returned to the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council. If the amendment were approved by the Revolu-
tionary Command Council, it shall be submitted to the President
to promulgate it. But if the Revolutionary Command Council
insists on its opinion in the second reading, the draft shall
be returned to the National Assembly to be presented in a
joint sitting of the Council and the Assembly. The decision




The National Assembly shall consider, within a period of
fifteen days, the draft Laws forwarded to it by the President
of the Republic. If the Assembly rejects the draft, it shall
be returned to the President of the Republic with the state-
ment of the reasons of rejection. But if the Assembly accepts
the draft, then it shall be submitted to the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council and if it approves the draft, then it shall be
liable for promulgation. But if the National Assembly amends
the draft, then it shall be submitted to the Revolutionary
Command Council, and if it approves the draft, it shall be
liable for promulgation. But if the Revolutionary Command
Council rejects the amendment or makes another amendment, it
shall be returned again to the National Assembly within one
week. If the National Assembly adopts the opinion of the Revo-
lutionary Command Council, the draft shall be submitted to
the President of the Republic for promulgation. But if the
National Assembly insists, in the second reading, on its
opinion, then a joint sitting of the Council and the Assembly
shall be held, and the draft adopted by the majority of two
thirds shall be considered as final, and it shall be submitted
to the President of the Republic for promulgation.
ARTICLE 54
The National Assembly shall consider draft laws presented
by one quarter of its members in affairs other than military
matters and public security affairs.
If the Asembly approves the draft law, it shall be submitted
to the Revolutionary Command Council to consider it within
fifteen days from the date of its arrival to the Council's Bureau
If it is approved by the Revolutionary Command Council, it




But if the Revolutionary Command Council rejects or amends
it, the draft shall be returned to the National Assembly. If
the latter insists on its opinion, in the second reading, a
joint session of the Council and the Assembly shall be con-
vened under the presidency of the Chairman of the Revolutionary
Command Council or his Deputy. The draft issued by the majority
of two thirds shall be considered as final and shall be sub-
mitted to the President of the Republic for promulgation.
ARTICLE 5 5
(a) Deputies of the President of the Republic and the Minis-
ters and those who are in ranks similar to them shall be en-
titled to attend the meetings of the National Assembly and
participate in discussions.
(b) The National Assembly may, after the approval of the
President of the Republic, call the Ministers in order to make
an enquiry or explanation.
ARTICLE 5 6
The President of the National Assembly and every member in
it are held responsible before the Assembly for violating the
Constitution, perjuring the obligations of the Constitutional
oath or for any act or conduct the National Assembly deems as
detrimental to the honor of responsibility he exercises.
CHAPTER THREE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
ARTICLE 57
(a) The President of the Republic is the President of the
State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He shall
undertake the executive power directly or through the Council
of Ministers.
(b) The President of the Republic shall promulgate the necessary




The President of the Republic shall directly exercise the
following powers:
(a) Preserve the independence of the country and integrity
of its lands, protect is interior and exterior security and
protect the rights and freedom of citizens.
(b) Supervise the application of the Constitution, laws, reso-
lutions, judicial decisions and development projects in all
parts of the Republic of Iraq.
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(c) Appoint Deputies for the President of the Republic and
release them from their posts.
(d) Appoint the Ministers and release them from their posts.
(e) Appoint civil and religious judges and civil and mili-
tary officials of the State, and terminate their services in
accordance with the law.
(f) Appoint and accredit Iraqi diplomatic representatives
in the Arab and foreign countries, and in international con-
ferneces and organizations.
(g) Grant military ranks and medals in accordance with the
law.
(h) Hold negotiations and conclude international agreements
and treaties.
(i) Accept diplomatic and international representatives and
demand their withdrawal.
(j) Approve capital punishments and issue special amnesty.
(k) Direct the control of the work of the Ministries and
general institutions and coordinate them.
ARTICLE 5 9
Deputies of the President of the Republic and the Minis-
ters shall be held responsible before the President of the
REpublic for their works, and he is entitled to refer any
one of them to trial, in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution, for functional errors committed, for taking
advantage of, or abusive use of, his powers.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
ARTICLE 60
(a) The Council of Ministers shall consist of the Ministers
and be presided over by the President of the Republic.
(b) The President of the Republic shall call the Council of
Ministers to meet and conduct its meetings.
ARTICLE 61
The Council of Ministers shall exercise the following powers
(a) Initiate draft laws and refer them to the proper legisla-
tive authority.
(b) Issue administrative regulations and decisions in accord-
ance with the law.
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(c) Appoint civil officials of the State and promote them,
in accordance with the law.
(d) Submit the general plan of the State.
(e) Submit the general budget of the State and the budgets
annexed to it.
(f) Conclude and grant loans, and supervise organizing and
administering currency.
(g) Declare a full or partial emergency and terminate it in
accordance with the law.






(a) The Judiciary is independent and no power shall be exer-
cised over it except the law.
(b) The right to litigation shall be guaranteed to all citizens
(c) The law shall define the manner of courts formation, their
grades, jurisdictions, stipulations for appointing civil and
religious judges, transferring and promoting them, litigating
and retiring them.
ARTICLE 6 3
The law shall define the posts of the Public Prosecution,
its stipulations for appointing Public Prosecutors and their
deputies and the rules for transferring and promoting them,




(a) No one shall be member of the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil and no one shall be deputy to the President of the Republic
or Minister except whoever is Iraqi by birth and from Iraqi
parents by birth also.
(b) Members of the Revolutionary Command Council, deputies to
the President of the Republic and the Ministers shall not
exercise a free profession or a commercial business, or purchase
from the state properties, sell to the State some of their




(a) The provisions of this Constitution shall remain in
force until the Permanent Constitution is promulgated.
(b) This Constitution shall not be amended except by the
Revolutionary Command Council by a majority of two thirds
of its members.
ARTICLE 6 6
(a) Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall
come into force from the date of their publication except
otherwise provided therein.
(b) Laws shall have no retroactive effect except if other-
wise provided therein and this exclusion shall not include
Criminal Laws and laws of taxes and financial dues.
ARTICLE 67
This Interim Constitution, the laws and judicial decisions
shall be promulgated and executed in the name of the people.
ARTICLE 6 8
All laws and resolutions of the Revolutionary Command
Council enforced prior to the promulgation of this Constitu-
tion shall remain in force and they may not be amended or
abrogated except through the manner provided in this
Constitution.
ARTICLE 6 9
The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council shall
undertake the promulgation of this Constitution and its pub-
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